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Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants

James W. Ellis*
Ruth A. Luckasson**

Defendants who are mentally retarded present difficult doctrinal
and practical issues for the criminal justice system. Given the frequency with which these issues arise, it is surprising that they
have received so little systematic attention from courts and commentators.' At the practical level, mentally retarded defendants
often go unrecognized, 2 and therefore the difficult issues which
may be present are overlooked. When the doctrinal issues are dis* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. A.B. 1968, Occidental College;
J.D. 1974, University of California at Berkeley. Professor Ellis served as Law Reporter for Part VII of the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards on Commitment of Nonresponsibility Acquittees.
** Assistant Professor and Presidential Lecturer in Special Education, University of New Mexico. B.S. 1974; M.A. 1977; J.D. 1980, University of New Mexico. Professor Luckasson was a member of the ABA Standards Task Force on Competence to
Stand Trial and Competence on Other Issues [Parts IV and V of the Criminal Justice
Mental Health Standards].
The authors wish to express their deep gratitude to Penni Adrian, Don Bruckner,
Patti Williams, and Bonnie Stepleton, law students at the University of New Mexico,
and Caroline Everington, doctoral student in special education at the University of
New Mexico, for their assistance in researching this Article.
1. During the eugenics scare in the early decades of this century, retarded defendants received substantial - indeed inordinate - attention. See infra Part Im. In
the last fifty years, however, interest in retarded defendants appears to have subsided
dramatically. But see Mickenberg, Competency to Stand Trial and the Mentally Retarded Defendant The Need for a Multi-DisciplinarySolution to a Multi-Disciplinary Problem, 17 CAL. W.L. REv. 365 (1981); Comment, The Mentally Retarded
Offender in Omaha-Douglas County, 8 CREIGHTON L. REv. 622 (1975); Person, The
Accused Retardate, 4 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 239 (1972); Pieski, Subnormal
Mentality As a Defense in the CriminalLaw, 15 VAND. L. REV. 769 (1962).
2. See generally Allen, The Retarded Offender: Unrecognizedin Court and Untreated in Prison, 32 FED. PROBATION 22 (Sept. 1968). See infra Part II (discussion of
the reasons mentally retarded defendants go unrecognized).
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cussed, it is frequently in the context of defendants who are mentally ill, and the differences between mental illness and mental
retardation are ignored. The legal rules appropriate for mentally
retarded defendants have become, at best, an afterthought to the
fervent battles involving criminal defendants who are mentally
ill.3

In a sense, the problems posed by mental retardation were also
an afterthought in the promulgation of the new ABA Criminal
Justice Mental Health Standards.4 From the beginning they were
entitled "Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards. '5 Although
numerous mental health professionals served on the various interdisciplinary task forces from the outset, 6 mental retardation professionals were appointed only after the first year. Moreover,
while the final version of the Mental Health Standards explicitly
discusses mentally
retarded defendants, previous drafts did so
7
inconsistently.
However, the early omission of issues related to mental retardation was remedied and the final Mental Health Standards repre3. Many of the most authoritative and helpful studies and treatises on mental
disability and the criminal law make little or no mention of mental retardation. See,
e.g., H. STEADmAN, BEATING A RAP?: DEFENDANTS FouND INcomPETENT TO STAND
TRIAL (1979); R. RoEscH & S. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL (1980);
A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INsANITY DEFENSE (1967); S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DiLEIMMAS OF CRIME (1971); H. FINGARE=IE & A. HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND
CRMINAL RESPONSIBLITY (1979); MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES
FROi LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (J. Monahan & H. Steadman eds. 1983).
4. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS (1984) [hereinafter
cited as MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-x.y]. The ABA House of Delegates formally
adopted the Mental Health Standzrds as chapter seven of the ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRImINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 1980) on August 7, 1984. Nevertheless, when considering

each chapter of the ABA Standardsfor Criminal Justice, the House of Delegates
votes only upon the black letter standards. Therefore, the commentary accompanying
the Mental Health Standards does not represent ABA policy; its purpose is to assist
practitioners by explaining the MentalHealth Standards'underlying legal and mental
health rationales. All citations to the commentary are to the August 1984 edition of
the Mental Health Standards submitted to the House of Delegates. Some minor
changes should be expected in the final commentary, which will appear in the ABA
Standardsfor Criminal Justice, because the Standing Committee on Association
Standards for Criminal Justice is presently updating the commentary.
5. Emphasis added. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1st Tent.
Draft 1983) [hereinafter cited as FIRST TENTATIVE DRAFT]. "Mental health" is inappropriate as an umbrella term because people with mental retardation are not ill. See
infra note 52. A more encompassing and accurate title would be "Mental Disability
Standards." The term "disability" is now used to describe both mental illness and
mental retardation. See generally THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (S. Brakel
& R. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971). The ABA's own journal in the field is similarly entitled
the Mental and PhysicalDisability Law Reporter.
6. Although some psychiatrists and a somewhat larger number of psychologists
work with people who are mentally retarded, most members of these professions have
no experience and little training in the area of retardation. See infr parts VI & VII
(discussion of mental retardation professionals).
7. See generallyFIRST TENTATIVE DRAFT.
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sent one of the first comprehensive, albeit imperfect, attempts to
address the problems of retarded defendants.8 They provide a useful vehicle for analyzing the current state of the law regarding the
impact of mental retardation on both procedural and substantive
issues that the criminal courts must address.
This Article attempts to provide a preliminary overview of the
issues in the Mental Health Standardsas they relate to defendants
with mental retardation. Part I reviews the history of the treatment of retarded defendants in the criminal justice system. Part
II describes the characteristics of people with mental retardation
and the consequences of those characteristics. Part III then discusses the extent to which mental retardation should be exculpatory of criminal responsibility. Part IV analyzes the critical
importance of competence issues to mentally retarded defendants.
Part V elaborates upon dispositional issues including civil commitment and sentencing. Parts VI and VII discuss the role of mental
retardation professionals in the criminal justice system. Part VIII
concludes with a discussion of specialized training for participants
in the criminal justice system in mental retardation.

I.

History of Attitudes Toward

Mentally Retarded Defendants
The distinction between mental illness and mental retardation has
been long recognized, although inconsistently applied, in AngloAmerican law. Observations about the difference between
"idiots" and "lunatics" can be traced back to at least the thirteenth
century, although the legal distinction originally was applied in
property law rather than criminal cases. 9 Three centuries later,
Fitzherbert10 provided a definition and a loosely structured test to
determine whether an individual was an "idiot":
[An idiot is] a person who cannot account or number twenty
pence, nor can tell who was his father or mother, nor how old he
is, etc., so as it may appear he hath no understanding of reason
what shall be for his profit, or what for his loss. But if he have
such understanding that he know and understand his letters,
and do read by teaching of another man, then it seems he is not
a sot or natural fool.1 1
8. Cf. MODEL DEVELOPmENTALLY DISABLED OFFENDER AcT [hereinafter cited as
MODEL DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED OFFENDER AcT], reprintedin DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW: STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 722-79 (B. Sales, D. Powell, R. Van
Duzend et al. eds. 1982). This was one of several earlier model statutes prepared for
the ABA Commission on the Mentally Disabled. Unlike the ABA Standardsfor
CriminalJustice,the model acts were not presented to the ABA House of Delegates
and do not represent official ABA policy.
9. Comment, Lunacy and Idiocy - The Old Law and its Incubus, 18 U. Cm. L.
REV. 361, 362 (1951). A lunatic is "congenitally insane" and thus potentially treatable
- unlike an idiot, who is born "mentally deficient or disturbed." Id
10. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 544-45 (4th ed. reprinted
1966) (discussing Fitzherbert and his work).
11. S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 128 (1925) (quoting A.
FITZHERBERT, NATURA BREVIUM (1534)). The test has been described as a "crude but
by no means ridiculous form of intelligence test." 1 N. WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY
VOL.
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This test became popularized almost immediately as the
"counting-twenty-pence test," and is cited, with some variations,
2
by numerous early authorities.'
The early definitions commonly required that idiocy be both
congenital and permanent. 13 In this, and in their focus on both
intellectual impairment and its impact on functional ability, the
early definitions are not wholly dissimilar from modern definitions of mental retardation. 14
The perceived immutability of idiocy fostered a defense to criminal prosecution which some believed to be superior to the defense
available to mentally ill defendants. 15 The relative liberality of
the defense of idiocy may also have been related to the accepted
analogy between the presumed incapacity of children and mentally retarded adults to form criminal intent.16 People also may
have perceived mentally retarded individuals as less dangerous to
others than mentally ill persons.17
This situation did not survive into the current century. People
came to view mentally retarded individuals as a threat to society,
and a principal source of criminal and immoral behavior.'8 A
IN ENGLAND: THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 36 (1968); J. BRYDALL, NON COMPOS
MENTIS: OR, THE LAw RELATING TO NATURAL FOOLS, MAD-FOLKS, AND LUNATICK
PERSONS 8 (1700).

12. Glueck suggested that users of Fitzherbert's formulation improperly focused
only on the first part of his definition and ignored the accompanying limitations. See
Glueck, supra note 11, at 128-29.
13. An early treatise quoted Lord Coke: "An idiot, who from his nativity by a
perpetual informity is non compos... ." I. RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 13 (1st ed. 1838 reprint 1962). Lord Coke elaborated- "Idiocy,
imbecility, and senile dementia admit neither of cure nor amelioration...." I&L at
227.
14. See infra text accompanying note 40.
15. The authorities were not unanimous on this point: "Ideocy being a defect
from birth is generally to be protected from punishment; but lunacy, which is a partial
derangement, the senses returning at uncertain intervals, the offender is only protected from punishment for acts done during the prevalence of the disorder ...."
A. HIGimORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IDIOCY AND LUNACY 195 (1807). Isaac Ray
was of a different view, decrying "[tihe little indulgence shown to imbecility in criminal courts," and observing that "[tjhe usual treatment of such offenders, it is to be
feared, is prompted more by prejudice and excited feelings than by enlarged views of
human nature and of the objects of criminal jurisprudence." I. RAY, supranote 13, at
78, 98. See generallyN. DAIN, CONCEPTS OF INSANITY IN THE UNITED STATES 45 (1964)
(evidence of great intellectual deficiency seemed to be enough proof of insanity);
N. WALKER, supranote 11, at 37 (defendant perceived by jury as lacking normal intelligence was acquitted on grounds of insanity).
16. See generally Woodbridge, Physicaland Mental Infancy in the CriminalLaw,
87 U. PA. L. REV. 426 (1939) (discussing the comparison of children and "feebleminded" persons-mentally retarded persons-in relation to their ability to formulate the intent necessary to be found criminally liable); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 351-53 (1972) (setting forth the common law view of
age in relation to criminal responsibility).
17. A. HIGmiORE, supra note 15, at vi (1807).
18. This focus upon the supposed criminal propensities of retarded people was
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leader in this alarmist movement, Dr. Henry Goddard, declared
that mentally retarded people constituted a "menace to society
and civilization... responsible in a large degree for many, if not
all, of our social problems."'19 Retarded people were believed to
have a congenital deficit in moral sensibility analogous to colorblindness. 20 Another influential authority of the era, Walter
Fernald, observed that "[e]very imbecile, especially the high-grade
imbecile, is a potential criminal, needing only the proper environment and opportunity for the development and expression of his
criminal tendencies." 21 Many authors recounted (or invented)
elaborate and lurid geneological "studies" 22 to illustrate the relapart of the larger pattern of discrimination that accompanied the eugenics scare of the
early twentieth century. For general discussions of the treatment of retarded people
during this period, see A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 332-86 (2d ed.
1949); S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE 9-36 (1983); R. SCHEERENBERGER, A HISTORY OF MNTAL RETARDATION 154-75,189-211 (1983); W. SLOAN &
H. STEVENS, A CENTURY OF CONCERN:

A

HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON

MENTAL DEFICIENCY 1876-1976 64-120 (1976); P. TYOR & L. BELL, CARING FOR THE
RETARDED IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (1984); W. WOLFENSBERGER, THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF OUR INSTITUTIONAL MODELS 3, 13, 34-36 (1975). The story of this nation's

treatment of mentally retarded people has been described as "grotesque" by five
members of the Supreme Court. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 105
S. Ct. 3249, 3262 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J.); id.at 3266
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, 33.).
19. Goddard, The Possibilitiesof Research as Applied to the Prevention of Feeblemindedness, PROC. OF THE NAT'L CONF. OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTIONS 307 (1915).
Goddard was a prolific writer and a respected authority in the field of mental retardation, serving as President of the American Association on Mental Deficiency. See gen-

erally H. GODDARD,

THE CRIMINAL IMBECILE: AN ANALYSIS OF THREE REMARKABLE
MURDER CASES (1915); H. GODDARD, FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS: ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (1914); H. GODDARD, THE KALLIKAK FAMILY (1912). He ultimately re-

nounced his alarmist views.

See Goddard, Feeblemindedness: A Question of

Definition, 33 J. PSYCHO-ASTHENICS 219, 223-27 (1928). For a review of Goddard's
work and an evaluation of his influence, see S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN

158-74 (1981).
20. Kerlin, Moral Imbecility, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL
OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN INST. FOR IDIOTIC AND FEEBLE-MINDED PERSONS 32-37

(1899), reprintedin 1 THE HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION: COLLECTED PAPERS
303-10 (M. Rosen, C. Clark & M. Kivitz eds. 1976). This view was consistent with the
then popular, broader theory that criminality was congenital. See S. GOULD, supra
note 19, at 122-45. See generally C. LOMBROSO, CRIME: ITS CAUSES AND REMEDIES
151-74 (H. Horton trans. 1912 reprint 1968).
21. Fernald, The Imbecile with Criminal Instincts, 14 J. PSYCHO-ASTHENICS 16
(1909), reprinted in 2 THE HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION: COLLECTED PAPERS,
supra note 20, at 165, 180. One of the original developers of intelligence tests believed
the tests should be used to identify mentally retarded individuals, whom he considered potential criminals, for lifelong segregation:
The feebleminded ... [are] by definition a burden rather than an asset,
not only economically but still more because of their tendencies to become
delinquent or criminal. To provide them with costly instruction for a few
years, and then turn them loose upon society as soon as they are ripe for
reproduction and crime, can hardly be accepted as an ultimate solution of
the problem. The only effective way to deal with the hopelessly feebleminded is by permanent custodial care.
L. TERMAN, TiE INTELLIGENCE OF SCHOOL CHILDREN 132-33 (1919).

22. For an account of the methodology in one such work, see S. GOULD, supra
note 19, at 158-74 (1981). Gould documents the discredited methodology of Goddard in
his studies including failure to test an unbiased sample, over-utilization of visual
identification and intuition of testers, and the alteration of photographs to demonstrate physical features supposedly identified with mental retardation. I&

VOL.
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tionship between mental deficiency and crime and immorality,
23
and to demonstrate the genetic origin of the disability.
The measures the alarmists thought necessary to prevent the
corrosion of society by the presumed criminality of retarded people included the sterilization of all "feeble-minded" people and
their permanent segregation from society.24 These efforts
achieved remarkable political success. 25 The link between sterilization and segregation laws and the perception of retarded people
as potential criminals appears in the language of Justice Holmes's
decision upholding the Virginia eugenic sterilization statute: "It is
better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
'26
their kind .... Three generations of imbeciles are enough.
Given the nature of the claims made by the alarmists, their recommendations included remarkably few suggestions directed at the
criminal law's treatment of the supposedly dangerous and im'27
moral "feebleminded.
Many mental retardation professionals came to reject the
23. See, e.g., R. DUGDALE, "THE JUKEs": A STUDY IN CRIME, PATiPERISM, DISEASE
AND HEREDITY 41-55 (5th ed. 1895); A. ESTABROOK, THE JUKE IN 1915 63-67 (1916);
H. GODDARD, THE KALLuAK FAMILY 18-19 (1912). These accounts were apparently
very influential, and citations to them can be found in many discussions of mental
retardation from that era. See, eg., S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRMIINAL
LAW 332 (1925). It is noteworthy that some of these very authors employed the same
methodology to demonstrate the necessity for miscegenation laws. See, e-g., A. ESTABROOK & I. McDouGLE, MONGREL VIRGINANS: THE WIN TRIE (1926).
24. P. TYOR & L. BELL, supra note 18, at 105-22.
25. Twenty-nine states enacted eugenic sterilization laws between 1907 and 1931.
See J. LANDMAN, HUMAN STERLniATION 302-03 (1932); see generally S. SMITH,M. WILKINSON & L. WAGONER, A SUMMARY OF THE LAWS OF THE SEVERAL STATES GovERNING: I,-MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE OF THE FEEBLEMINDED, THE EPILEPTIC AND THE
INSANE, II,-ASEXUALIZATION, II,-INSTITUTIONAL COMMIMENT AND DISCHARGE OF
THE FEEBLEMINDED AND THE EPILEPTIC (1914); cf Amicus Curiae Brief for the Association for Retarded Citizens et al. at 7-15, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
26. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Justice Holmes's factual assertions
about the disabilities of Carrie Buck and her daughter were in error. See Gould, Carne Buck's Daughter,NAT. HIST., July 1984, at 14, 16-18.
27. Goddard, for example, accepted that many retarded offenders would be entitled to a defense of insanity, concluding that it was
of the highest probability that persons of a mental age under twelve years,
like the normal boys or girls of the same age, do not know and cannot be
expected to know the quality of their acts. And this is sufficient, because
the law requires no more than a reasonable doubt, and there certainly is a
very reasonable doubt as to whether such persons know the quality of an
act of murder and know that it is wrong.
H. GODDARD, THE CRIMINAL IMBECILE: THE ANALYSIS OF THREE REMARKABLE CRIMINAL CASES 99 (1915). Nevertheless, Goddard believed that retarded defendants,
whether convicted or acquitted on grounds of mental disability, should be incarcerated for life, under the theory that an "imbecile" will "never recover; he will never be
free from the danger of following the suggestion of some wicked person or of yielding
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theories of the alarmists by the 1930s, 28 and some of the most influential leaders of the eugenics movement eventually recanted
their earlier views. 29 By the 1950s, authorities commonly agreed
that no significant link existed between mental retardation and
criminality. 30

The abandonment of the alarmist view led to a period of marked
decline in the attention paid to issues presented by mentally retarded criminal defendants. The next significant development
was the growing recognition in the 1960s and 1970s that the criminal justice system ill-treated retarded defendants. Sporadic proposals for reform accompanied these observations. President
Kennedy's Panel on Mental Retardation noted problems in the
areas of the insanity defense, confessions, competence to stand
trial, and disposition following conviction and acquittal.31 Other
authorities proposed a special court for retarded defendants 32 and
separate treatment following conviction. 33 The Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional the system of indefinite commitment of
retarded defendants found permanently incompetent to stand
trial.3
These events of the last two decades occurred against the backdrop of a more general movement toward fuller recognition of the
rights of retarded people in all areas of American law.35 Despite
isolated exceptions, criminal justice issues have engendered less
activity and movement toward reform than other legal problems
facing retarded people. 36 The contemporary literature remains
sparse and actual improvements in the treatment of mentally retarded defendants are difficult to detect. Although the last yesto his own inborn and uncontrolled impulses. It will never be safe for him to be at
large." Id.at 102.
One statutory response to this kind of fear was the enactment of defective delinquent and sexual psychopath statutes, aimed at both mentally ill and mentally retarded defendants. The Mental Health Standards properly call for the repeal of all
such statutes. See MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-8.1 & commentary at
447-53.
28. But see Richmond, The CriminalFeebleminded, 21 J. CRIM. L. & CRIUMINoLOGY 537, 546-51 (1931) (a strident protest at the abandonment of alarmist views).
29. See Fernald, Thirty Years Progress in the Care of the Feeble-Minded, 29 J.
PSYCHO-ASTHENICS 206, 209 (1924); Goddard, Feeblemindedness: A Question of Definition, 33 J. PSYCHO-ASTHENICS 219, 223-27 (1928).
30. See H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 385 (1954).
31. PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ON LAw 31-41 (1963).
32. Allen, Toward an Exceptional Offenders Court in MENTAL RETARDATION 3,
5-6 (Feb. 1966).

33. R. Stephens, CriminalJustice in America: An Overview, in THE RETARDED
OFFENDER 94, 124-30 (M. Santamour & P. Watson eds. 1982).
34. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
35. The rights of retarded people were greatly enhanced in education, institutional conditions, and deinstitutionalization and community placement. See generally
S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADvOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE (1983); THE MENTALLY RE-

TARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAw (M. Kindred, J. Cohen, D. Penrod & T. Shaffner eds.
1976); D. ROTHMAN & S. RoTIMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS (1984); Turnbull,
Rights for Developmentally Disabled Citizens: A Perspectivefor the 80s, 4 U. ARK.
LrrTLE ROCK L.J. 400 (1981).

36. See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
VOL.
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tiges of alarmist views about the criminality of retarded people
have not been eliminated, 37 the greater problem today is inattention and failure to identify the unique needs of retarded defendants in the criminal justice system.
II.

Characteristicsof Mentally Retarded Defendants

A. The AAMD's Definition and its Meaning
There is general agreement about the definition of mental retardation. 38 The American Association on Mental Deficiency
(AAMD), the principal professional organization in the field of
mental retardation, 39 has adopted the following definition:
"Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adap40
tive behavior and manifested during the developmental period."

37. See, e.g., United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Robb, J.,
dissenting). Judge Roger Robb remarked that the majority's decision to require scrutiny of the adequacy of a retarded defendant's guilty plea "licenses every illiterate
moron to violate the law with impunity." Id.
38. Terminology in this field is somewhat complex. "Mental retardation" is today
the accepted term in modern usage, although the archaic "mental deficiency" has not
been completely abandoned. Another common term in current usage is "developmental disabilities," a broader concept encompassing a number of handicapping conditions, including mental retardation. See, e.g., Developmentally Disabled Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1982). Previously accepted terminology
included "idiots," "imbeciles," "morons," and "feebleminded," all used to describe different degrees of mental retardation. The terminology was used without precise uniformity: "idiot" corresponded roughly with severe and profound retardation,
"imbecile" with moderate retardation, and "moron" and "feebleminded" with mild
retardation. On occasion each term has been used as an umbrella term to include all
levels of disability. In common conversation, of course, these terms have become epithets, but they remain on the books in the statutes of a substantial number of states.
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-47-50(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985); IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5.
Their continuing use offends mentally retarded people and their families. See
A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 119 (1975). Stone
remarks that "[p]erhaps there is no other place in the mental health system where
labels are more odious and more invidious." Id
39. Founded in 1876 as "The Association of Medical Officers of American Insititutions of Idiotic and Feeble-minded Children," the association changed its name in 1906
to "The American Association for the Study of the Feeble-minded," and in 1933 to its
current name. The AAMD now has approximately 10,000 members from a variety of
disciplines that serve mentally retarded people. See generally W. SLOAN & H. STEVENS, A CENTURY OF CONCERN: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON
MENTAL DEFICIENCY 1876-1976 (1976).
40. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL
RETARDATION 1 (H. Grossman ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as AAMD, CLASSIFICATION
IN MENTAL RETARDATION].
The causes of mental retardation are numerous and complex, including both environmental and genetic factors. See D. MACMILLAN, MENTAL RETARDATION IN
SCHOOL AND SOCIETY 81-166 (2d ed. 1982); N. ROBINSON & H. ROBINSON, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CHILD 51-133 (2d ed. 1974).
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43
Courts, 41 legislatures, 42 and other professional organizations
have accepted this definition.
General intellectual functioning is a phenomenon measured,
and thus defined, by intelligence tests. It is, therefore, quantifiable as an intelligence quotient (IQ) score. The AAMD's definition sets the upper boundary of mental retardation at an IQ level
of 70, which is approximately two standard deviations from the
mean score of 100. 44 For an individual to be classified as mentally
retarded, the deficit in intellectual functioning must be accompanied by impairments in adaptive behavior defined as "significant
limitations in an individual's effectiveness in meeting the standards of maturation, learning, personal independence, and/or social responsibility that are expected for his or her age level and
cultural group, as determined by clinical assessment and, usually,
standardized scales." 4 5 Thus, adaptive behavior is a term of art,
which is not synonymous with maladaptive behavior. The inclusion of adaptive behavior in the definition of mental retardation
requires that intellectual impairment, measured by an intelligence
46
test, have some practical impact on the individual's life.
The final requirement of the definition of mental retardation is
that the disability must become manifest before the age of eighteen. The origin of this requirement is obscure, and its relevance to
criminal justice is limited.47 If an individual impaired in both intellectual function and behavior would otherwise be classified as
41. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3256
n.9 (1985); In re Krall, 151 Cal. App. 3d 792, 797, 199 Cal. Rptr. 91, 94 (1984); United
States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 724 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1976); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 240
n.1, 426 A.2d 467, 469 n.1 (1981).
42. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.01(k) (Page 1981 & Supp. 1984); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 393.063(23) (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 427.005(10) (1983).
43. See, e.g., 1 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES, CLINICAL MODIFICATION (ICD-9-CM) 1098-99; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 36 (3d ed. 1980) [herinafter cited as DSM-III].
44. AAMD, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 40, at 23. The
authors of the current definition caution that "[t]his upper limit is intended as a
guideline; it could be extended upward through IQ 75 or more, depending on the reliability of the intelligence test used." Id. at 11.
The immediate predecessor to the current edition of the manual explicitly cast the
definition in terms of standard deviations, but this definition was modified because of
concern that it might suggest a greater precision than current testing instruments can
provide. Id. at 23.
From 1959 to 1973 the AAMD definition was substantially broader, including all
persons with IQ scores more than one standard deviation from the mean (approximately IQ 85). Persons whose scores fell in the range of 70-85 were labeled "borderline retarded." This approach was abandoned in 1973 because professionals
recognized that individuals in the so-called "borderline retarded" group frequently
did not function as mentally retarded people. This group is no longer labeled retarded
by professionals in the field. Id. at 6.
45. Id at 11.
46. See id. at 203-16 (illustrations of deficits in adaptive behavior at various levels
of mental retardation). The most frequently used scales for measuring adaptive behavior are the AAMD Adaptive Behavior Scale and the Vineland Social Maturity
Scale.
Three scholars in the field of mental retardation have recently proposed that the
adaptive behavior component be omitted from the definition because "the essence of
mental retardation involves inefficient cognitive functioning." Zigler, Balla &
Hodapp, On the Definition and ClassTication of Mental Retardation, 89 AM. J.
MENTAL DEFICIENCY 215, 227 (1984).
47. See, e.g., Mental Health Standards, supra note 4, 7-9.1 commentary at 459.
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mentally retarded, it matters little whether the onset of the problem occurred when the person was a child or an adult. The criminal law generally will be concerned with the manifestations and
consequences of the individual's handicap and not the date of its

origin.
Mentally retarded people are classified in a system of four categories: mild, moderate, severe, and profound.48 Approximately
eighty-nine percent of the people classified as mentally retarded
fall within the "mildly retarded" category.4 9 Mildly retarded people have IQ scores in the range between 50 to 55 and approximately 70, and thus have a substantial disability. Judges and other
criminal justice personnel unfamiliar with this classification
scheme may find the labels of "mild" and "moderate" to be euphemistic descriptions of individuals at those levels of disability.5 0
B.

Mental RetardationContrastedwith Mental Illness

Mental retardation is often confused with mental illness. This
confusion can have unfortunate consequences in the criminal justice system.
The American Pyschiatric Association defines "mental disorder" as "an illness with psychologic or behavioral manifestations
and/or impairment in functioning due to a social, psychologic, genetic, physical/chemical, or biologic disturbance. The disorder is
not limited to relations between the person and society. The illness is characterized by symptoms and/or impairment in functioning."51 While there may be some points of similarity between this
definition and the AAMD's definition of mental retardation, the
52
cardinal difference is that mental retardation is not an illness.

"Temporal manifestation of retardation is not germane to the issues confronted
within Part IX of these standards." Id.
48. AAMD, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 40, at 13.
Somewhat different (and arguably archaic and misleading) terminology is occasionally still employed in the context of special education. Mildly retarded people may be
characterized as "educable," and moderately retarded people as "trainable. " D.
EVANS, THE LIVES OF MENTALLY RETARiED PEOPLE 14 (1983).
49. DSM-I, supra note 43, at 40. People who are "mildly retarded" should not
be confused with the so-called "borderline retarded," who are no longer considered
mentally retarded. See supra note 44.
50. See AAMD, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 40, at
203-16 (illustrative descriptions of adaptive behaviors at each level of retardation).
See also infra note 286.
51. AmERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 89 (5th ed.
1980). The glossary does not separately define "mental illness," providing only a
cross-reference to "mental disorder"; see DSM-]I, supra note 43, at 363.
52. Syndicated columnist George Will has captured this distinction vividly, noting
that retarded people are often described as if they suffered from a disease: "Jonathan
Will, 10, fourth-grader and Orioles fan (and the best Wiffle-ball hitter in southern
Maryland), has Down's syndrome. He does not 'suffer from' (as the newspapers are
wont to say) Down's syndrome. He suffers from nothing, except anxiety about the
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Mentally ill people encounter disturbances in their thought
processes and emotions;
mentally retarded people have limited
53
abilities to learn.
Important consequences for the criminal justice system flow
from the difference between mental illness and mental retardation. Many forms of mental illness are temporary, cyclical, or episodic. Mental retardation, by contrast, involves a mental
impairment that is permanent.- Thus, legal rules which focus
upon the prospect of "curing" mentally ill people 5 may not address the condition of retarded people in an appropriate or useful
fashion. Similarly, to discuss "restoration" of competence to stand
trial presupposes that the individual was previously competent.
Since most mentally retarded people became disabled at birth or
as young children, 56 this formulation is neither accurate nor
meaningful. Perhaps the most significant danger of confusing
mental illness and mental retardation in the criminal justice system is the failure to understand that psychiatric treatment appropriate for mentally ill people will do nothing to assist a retarded
person who is not mentally ill. If the treatment is being provided
to influence the mentally retarded defendant's competence to
stand trial or to render the individual nondangerous, the failure
to provide habilitative services 57 tailored to the defendant's needs
Orioles' lousy start." Will, The Killing Will Not Stop, Wash. Post, Apr. 22, 1982, at
A29, col. 1.
The American Psychiatric Association includes mental retardation in its classifica-

tion system of mental disorders. DSM-HI, supranote 43, at 36-41. This does not make
mental retardation an illness. The purpose of the American Psychiatric Association's
nosology in DSM-fII is to allow psychiatrists to classify the symptoms presented by
patients. Since some mentally retarded people may also suffer from mental illness,
see infra note 59 and accompanying text, identification of the fact that a mentally ill
patient is mentally retarded may have important consequences for diagnosis and
treatment.
53. Thus people of any level of intelligence may be mentally ill. However, most
mentally retarded people are free of mental illness. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
54. The consequences of the mental impairment, including deficits in adaptive behavior, may be ameliorated through education and habilitation. Therefore, it is not
accurate to state categorically that mental retardation is "permanent" or "incurable."
See AAMD, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 40, at 15 ("The
AAMD definition carries no connotation of chronicity or irreversibility and, on the
contrary, applies only to levels of functioning.") (emphasis omitted); CURATIVE ASPECTS OF MENTAL RETARDATION: BIOIEDICAL AND BEHAviORAL ADvANcEs xiii (F.
Menolascino, R. Neman, & J. Stark eds. 1983). But cf.Durham v. United States, 214
F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (defining "mental defect" as "a condition which is not
considered capable of either improving or deteriorating. ..").
55. See, e.g., State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 255, 344 A.2d 289, 299 (1975) (declaring
unconstitutional a statute that required confinement of insanity acquittes until they
were restored to reason). But see Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361-70 (1983)
(Constitution permits the government, on the basis of an insanity judgment, to confine an acquittee to a mental institution until he has regained his sanity).
56. See infra note 245; R. EDGERTON, MENTAL RETARDATION 3-4 (1979).
57. "Habilitation" is the term used by mental retardation professionals to describe
the array and combination of services that mentally retarded people need to address
their disabilities. The Accreditation Council for Services for Mentally Retarded and
Other Developmentally Disabled Persons (AC/MRDD) defines habilitation as "the
process by which the staff of an agency assists individuals to acquire and maintain
those life skills that enable them to cope more effectively with the demands of their
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may result in needlessly protracted, possibly lifelong,
confinement. 5
Mental illness and mental retardation are not mutually exclusive conditions; some mentally retarded people are also mentally
ill. Dr. Frank Menolascino has estimated that the incidence of
mental illness among retarded people is approximately thirty percent.59 Not only is the combined effect of their disabilities a burden,60 but our service delivery systems frequently make no
allowance for their needs. Mental retardation facilities often refuse to serve persons with the behavioral disorders these individuals may manifest, and mental illness facilities often lack any
expertise or programming for the habilitation of mentally re61
tarded persons.
C. The Incidence of Mental RetardationAmong
CriminalDefendants
The mental retardation literature has addressed no other subject
in criminal law as extensively as the incidence of retardation
among criminal defendants and prisoners, and its implications regarding the "criminality" of mentally retarded people.6 2 The pubown persons and of their environments and to raise the levels of their physical,
mental, and social functioning. Habilitation includes, but is not limited to, programs
of formal, structured education and treatment." ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR SERVICES FOR MENTALLY RETARDED AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS,
STANDARDS FOR SERVICES FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED INDIVIDUALS 21-22

(1984). The term has been used in numerous statutes and at least 150 reported American court cases. LEXIS Count (LEXIS search was designed to minimize the retrieval
of all examples of the term outside the context of mental retardation and disability
context). Legislatures and courts typically have adopted a definition identical or similar to AC/MIRDD's. See, ag., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395 (1972), affd in
part and remanded in part on other grounds sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305, 1312-13 (5th Cir. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-3(K) (1978 & repl. 1984). The
Supreme Court used the term interchangeably with "training" in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316-19 (1982), but the words are not synonymous; "training" does
not reflect adequately the other components of habilitation (including Nicholas Romeo's) such as physical therapy.
58. See infra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
59. F. MENOLASCINO, CHALLENGES IN MENTAL RETARDATION: PROGRESSIVE IDEOLOGY AND SERVICES 126-27 (1977).

60. Individuals with both mental illness and mental retardation are often referred
to as "dual diagnosis" clients. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE MENTALLY RETARDED 10, 83-84 (F. Menolascino & J. Stark 1984).
61. F. MENOLASCINO, supra note 59, at 190 (1977).

62. See, e.g., H.

GODDARD, THE CRIMINAL IMBECILE: AN ANALYSIS OF THREE RE-

MARKABLE MURDER CASES 106 (1915) ("[I]n the neighborhood of fifty percent of all

criminals are feeble-minded."); McCarty, Mental Defective and Criminal Law, 14
IOWA L. REv. 401, 416 (1929) (25 to 50% of all prisoners were "feeble-minded"). A
bibliography listed 210 publications on the subject through 1916. Crafts, A Bibliography on the Relations of Crime and Feeble-Mindedness,7 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY
544 (1916). One researcher has noted that approximately 500 studies have been published since Goddard's work in 1914: "No other single characteristic of the mental
retardate has been so thoroughly studied, yet these investigations have failed to pro-
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lished studies have produced widely disparate conclusions. 63
Many of these disparities can be explained by methodological factors.6

The best modern evidence suggests that the incidence of

criminal behavior among people with mental retardation does not
greatly exceed the65incidence of criminal behavior among the population as a whole.

Although the early alarmist literature which proclaimed that
mentally retarded people were naturally destined to become
criminals - and in fact that mental retardation caused criminality
has been debunked, the question of a causal relationship has
not been fully resolved. Monahan and Steadman, in their study of
the epidemiology of crime and mental illness, 66 suggest an analysis
of causation which may be a useful model in considering the parallel subject in mental retardation. They suggest that there are
three possible paths that may link mental disorder (illness) to
crime: mental disorder and crime may coexist without any causal
relationship, mental disorder may predispose individuals toward
criminality,67or mental disorder may inhibit individuals from
criminality.
Applying this model to mental retardation, a striking difference
between the two types of disabilities becomes clear. As with
mental illness, mental retardation may coexist with criminality.
It may also inhibit criminal behavior, as with a person who is profoundly retarded and so physically involved (disabled) that he requires assistance with every movement. But mental retardation

vide conclusive evidence that intelligence level plays a role in delinquent and/or criminal behavior." F. MENoiAScINO, supra note 59, at 181.

63. Compare Brown & Courtless, The Mentally Retarded in Penal and Correctional Institutions, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1164, 1166 (1968) (national average of
about 10% with some states lower than 3%) with McCarty, supra note 62, at 416 (25 to
50% of all prisoners found to be "feeble-minded").
64. Early in this century, one authority observed that the statistics on retarded
offenders were inflated by researchers counting only prisoners, thus failing to account
for different rates of apprehension and parole at different levels of intelligence. The
author then conducted her own study of the percentage of "feeble-minded" among
criminals in Chicago and concluded that it was less than 10%. Bronner, A Researchon
the Proportionof Mental Defectives Among Delinquents,5 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 561, 568 (1914).
65. See Biklen & Mlinarcik, CriminalJustice,MentalRetardationand Criminality: A Causal Link? 10 MENTAL RETARDATION AND DEVELoPMENTAL DIsAMMEs
172 (J. Wortis ed. 1978) (an estimate of retarded persons in prisons may not reflect
any greater propensity of the mentally retarded to commit crime than other segments
of the general population); MacEachron, Mentally Retarded Offenders: Prevalence
and Characteristics,84 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 165, 168 (1979) (prevalence rates
for retarded offenders in Maine and Massachusetts were only slightly higher than the
prevalence rate of mental retardation in the general population). See generally Santamour, A FunctionalDiscussion of Mental Retardation and CriminalBehavior, in
THE RETARDED OFFENDER, supra note 33.
66. Monahan & Steadman, Crime and Mental Disorder:An EpidemiologicalAp-

proach, in 4 CRIME AND

JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH

145 (M. Tonry &

N. Morris eds. 1983).
67. Id. at 182. See generally Teplin, The Criminalityof the Mentally Ilr A Dangerous Misconception, 142 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 593 (1985); Teplin, Criminalizing
Mental Disorder The ComparativeArrest Rate of the Mentally 114 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 794 (1984) (suggesting that mentally ill persons are undergoing criminalization
with adverse public policy consequences).
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will rarely, if ever, cause criminality. Mental retardation is a
learning deficiency rather than a thinking disorder; the irrational-

ity, paranoia, and delusions that can indicate mental illness and
which are related to criminality are not indicators of mental retardation.6 But while direct causation can be ruled out, there are
indirect consequences of mental retardation, including the iatrogenic effects on personality and behavior of living in dehumanizing institutions. These consequences may affect the interaction
69
between the mentally retarded and the criminal justice system.
D.

Characteristicsof People with Mental Retardation

Mentally retarded people are individuals. Any attempt to describe
them as a group risks false stereotyping and therefore demands
the greatest caution.70 Nevertheless, some characteristics occur
with sufficient frequency to warrant certain limited generalizations. Several of these traits have important implications for the
68. However, mental illness and mental retardation can coexist in the same individual, and those mentally retarded people may have symptoms of mental illness associated with criminal behavior. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
69. Two distinguished social scientists recently analyzed the relationship between
crime and intelligence. Their review of the data, controlling for socioeconomic status
and cultural and family background, suggests that the average IQ of offenders is approximately 92, eight points less than the average of the population (but not within
the mental retardation range), and that deficits in verbal ability account for much of
that difference. The data also suggest that offenders of lower intelligence commit
different types of crimes than other offenders. Crimes such as forgery, embezzlement, and securities fraud are associated with higher IQs; impulsive crimes such as
assault, homicide, and rape are associated with lower IQs; and property crimes and
drug and alcohol related offenses are associated with offenders of average IQ. The
scholars suggest several possible explanations for these relationships: more intelligent criminals are deterred by the risk of arrest and prosecution and thus choose
lower risk crimes; less intelligent offenders have fewer internal controls and thus
commit impulsive crimes that do not involve preparation, planning, and delayed
achievement of the criminal goal; and less intelligent offenders do not usually have
the skills or social contacts to enter settings in which crimes such as embezzlement
could be committed. J. WILSON & R. HEmNsTEIN, CRIME AND HUmAN NATuRE 148-72

(1985). See also Hirschi & Hindelang, Intelligence and Delinquency: A Revisionist
Review, 42 Az. SOcIOLoGIcAL REv. 571, 575 (1977) (the link between intelligence and
crime is attributable to a person's experience in school); Edgerton, Crime, Deviance
and Normalization: Reconsidered,in DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND COmmNITY ADJUSTMENT OF MENTALLY RETARDED PEOPLE 145 (R. Bruninks, C. Meyers, B. Sigford
& K. Lakin eds. AAMD Monograph No. 4 1981).
70. One author has commented:
It is a typical observation in behavioral research that there is more variability within a group of mentally retarded persons than between retarded
and non-retarded persons ....

Mentally retarded people are not alike,

because mental retardation is not an entity. It is a collection of well over
200 syndromes that have only one element in common: relative inefficiency at learning by the methods and strategies devised for other people
to learn.
Haywood, Reaction Comment, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CrIZEN AND THE LAW
677 (1976). See Edgerton, supra note 69, at 145 (emphasizing the variation among retarded offenders).
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criminal justice system, and therefore merit close attention to determine if they exist in an individual criminal case.
1.

Communication and Memory

Many mentally retarded people have limited communication
skills. The most seriously disabled persons have no expressive
language and limited or no receptive language. 7 1 Therefore, it
would not be unusual for a mentally retarded individual to be unresponsive to a police officer or other authority or to be able to
provide only garbled or confused responses when questioned.
Even when the mentally retarded person's language and communication abilities appear to be normal, the questioner should give
extra attention to determining whether the answers are reliable.
Several factors can influence the reliability of an answer. For example, many people with mental retardation are predisposed to
"biased responding" or answering in the affirmative questions regarding behaviors they believe are desirable, and answering in the
negative questions concerning behaviors they believe are prohibited. 72 The form of a question can also directly affect the likelihood of receiving a biased response, 73 and thus police officers,
judges, and lawyers may inadvertently or intentionally cause the
susceptible mentally retarded accused person to answer in an inaccurate manner by asking a question in an inappropriate form.
Further, many mentally retarded persons are reluctant to resist
questioners by refusing to answer questions that are beyond their
ability.74 Even when a person with mental retardation can verbalize effectively, memory will often be impaired. This is particularly true of events which the individual had not identified as
important. 75 Because few mentally retarded people are able to de71. "Expressive language" refers to an individual's ability to speak or otherwise

communicate while "receptive language" refers to the ability to understand the communication of others.
72. See, e.g., Rosen, Floor & Zisfein, Investigating the Phenomenon of Acquiescence in the Mentally Handicapped: 1 TheoreticalMode Test Development and Normative Data, 20 BRiT. J. MENTAL SUBNORMAIxTY

58, 58-68 (1974); see generally

Sigdman, Budd, Stankel & Schoenrock, When in Doub Say Yes: Acquiescence in
Interviews with Mentally Retarded Persons,19 MENTAL RETARDATION 53 (1980).

73. Question types can be ordered in terms of difficulty along a continuum. An
individual's ability to answer a certain type of question is directly related to the individual's intellectual ability. Thus, "yes-no" questions and choosing among pictures
are simpler than "either-or" questions or the progressively more difficult multiple
choice and open-ended questions. Sigelman, Winer & Schoenrock, The Responsiveness of Mentally RetardedPersons to Questions, 17 EDUC. & TRAINING MENTALLY RETARDED 120, 123 (1982). Although the "yes-no" questions are easiest for a retarded
person to answer, the validity of the answer is so suspect, given the danger of response
bias, that it has been suggested that questioners abandon the use of "yes-no" questioning techniques. Budd, Sigelman & Sigelman, Exploring the OuterLimits of Response
Bias, 14 SOCIOLOGICAL Focus 297, 305-06 (1981).

74. In one study mentally retarded persons were asked for directions to their
homes. Fifty-five percent of the sample gave directions which, although complete,
proved inaccurate in significant ways. Kernan & Sabsay, Getting There: Directions
Given by Mildly Retarded and Nonretarded Adults, in LIVES IN PROCESS: MILDLY
RETARDED ADULTS IN A LARGE CITY (R. Edgerton ed. 1984).

75. See, e.g., Luftig & Johnson, Identification and Recall of StructurallyImporVOL.
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termine what information might have legal significance for their
case, spontaneous memory and cursory questioning cannot reliably ascertain all the facts.
2. Impulsivity and Attention
People with mental retardation are often described as impulsive
or as having poor impulse control. 76 This characteristic appears to
be related to problems in attention and thus involves attention
span, focus, and selectivity in the attention process. 77 In the criminal justice system, deficits in attention or impulse control can have
important implications in almost all steps from the commission of
the offense through sentencing. The mentally retarded person
might accompany perpetrators or actually commit a crime on impulse or without weighing the consequences of the act; when
stopped by the police he might be unable to focus on the alleged
crime or appreciate the gravity of his arrest; in trial preparation
the individual would likely be similarly ineffective at focusing on
the relevant aspects of the incident or attending to the task of assisting counsel; at trial the individual may appear deviously to
steer away from certain lines of testimony or may appear obstinate when in fact his attention disability prevents him from responding appropriately. Similar problems may arise at each step
of the judicial process.
3. Moral Development
Studies on the moral development of people with mental retardation reveal that some individuals have incomplete or immature
concepts of blameworthiness and causation. 78 Some mentally retarded people will determine or assign guilt even when a situation
tant Units in Prose by Mentally Retarded Learners, 86 Am. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY
495, 501 (1982); infra note 77.
76. See AAMD, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 40, at 16;
PSYCHOLOGY OF EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN AND YOUTH 513 (W. Cruickshank ed. 3d ed.
1971); Santamour & West, The Mentally RetardedOffender: Presentationof the Facts
and a Discussion of Issues, in THE RETARDED OFFENDER, supra note 33, at 7,18.
77. See generally C. MERCER & M. SNELL, LEARNING THEORY RESEARCH IN
MENTAL RETARDATION 94-141 (1977).
78. The factors that appear to be related to moral development include intelligence, opportunity for interaction with others, living in an enriching environment,
chronological age, and mental age. Boehm, Moral Judgment Cultural and Subcul-

tural Comparisonwith Some Piaget'sResearch Conclusions, 1 INT'L

J. PSYCHOLOGY

143, 149-50 (1966); Boehm, The Development of Conscience: A Comparisonof American Children ofDifferent Mental and SocioeconomicLevels, 33 CHILD DEV=LOPMENT
575,590 (1962); Ozbek & Forehand, FactorsInfluencing the MoralJudgment ofRetardates, 17 J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY RESEARCH 255, 259-60 (1973); Whiteman & Kosier,
Development of Children'sMoralisticJudgments: Age, Sex, IQ, and CertainPersonalExperiential Variables,35 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 843, 843-44 (1964). Cf. supra note 20
and accompanying text (the earlier belief that mentally retarded people had "moral
deficits" analogous to color-blindness).
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is the result of an unforeseeable accident. The inability to distinguish between an incident which is the result of blameworthy behavior and an incident which results from a situation beyond the
individual's control can have serious consequences. For example,
a defendant with retardation may plead guilty to a crime which he
did not commit because he believes that blame should be assigned
to someone and he is unable to understand the concept of causation and his role in the incident.
Similarly, some people with mental retardation will eagerly assume blame in an attempt to please or curry favor with an accuser.
This phenomenon of "cheating to lose" may give rise to unfounded
79
confessions.
4. Denial of Disability
Certain dimensions of self-concept and self-perception are also
often affected by mental retardation. It is not uncommon for individuals with mental retardation to overrate their own skills,
either out of a genuine misreading of their own abilities 80 or out of
defensiveness about their handicap.8 1 This tendency is evident in
estimates by retarded people of their academic achievement, physical skill, and intellectual level.8 2 It is therefore not surprising
when a mentally retarded person brags about how tough he is or
how he outsmarted a victim, when in fact, he accomplished
neither feat. Overrating is probably closely tied to desperate attempts to reject the stigma of mental retardation. Many mentally
retarded individuals expend considerable energy attempting to
avoid this stigma.8 3 In a similar vein, some mentally retarded people make ill-advised and damaging attempts to enhance their sta84
tus or deny their disability in the courtroom.
Given these characteristics, it should not be surprising that few
79. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON LAw 33 (1967); Person, The Accused Retardate,4 COLUm. HUM. RTs. L. REV.

239, 254 (1972). See generally Mickenberg, Competency to Stand Trial and the Men-

tally Retarded Defendant The Need for a Multi-DisciplinarySolution to a MultiDisciplinaryProblem, 17 CAL. W.L. REV. 365 (1981).
80. See, e.g., Ringness, Self-concept of Children of Low, Average, and High Intelligence, 65 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 453, 453 (1961).
81. Cf Cleland, Patton & Seitz, The Use of Insult as an Index of Negative Reference Groups, 72 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 30, 33 (1967) (the most common insults
used by people with mental retardation relate to intelligence, indicating that denial of
their intellectual limitations is a nearly universal defense).
82. See, e.g., Bialer, Emotional Disturbanceand Mental Retardation: Etiologic
and Conceptual Relationships,in PsYCHiATPRc APPROACHES TO MENTAL RETARDATION 68, 79 (F. Menolascino ed. 1970).
83. For example, in one study individuals institutionalized for mental retardation
attempted to conceal the reason for institutionalization with "tales" of "mental illness," "nerves," and even "criminal offenses." R. EDGERTON, THE CLOAK OF COM:PETENCE: STIGMA IN THE LIVES OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 148 (1967). See generally
J. DUDLEY, LIVING WITH STIGMA: THE PLIGHT OF THE PEOPLE WHO WE LABEL MENTALLY RETARDED (1983).
84. See, e.g., Tyars v. Finner, 709 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1983). During involuntary commitment proceedings the retarded respondent began to punch the air and
yell "pow, pow" when he heard the incriminating testimony on his alleged aggressiveness. Id,
VOL.
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people with mental retardation identify themselves as disabled
when arrested or at any other point in the criminal justice system.
In fact, many of these individuals will go to great lengths to hide
their disability.8 5
5. Lack of Knowledge of Basic Facts
The very nature of the cognitive deficits inherent in the classification of a person as mentally retarded means that most individuals
with mental retardation will know less than most people without
mental retardation. 86 This knowledge deficit is often aggravated
by the special education curriculum for mentally retarded children, which is less informative than the regular curriculum. Special education students will often be excluded from certain classes
and activities that teach general knowledge about the world, in
order to focus more time and attention on learning basic skills or
participating in vocational training.8 7 For example, while other
students are learning the concepts and vocabulary of civics and
social studies, students with mental retardation may instead receive extended instruction in reading or engine assembly.
Although special curricula are necessary for most mentally retarded students, their exclusion from certain courses is not without cost.
6. Motivation
Many people with mental retardation appear to be less motivated
toward the mastery of problems than people of normal intelligence. The general desire to be effective at life's tasks, a strong
motivator for mentally typical people, fails to motivate most mentally retarded people in the same way.8 8
However, the desire to please authority figures does appear to
be a powerful motivator. Many persons with mental retardation,
especially those who have experienced institutionalization, have a
particular susceptibility to perceived authority figures and will
85. Incarcerated mentally retarded offenders have been described as "clever in
masking their limitations." Santamour & West, supra note 76, at 18.
86. At least four of the twelve subtests found in the commonly used Wechsler
Intelligence Scale-Revised are designed to assess vocabulary, information, similarities,
and comprehension. Thus, an IQ score indicating mental retardation will almost always mean that the person has deficits in each of these areas. D. WECHSLER, WECHSLER'S MEAS
mENT AND APPRAISAL OF ADULT INTELUGENCE (5th ed. 1972).
87. See, e.g., Brown, Branston-McClean, Baumgart, Vincent, Falvey & Schroeder,
Using the Characteristicsof Currentand Subsequent Least Restrictive Environments
in the Development of CurricularContentfor Severely HandicappedStudents, 4 Am.
ASS'N FOR THE EDUC. OF THE SEVERELY AND PROFOUNDLY HANDICAPPED

REV. 407,

408-09 (1979).
88. See, e.g., Harter & Zigler, The Assessment of Effectance Motivation in Normal
and Retarded Children,10 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 169, 178-80 (1974).
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seek the approval of these individuals even when it requires giving
an incorrect answer.8 9 Such "outer-directed" behavior suggests
that many people with mental retardation will be particularly vulnerable to suggestion, whether intentional or unintentional, by authority figures or high-status peers.
The phenomenon of "learned helplessness," or "fatalistic passivity," has also been reported in people with mental retardation.9 0
This characteristic resignation has been attributed to the experiencing of repeated failures and the tendency among mentally retarded people to attribute their failures to uncontrollable factors.
IMI

CriminalResponsibility of Retarded Defendants

The Defense of Mental Nonresponsibility9 '

A.

The relevance of mental retardation to criminal responsibility has
been debated for centuries. 92 Established authorities have long ac93
cepted that an "idiot" cannot be convicted of a criminal offense.
The principal points of contention have centered around the definition of the level of disability sufficient to constitute "idiocy," 94
and the legal relevance of lesser degrees of disability.
Courts have consistently held that mental retardation must be
almost totally disabling to constitute a defense to accusations of
crime.9 5 In the famous early eighteenth century case of Rex v.
89. See, e.g., Harter, Mental Age, IQ and MotivationalFactorsin the Discrimination Learning Set Performance of Normal and Retarded Children, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 123, 137-38 (1967).

90. See, e.g., DeVellis, LearnedHelplessness in Institutions,15 MENTAL RETARDA10 (Oct. 1977); Weisz, Learned Helplessness and the Retarded Child,in MENTAL

TION

RETARDATION: THE DEVELOPMENTAL-DIFFERENCE CONTROVERSY 27 (E. Zigler & D.

Balla eds. 1982).
91. Mental nonresponsibility is commonly referred to as "insanity." See infra
text accompanying notes 138-40.
92. See supra notes 9-30 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *24:
"The second case of a deficiency in will, which excuses from the guilt of crimes, arises
also from a defective or vitiated understanding, viz in an idiot or a lunatic. For the
rule of law as to the latter, which may easily be adapted also to the former, is that
"furiosusfurore solum puitur." In criminal cases therefore idiots and lunatics are
not chargeable for their own acts, if committed when under these incapacities: no, not
even for treason itself." Id. Accord M. DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE 223 (1619)

("If one that is non compos mentis, or an ideot, kill a man, this is no felony; for they
have no knowledge of good and evill, nor can have a felonius intent, nor a will or mind
to doe harm .. ").
94. "[Imbecility] differs from idiocy in the circumstance that while in the latter
there is an utter destitution of every thing like reason, the subjects of the former
possess some intellectual capacity, though infinitely less than is possessed by the great
mass of mankind." I. RAY, supra note 13, at 65. The exculpation of severely and profoundly retarded persons never engendered much controversy. "The general principles that determine the legal relations of idiocy are so obvious, and the fact of its
existence so easily established that little occasion has been afforded for doubt or diversity of opinion." Id. at 78.
95. Cf.Ellis, Tort Responsibility of Mentally Disabled Persons, 1981 AM. BAR.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1079, 1092-96 (discussing mental disability in the context of the
defense of contributory negligence).
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Arnold,96 the English court of Common Pleas formulated what
came to be known as the "wild beast" test: "it must be a man that
is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not
know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute,
or a
97
wild beast, such a one is never the object of punishment."
More than a century later, the House of Lords created the most
famous and long-lasting definition of those mentally disabled people who are entitled to exculpation. The M'Naghten test 98 was
phrased in terms of "a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind." 99 There remained some uncertainty as to whether it was
meant to include defendants whose incapacity resulted from
mental deficiency. 10 0 However, since "idiocy" and "imbecility"
were at that time universally viewed as forms of insanity, there is
little doubt they were both understood to be within the formulation. 0 1 Almost immediately, courts incorporated the "right from
wrong" test into jury instructions where
the claim was that the
10 2
defendant "was of very weak intellect.'
96. 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724). See 1 N. WALKER, supra note 11, at 52-57 (1968)

(discussing the case in historical context).
97. 16 How. St. Tr. at 765. It should be noted that the Arnold case involved a
defendant who claimed to be mentally ill rather than mentally retarded. "[Tihey admit he was a lunatic, and not an ideot. A man that is an ideot, that is born so, never
recovers, but a lunatic may, and hath his intervals; and they admit he was a lunatic."
Id
98. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). On the antecedents of
M'Naghten using the right from wrong distinction, see Platt & Diamond, The Origins
of the "Rightand Wrong" Test of CriminalResponsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An HistoricalSurvey, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1227 (1966).
99. 1i at 722. See R. MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF DANIEL MCNAUGHTON (1981) (an investigation into the political nature of
the crime and the verdict); DANIEL MCNAUGHTON: HIS TRIAL AND THE AFZEMIATH
(D. West & A. Walk eds. 1977) (a compilation of commentaries on the historical, medical, and legal consequences of the decision); 1 N. WALKER, supranote 11, at 84-103, see
also Diamond, On the Spelling of Daniel M'Naghten's Name, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 84
(1964).
100. See, e.g., State v. Palmer, 161 Mo. 152, 172, 61 S.W. 651, 657 (1901) ('Mental
disorders cannot be regarded as evidence of insanity which will confer legal irresponsibility for crime, however, unless they are caused by or result from disease or lesion
of the brain .... Thus, mere weakness of mind does not excuse crime, nor will bad
education or bad habits, nor the fact that a person is of a low order of intellect .
.
101. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 447 (2d ed. 1961).
102. R. v. Higginson, 174 Eng. Rep. 743 (1843); cf R. SMITH, TRIAL BY MEDICINE:
INSANITY AND RESPONSIBILY IN VICTORIAN TRIALS 93 (1981) (suggesting that the
execution of Higginson despite evidence of his "imbecility" may have represented an
attempt to tighten the defense in the wake of M'Naghten, and thus reduce public criticism).
A similar result had been reached earlier in this country by Justice Story, sitting as
Circuit Judge, in United States v. Cornell:
There is no pretence to say, that the prisoner is in any legal or accurate
sense, deficient in understanding. It was proved by all the witnesses, by
his own witnesses, it was admitted by his counsel, that he was compos
mentis, having intelligence to discern what was right and what was wrong.
All that was suggested was, that he was more ignorant and somewhat
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Subsequent litigation focused on whether a defendant was sufficiently retarded to be held unable to distinguish right from wrong.
Numerous courts have held evidence of mental retardation 03 insufficient to justify an acquittal, or in some cases, even to warrant
a jury instruction on insanity.'0 4 The only point of disagreement
involved claims that a retarded adult defendant had a "mental
age"' 0 5 equivalent to that of a child incapable of committing a
06
crime.1
Surprisingly, the debate about the analogy between mental deficiency and the criminal law's treatment of children began before
the development of intelligence tests and the subsequent popularity of the notion of "mental age." Justice Seymour's charge to the
jury in State v. Richards0 7 relied upon the comparison drawn by
Lord Hale between infants and "imbeciles:" "[I]nasmuch as children under fourteen years of age are prima facie incapable of
crime, imbeciles ought not to be held responsible criminally 0unless
8
of capacity equal to that of ordinary children of that age."'
more stupid than common men, of bad education, and bad passions, and
bad habits. Now these are precisely the common causes of crimes; but certainly they form no legal excuse or justification for the commission of
them.
25 F. Cas. 650, 657 (D.R.I. 1820) (No. 14,868).
103. Mental retardation appears to have been often described by the phrase "weak
minded." Ambiguities in 19th century terminology of mental disability make it impossible to be certain whether all such cases involved mental retardation. At least in
England, it was not uncommon for persons whose behavior was viewed as eccentric
and morally unacceptable to be labelled as "weak minded," or even as "idiots" or
"imbeciles," without a suggestion that the person was mentally deficient. R. SMIrH,
TRIAL BY MEDICINE: INSANrrY AND RESPONSIBILTY IN VICToRIAN TRIALS 116 (1981).
104. E.g., State v. Pinski, 163 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Mo. 1942); Wartena v. State, 105 Ind.
445, 450, 5 N.E. 20, 23 (1886); State v. Johnson, 233 Wis. 668, 674, 290 N.W. 159, 162
(1940); Craven v. State, 93 Tex. Crim. 328, 247 S.W. 515, 517 (1923). See H. WEIHOFEN,
supra note 30, at 120 n.4 (1954) (listing cases); Annot., 44 A.L.R. 584 (1926).
Some states had statutes which provided that "idiots" were incapable of committing
crimes. H. WEIHOFEN, supranote 30, at 50 n.1. But courts uniformly held that this did
not create a defense broader than that provided by the locally adopted test for insanity. See, e.g., Singleton v. State, 90 Nev. 216, 522 P.2d 1221, 1223 (1974) (even when
there was expert testimony that defendant's IQ fell within the professionally accepted
definition of an "idiot," the appropriate test was still M'Naghten).
105. "Mental age" is a means of describing the severity of a mentally retarded person's disability. The concept was invented by Alfred Binet, one of the creators of the
earliest intelligence tests. The concept of mental age represents an attempt to compare the intellectual functioning of the individual being tested with the performance
of mentally typical (nonretarded) people. Thus, a child with a chronological age of 12
may receive a similar score on an IQ test to a nonretarded child who is six years old,
and therefore be said to have a mental age of 6. This is accomplished by identifying
for each question or item on an IQ test the age level at which most children typically
can answer the question successfully. See N. ROBINSON & H. ROBINSON, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CHILD 340-42 (2d ed. 1976).

106. See Woodbridge, Physical and Mental Infancy in the CriminalLaw, 87 U. PA.
L. REV. 426, 438-53 (1939).
107. 39 Conn. 591 (1873).
108. Id at 594. Defendant, described as "considerably below par in intellect" but
"not a mere idiot," was charged with burning a barn. Id. at 592. The prosecution's
witnesses are said to have described him as "inferior in intellect to children ten years
of age," while defense witnesses stated that "they are acquainted with many children
of six years who are his superiors in mental capacity." Id. at 594. In applying the
analogy, Justice Seymour charged the jury to be careful of the imperfection of the
comparison "between the healthy and properly balanced, though immature, mind of a
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The Richards case has been severely criticized' 0 9 and its approach has not been followed in subsequent cases.110 Following
the popularization of intelligence tests early in this century, defendants frequently sought to use the "mental age" component of
test results to seek exculpation based on analogy to the legal rules
governing children whose chronological age compared with the
defendant's mental age. These attempts were universally unsuccessful.' The courts held that there was not full equivalence between a child and a mentally disabled adult, and resisted a
doctrine which might have resulted in successful defenses for substantial numbers of defendants." 2
child, and the unhealthy, abnormal and shrivelled intellect of an imbecile." I&i The
instruction also asserted the relevance of the defendant's life-long confinement in
alms-houses, suggesting that this constraining background had an impact on his ability to control his own impulses: "He has, it appears, been seldom left to the free guidance of his own judgment." I& at 595. Justice Seymour concluded by instructing the
jury to specify if their acquittal was
on the ground of want of mental capacity ... in order that the prisoner
may in that event have the benefit under our statute of a home where he
will be kindly cared for, but kept under such restraints as to prevent his
doing injury to the persons or property of others.
I&.
109. E.g., H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 30, at 193 n.77. But see S. GLUECK, MENTAL
DIsoRDER AND CRIMINAL LAW 196-97 (1925) (feebleminded adults with a mental age
of seven to fourteen should enjoy a rebuttable presumption of innocence when pleading not guilty by reason of insanity).
110. See H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 30, at 39, 193 n.78.
111. A typical case was State v. Schilling, 95 N.J.L. 145, 148, 112 A. 400, 402 (1920),
in which a 28-year-old man was said to have a mental age of 11:
There is a vast difference between a child at the age of 11 years and that of
a man of 28, and while perhaps there is a presumption that an infant of
tender years is incapable of committing a crime, that presumption does not
extend to one of advanced years, requiring the state to rebut it ....
The
presumption of the lack of power of thought and capacity in favor of a
child is due more to the number of years he has lived than to the character
of the development of his mind,..

but that reason does not apply when

he comes to manhood.
I& at 402. See also Chriswell v. State, 171 Ark. 255, 258, 283 S.W. 981, 983 (1926)
("where an adult person has the intelligence of a child from 7 to 9 years of age, that
fact alone cannot be made the test [of insanity]"); People v. Marquis, 344 Ill. 261, 176
N.E. 314 (1931) (subnormal mentality is not a defense to a crime unless it renders the
accused unable to distinguish right from wrong). Cf. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 255
Mass. 9, 151 N.E. 74 (1926) (defendant unsuccessfully objected to testimony that a
person with a mental age of 13 could be capable of first degree murder); State v. Kelsie, 93 Vt. 450, 452, 108 A. 391, 392 (1919) (defense counsel's attempt to ask expert
witness whether 33-year-old defendant would qualify as an imbecile was rejected because the expert had already testified that "the accused was mentally and morally an
8-year old boy"); Annot., 44 A.L.R. 584,586 (1926) (a comparison of chronological with
mental age when defining subnormal mentality is not, without more, a defense to a
crime).
112. E.g., In re Ramon M., 22 Cal. 3d 419, 429-30, 584 P.2d 524, 531, 149 Cal. Rptr.
387, 394 (1978) ("Approximately 16% of the adult population and a much higher percentage of adolescents between ages 14 and 18 have mental ages below 14 years.
Under defendant's proposed interpretation... all such persons would be presumed
incapable of committing crimes."). Cf. Commonwealth v. Szachewicz, 303 Pa. 410,154
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In the last three decades, the few reported judicial opinions addressing the criminal responsibility of mentally retarded individuals have focused on the relationship between modern formulations
of the test for insanity and the disabilities of the defendants. In
Durham v. United States,"8 dissatisfaction with the perceived
harshness of the M'Naghten test led the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia to formulate a new test that
created a defense for acts which were the "product of mental disease or defect." 1 4 The definition of the disabilities entitling a
defendant to this defense was extremely significant. Recognition
of a retarded defendant's mental condition as a "mental defect"
would be outcome-determinative under this test where that condition was held to have "produced" the criminal behavior. In
Durham,the court used "disease" to signify a condition capable of
improving or deteriorating. "Defect" signified a permanent condition, either congenital, the result of an injury, or the residual effect of mental or physical disease. 1 5
Eight years later, the same court warned that this passage in
Durham had not been intended to define the terms, but rather to
differentiate between the two kinds of disabilities. In McDonald
v. United States,"6 the court ruled that the definitions were to
come from the judiciary; factfinders were not bound by ad hoc definitions formulated by experts." 7 Therefore, the court ruled, juries should be instructed that "a mental disease or defect includes
any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects
mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior
controls.""18 This meant that definitions by mental disability professionals, such as the AAMD's definition of mental retardation,
would not be dispositive on the issue of criminal responsibility.
The court retained the authority to define "mental defect" more
narrowly (or more broadly) than mental retardation professionals,
basing the choice on jurisprudential rather than clinical
considerations. 119
A. 483, 484-85 (1931) (related doctrine of partial responsibility "would turn loose on

society a class of dangerous citizens, who, because of their legalized immunity, would
prey on other members of society without much restraint.") Similarly, an early adherent of more lenient doctrinal treatment of retarded defendants insisted that those
acquitted receive "absolutely indeterminate incarceration" in a special institution or
colony. S. GLUECK, MIENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 385 (1925) (emphasis
in original).
113. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
114. Id.at 874-75.
115. Id. at 875.
116. 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
117. Id.at 851. "A psychiatrist's determination of 'a mental disease or defect' for
clinical purposes... may or may not be the same as the jury's purpose in determining criminal responsibility." Id.
118. Id
119. Id. In the McDonald decision, the court required more than the results of
intelligence testing to warrant sending the issue of insanity to the jury. Id. at 850. An
IQ score of 68 standing alone was not evidence of a mental defect sufficient to invoke
the Durham charge. The court concluded that where "other evidence of mental abnormality appears, in addition to the IQ rating ... the instruction should be given."
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The Durham test was not adopted by any other jurisdiction and
after two decades even the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia replaced it because its reliance on expert testimony regarding causation of criminal behavior was perceived to be unworkable. 2 0° The abandonment of the Durham rule shifted the
debate to the meaning and relative merits of the M'Naghten test
and that of the American Law Institute's [ALI] Model Penal Code.
The latter test provides: "A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if, at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law." 2 1
Courts employing the ALI's test have held that the term
"mental defect" includes mental retardation. 2 2 The precise contours of the definition of "mental defect" are less significant under
the ALI's test than under Durham;under the ALI's test, a finding
of mental defect is only a prerequisite to determining whether the
defendant could appreciate criminality or conform his conduct.
The American Bar Association's Mental Health Standards reject the ALI's test and recommend a modified version of the
M'Naghten test: "[A] person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct, and as a result of a mental
disease or defect, that person was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of such conduct.' ' 23 Mental defect is defined to include
Id Thus a score within the upper range of the professional definition of mental retardation required corroborative evidence (in this case involving only conclusory testimony) to warrant jury consideration of an insanity defense.
120. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 973, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For a relatively recent compilation of the insanity defense tests used by the various states, see
Favole, Mental Disabilityin the American CriminalProcess: A FourIssue Survey, in
MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

247, 257-69 (J. Monahan & H. Steadman eds. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Favole].
121. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985).
122. E.g., In re Ramon M., 22 Cal. 3d 419,427-28,584 P.2d 524, 529-30,149 Cal. Rptr.
387, 394 (1978); United States v. Shorter, 343 A.2d 569, 572 (D.C. 1975).
123. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-6.1(a). The test contained in
this standard is similar to the new federal test for insanity enacted by Congress in
1984:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute
that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the
defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental
disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
Act of Oct. 12,1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 402(a), 98 STAT. 2057 (1984) (to be codified at
18 U.S.C. § 20). The principal difference between the ABA's standard and the new
federal test is the latter's inclusion of the adjective "severe" to modify mental disease
or defect. The legislative history indicates that the drafters were concerned with the
severity of mental illness, rather than mental retardation:
The concept of severity was added to emphasize that non-psychotic behavior disorders or neuroses such as an "inadequate personality," "immature
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mental retardation "which substantially affected the mental or
emotional 4processes of the defendant at the time of the alleged
offense."1
The principal difference between the ALI's test, which had previously been endorsed by the ABA,'2 and the new standard is the
omission of the so-called "volitional prong." Thus, under the
Mental Health Standards,a defendant would not be exculpated if
a mental disease or defect prevented him from conforming his
conduct to the law's requirements. The ABA committee's argument for this change exclusively involves mental illness, suggesting that in practice the volitional test is often combined with
vague or broad definitions of "mental illness." The mixture of
"these two imprecise notions results in expert opinions regarding
the psychological causes of criminal behavior which strain the
public's credulity and offend moral sentiments, especially in cases
involving defendants with personality disorders, impulse disorders, or some other diagnosable
abnormality short of a clinically
'' 6
recognized psychosis. 1
There are two separate contentions in this rationale. The first is
that mental illness constitutes an "imprecise notion," fraught with
definitional and diagnostic fuzziness. This is somewhat less true
of mental retardation, for which a uniform definition is more generally accepted and for which the methodologies of diagnosis and
personality," or a pattern of "antisocial tendencies" do not constitute the
defense.
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 229, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 341.
124. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4,7-6.1(b). The commentary to this
standard notes:
it is not possible to state, in the abstract, that a certain level of retardation
(e.g., severe, as opposed to moderate or mild) would or would not cross the
threshold [to warrant exculpation]. To impose such limitations would
take insufficient account of both the continuing imprecision of the diagnostic process and the unique features of each individual's disorder.
1d. commentary at 334. The drafters clearly did not intend that a defendant should be
entitled to a finding that he had a "mental defect" merely by proving that he was
mentally retarded under the AAMD's definition; rather, the standard contemplates
those with "mental defect" as a smaller subclass. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine a retarded defendant whose retardation did not "substantially affect [his] mental
or emotional process.., at the time of the offense." 1d. 7-6.1(b). The AAMD's definition requires "significantly subaverage intellectual functioning" and "deficits in
adaptive behavior." AAMD, CLASSIFICATION AND MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note
40, at 1. It is not clear what purpose is served by requiring courts to determine
whether such an individual's thought processes were "substantially affected" at the
time of the offense. The requirement may represent an inappropriate attempt to
treat mental retardation in strict parallel with mental illness, where a threshold of
severity is warranted. A preferable approach would provide that all mentally retarded defendants have a "mental defect" for purposes of the insanity defense. The
only remaining step to determine responsibility would inquire whether the retardation rendered the defendant unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.
125. See MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, Part VI introduction at 318.
126. Id. 7-6.1 commentary at 327-36. A leading advocate for the ABA's omission of
the volitional prong has asserted that "[t]he volitional inquiry probably would be manageable if the insanity defense were permitted only in cases involving psychotic disorders." Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.BA. J. 194, 196 (1983).
Cf.supra note 123.
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testing are somewhat more objective. The second component of
the committee's explanation is that the general public finds the
notion of "irresistible impulse" implausible in those defendants
capable of appreciating the wrongfulness of their conduct. This
contention may be equally true for mentally ill and mentally retarded defendants. Popular tolerance may not be much greater
for claims that retardation impaired impulse control than for assertions that mental illness did so.
While the public credulity about irresistible impulses may be
the same for both kinds of disability, the omission of the volitional
prong of the insanity defense may have a particular impact on retarded defendants. As discussed previously, a common characteristic of many mentally retarded people is a reduced ability to
control impulses. n' This trait may have its roots in the cognitive
impairment that leads to reduced intellectual functioning. The
ability to control impulsive behavior is related to the ability to understand both the nature of behavior and the social circumstances
that make an action appropriate or inappropriate to a particular
occasion. Thus, to some extent, impulsivity may reflect an educational deficit, because proper teaching can equip most retarded
persons to tailor their actions to social expectations. This deficit is
particularly common in people who have been institutionalized. 2 8
There should be considerable discomfort with the prospect of punishing retarded individuals whose ability to control their impulses
is underdeveloped or atrophied, in part, as an iatrogenic consequence of state action. 2 9
Other features of the Mental Health Standards'formulation of
the insanity defense are also noteworthy. By explicitly including
mental retardation within the definition of mental defect, the
Mental Health Standardsreject the argument that the insanity defense should be unavailable to mentally retarded people who are
127. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.

128. This phenomenon has long been observed:
The history of the prisoner's life is somewhat significant. From early
childhood it has been spent in alms-houses, subjected to constant constraint. In the most ordinary acts of his life he has been governed by the
superior will of others to whose care he has been committed. He has, it
appears, been seldom left to the free guidance of his own judgment. When
so left, he seems to have acted without forecast, under the pressure of immediate wants and impulses.
State v. Richards, 39 Conn. 591, 595 (1873).
129. It is not our contention that the existence of retarded individuals with impairments in their ability to control their behavior should dictate the choice between the
ALI's test and that of the Mental Health Standards. However, the appropriate treatment of these defendants should be one factor in deciding to abandon the volitional
component of the insanity defense. In those jurisdictions that retain the volitional
component, courts should be aware of these factors in deciding the individual cases of
retarded defendants who assert the defense.
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not also mentally ill. The ABA Commission on the Mentally Disabled recently published a proposed model statute which took this
approach.1 30 This statute provides that "[d]efendants who have a
developmental disability but who do not also have a mental illness
are not entitled to assert a defense that they are not guilty by reason of insanity . ..".-31 The comment to this section of the model
statute argues that developmental disabilities (including mental
retardation) present issues of criminal responsibility which are
more appropriately addressed in the context of the doctrine of "diminished capacity." 132 Subsequent sections of the statute provide
for a verdict of acquittal by reason of diminished capacity, and an
133
accompanying set of procedures for evaluation and commitment
of those so acquitted. The approach taken by the Mental Health
Standards is preferable to that of the model statute. Arguments
can be made for abolishing the insanity defense entirely, and relying, instead, solely upon the requirement of mens rea for exculpation of the mentally disabled.1 3 4 Nevertheless, abolishing the
insanity defense for mentally retarded defendants and leaving it
in place for mentally ill defendants would create a serious inequity; the inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of criminal conduct would exculpate a person who was mentally ill, but would
not exculpate a mentally retarded person. No principled reason
has been advanced for the differential treatment of these two similarly situated groups of defendants, each of whom is equally "innocent" of responsibility for his conduct. 3 5
Another feature of the Mental Health Standards is the use of
the term "appreciate" instead of "know" in the formulation of the
defense. The commentary states that this choice parallels that of
the drafters of the ALI's test for the cognitive component of their
formulation, and reflects the view that a responsibility test should
go beyond a defendant's "superficial intellectual awareness;" the
130.

MODEL DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED OFFENDERS

AcT, suipra note 8, §§ 1-4.

131. 1d § 10(1).
132. I& § 10(2), (3). It should be noted that the Mental Health Standardsprovide
for the admissibility of evidence of mental condition relevant to the issue of mens rea.
See MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-6.2 commentary at 341.
133. MODEL DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED OFFENDER ACT, supra note 8,
§ 10(1)-(4). The act avoids the use of the term "commitment" and opts for the euphemism of "provision of habilitation services on an involuntary basis." Id. § 10(6)(b).
134. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 18-207 (1982). But see MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS,
supra note 4,7-6.1 commentary at 334; Limiting The InsanityDefense: Hearingson S.
818, S. 1106, S.1558, S. 1995, S.2572, S. 2658, and S. 2669 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalLaw of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 255,269-75 (1982)
(statement of Professor Richard Bonnie); MODEL PENAL CODE, § 4.01 commentary at
180-86 (1985).
135. Other commentators also have suggested that the insanity defense is inappropriate for retarded defendants, but these suggestions appear to be based, in part, on
practical considerations concerning subsequent confinement. S. HAYES & R. HAYES,
SIMPLY CRIINAL 165 (1984) (the authors suggest that under the Australian system,
because a retarded person will not "recover" from his retardation, the insanity defense is inappropriate); see also S. HAYES & R. HAYES, MENTAL RETARDATION: LAW,
PoLicY AND ADMINISTRATION 406 (1982) (arguing that the principle of normalization
requires that mentally retarded people should receive no special doctrinal treatment
on the basis of their disability).
VOL.
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focus of the inquiry into criminal responsibility should not be limited, as the term "know" might suggest, to a defendant's limited
understanding of the law or prevailing morality. Instead, the test
for criminal responsibility should take into account all aspects of
the defendant's mental and emotional functioning which relate to
the ability to recognize and understand the significance of one's
136
actions.
Although this shift in terminology is relevant to the mental condition of some mentally ill defendants, it is particularly important
in cases involving mental retardation. When a retarded defendant's understanding of the wrongfulness of his conduct is in question, it is often a "lack of appreciation for the subtleties of social
interaction and abstract concepts of right and wrong that impair
his behavior."' 137 Identifying the issue as the retarded defendant's
ability to "appreciate" the wrongfulness of his conduct allows the
trier of fact to focus more realistically on the defendant's actual
understanding than does the more ambiguous "knowledge"
formulation.
Finally, it should be noted that the label which the Mental
Health Standards assign to the defense, "mental nonresponsibility" rather than "insanity," is a felicitous choice for cases involving
mental retardation. The commentary argues that the newer term
is preferable because "'insanity' carries with it too much stigmatizing baggage and... conjures up visions from an earlier era."' 38
In addition to "conjur[ing] up visions of beastlike derangement,"'139 "insanity" also connotes a mental illness or disease,

which is inapplicable to mental retardation. 140 Therefore, the
term "mental nonresponsibility" has the additional virtue of eliminating the confusion as to whether retarded defendants who are
not mentally ill are entitled to assert the defense.
136. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-6.1 commentary at 330-35; see
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 commentary at 178-80 (1985) (stating that the inquiry
should focus on "whether the defendant was without capacity to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law").
137. Tupin & Goolishian, Mental Retardation and Legal Responsibility, 18
DE PAUL L. REV. 673, 677 (1969); see Empirical Study: The Mentally Retarded Offender in Omaha-DouglasCounty, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 622, 646 (1975) (arguing that,
although mentally retarded persons may be able to distinguish right from wrong in
the abstract, they have difficulty applying the abstract concepts to specific factual settings). See generally Gray, The Insanity Defense: HistoricalDevelopment and Contemporary Relevance, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 559, 573 (1972) (discussing Piaget's
theories of abstract thinking and moral development).
138. AENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, ch.7 introduction at 5.

139. Id. part VI introduction at 316.
140. The stigmatizing aspects of the label "insane" may be felt in a particularly
acute manner by mentally retarded people and their families. Cf. S. HAYES &
R. HAYES, SIMPLY CRIMINAL 69 (1984) ('"The aims of the criminal process... [cannot]
be fulfilled adequately or appropriately while mentally retarded offenders remain
categorised as 'insane' ").
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B. Guilty But Mentally Ill
Dissatisfaction with the perceived leniency of the insanity defense
has led a number of states to adopt statutes providing an alternative verdict of "guilty but mentally ill."1 The momentum for
adoption of these laws appears to have increased following the insanity acquittal of John Hinckley, Jr. 14 The guilty-but-mentallyill statutes typically provide for the alternative verdict to be offered in jury instructions in cases in which the defendant has
raised the defense of insanity.143 The Mental Health Standards
unequivocally recommend that states refuse to adopt this
verdict.144
The ABA's criticism of these statutes is based on the belief that
they may prove confusing to juries and thus result in compromise
verdicts or otherwise deny an acquittal to a mentally nonresponsible defendant with meritorious defenses.14 5 The commentary
does not discuss the extent to which these statutes affect mentally
retarded defendants or the meaning and impact of the alternative
verdict in mental retardation cases.
Initially, it appears that the very formulation of the "guilty but
mentally ill" verdict would make it inapplicable to mentally retarded defendants who were not also mentally ill. Although "insanity" has become a legal term whose meaning is sufficiently
flexible to encompass defendants who are mentally retarded, 146
"mental illness" appears unambiguously to exclude those who are
not mentally ill. But some of the guilty-but-mentally-ill statutes
are not so clear.
Michigan's law, the first to be enacted, is typical in its confusing
treatment of mentally retarded defendants. It provides that a defendant can be found guilty but mentally ill if he raises the defense of insanity, which can be based on mental retardation,14 7 and
141. See MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-6.10(b) commentary at
386-88. For a general discussion of the guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict, see also Hermann & Sor, Convicting or Confining?Alternative Directions in Insanity Law Reforr7"n
Guilty But Mentally Ill Versus New Rules for Release of Insanity Acquittees,

1983 B.Y.U. L. REv. 499; Stelzner & Piatt, The Guilty But Mentally 171 Verdict and
Pleain New Mexico, 13 N.M.L. REV. 99 (1983); Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ilk An
Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 53 J. URB. L. 471 (1976). See generally
Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict An Idea Whose Time Should Not Have
Come, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 494 (1985).
142. See George, The American Bar Association's Mental Health Standards: An
Overview, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 338, 345-46 (1985).
143. In New Mexico the court delivers the guilty-but-mentally-ill instruction upon
the defendant's claim that he lacked the mens rea necessary for the offense, even if
the defendant's request for an insanity instruction is denied by the trial court. State v.
Page, 100 N.M. 788, 791, 676 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Ct. App. 1984).
144. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-6.10(b).
145. Id commentary at 386-88. Michigan's experience suggests that the introduction of the verdict does not reduce insanity acquittals, and that the majority of guiltybut-mentally-ill verdicts result from defendants' pleas. Project, Evaluating Michigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An EmpiricalStudy, 16 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 77,
100-04 (1982).
146. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
147. People v. Gasco, 119 Mich. App. 143, 144, 326 N.W.2d 397, 398 (1982).
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the trier of fact finds he "was mentally ill at the time of the commission of that offense."'' 4 This would appear to make the verdict
unavailable when the defendant's insanity defense was based
solely on evidence of mental retardation. However, a subsequent
section provides that a defendant found guilty but mentally ill
shall be evaluated by the department of corrections "and be given
such treatment as is psychiatrically indicated for his mental illness
149 Other states define "mental illness" for puror retardation."'
poses of the guilty-but-mentally-ill defense to include mental retardation. 150 Another approach has been to define mental illness
in terms similar to the state's mental illness civil commitment
statute. This presumably excludes mentally retarded people, as
they do not fall within the scope of that statute. 5 1 Certainly the
most confusing of the guilty-but-mentally-ill laws are those that
define "mentally ill" in terms similar to those employed in the
formulation of the insanity defense itself.152
M CH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(1) (West 1982).
149. I § 768.36(3) (emphasis added). The confusion between mental illness and
mental retardation is exacerbated by the reference to "psychiatrically indicated."
Although some psychiatrists work with mentally retarded individuals, they are not
the principal experts on mental retardation. See infra notes 392-402 and accompanying text.
150. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-36-1 (Burns Supp. 1984). "V'Mentally ill' means
having a psychiatric disorder which substantially disturbs a person's thinking, feeling,
or behavior and impairs the person's ability to function; 'mentally ill' also includes
having any mental retardation." Id. Georgia includes within the definition of "mentally ill" the AAMD definition of mental retardation. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(a)(2)
(Michie Supp. 1985). Indiana also provides that a convict shall be treated in a manner
"psychiatrically indicated for his illness" upon determining a disposition after a
guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-2-36-5 (Burns Supp. 1984). See
aZso GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(d), (e) (1984).
151. CompareN.M. STAT. ANN. 31-9-3(A) (1978 & repl. 1984) ("mentally ill means a
substantial disorder of thought, mood or behavior which afflicted a person at the time
of the commission of the offense and which impaired that person's judgment .... )
with N.M. STAT. ANN. 43-1-3(N) (1978 & repl. 1984) ("mental disorder means the substantial disorder of the person's emotional processes, thought or cognition which
grossly impairs judgment, behavior or capacity to recognize reality").
152. Pennsylvania defines "mentally ill" for guilty-but-mentally-ill purposes as
"one who as a result of mental disease or defect, lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law," and defines "legal insanity" as "laboring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 314(c) (Purdon 1982). Similarly, Alaska defines the
insanity defense in terms of the defendant being "unable, as a result of a mental
disease or defect, to appreciate the nature and quality of that conduct," ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.47.010 (1984), and defines guilty-but-mentally-ill in terms of "the defendant
lack[-ing], as a result of a mental disease or defect, the substantial capacity either to
appreciate the wrongfulness of that conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law." Id § 12.47.030. Under these statutes, jurors could probably tell
that mentally retarded defendants were included in the scope of both the insanity and
guilty-but-mentally-ill instructions, but the jurors' ability to disentangle the definitions for other purposes is open to serious doubt.

148.
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In one sense, where mentally retarded defendants are within
the scope of the statutes, they are no more disadvantaged by
guilty-but-mentally-ill instructions than are mentally ill defendants. Each group is subjected to the risk of jury confusion and
compromise verdicts, although the risk for retarded defendants
may be somewhat higher because of ambiguous terminology. In
another sense, however, mentally retarded defendants are at
greater risk. Typically, guilty-but-mentally-ill statutes do not
guarantee treatment for defendants who are convicted under this
verdict. 1 53 But the likelihood that mentally retarded individuals

will receive necessary and individualized habilitation may be even
smaller where the focus of the statute is on "psychiatrically indicated treatment."' 15 4 For a convict whose need is special education,
mental health treatment, particularly if it is of marginal quality,
will do little to alleviate that need. The availability of the guiltybut-mentally-ill verdict may persuade some juries and some defendants that there is an increased opportunity for appropriate
treatment, but this is unlikely to be true for mentally retarded
people.'i
IV.

Competence Issues for Mentally Retarded Defendants

For a mentally retarded defendant, many of the most important
issues in the criminal justice system turn on the question of "competence." This term eludes precise definition, but the issues
within its scope help explain its basic meaning. These issues involve the individual's ability to understand certain important and
relevant concepts and to act on the basis of that understanding at a
minimally acceptable level of skill. While the term "competence"
is not ordinarily employed in discussions of the insanity defense,
the questions of a retarded person's ability to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct (and perhaps to conform his actions
to the requirements of the law) invoke the same principles and
thus constitute a parallel inquiry.
This section will analyze three competence issues to which
mental retardation is particularly relevant: competence to waive
constitutional rights in the context of confessions, competence to
1 56
stand trial, and competence to enter a plea of guilty.

153. See Stelzner & Piatt, The Guilty But Mentally Il Verdict and Plea in New
Mexico, 13 N.M.L. REv. 99, 115 (1983). The study of the operation of Michigan's statute found that guilty-but-mentally-ill convicts were no more likely to receive treatment than other prisoners. Project, EvaluatingMichigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill
Verdict An Empirical Study, 16 U. MIcH. J. L. REFoRM 77, 104-05 (1982).
154. See supra note 150.
155. For a discussion of habilitation in prisons, see supra notes 363-91 and accompanying text.
156. There are, of course, numerous other contexts in which the competence of a
retarded defendant may come into question, including compentence to testify and
competence to waive other constitutional rights, such as assistance of counsel, jury
trial, and appeals.

VOL. 53:414

Mentally Retarded Defendants
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

A. Confessions
American courts have long recognized that confessions by mentally retarded persons are somewhat suspect, although they have
not always been successful in articulating the reasons for their
skepticism. 57 Long before Miranda v. Arizona 5 8 and its detractors made criminal confessions a long-playing national controversy, 59 courts occasionally overturned convictions because they
believed questionable confessions should not have been admitted
into evidence. Some such cases have involved mentally retarded
defendants.
The confession of a boy "of crude and feeble mind and irresolute
will" was held to be inadmissable when it was shown that the confession was made as an angry crowd threatened to hang the boy
(and had already hanged another person for the crime). 60 In another case, the Supreme Court of Mississippi threw out the confession of an individual who was described as "not bright" and whose
employer testified that "[h]e is going to give you the answer you
desire. If you want a 'yes,' he will give it to you; and if you want a
'no,' he will give you that.' 6 ' The Alabama Supreme Court found
inadmissable the confession of a "colored" servant "of weak
mental capacity, and humble, docile disposition" to her employer,
who had locked the servant in a smoke-house until she confessed. 62 The Supreme Court of Arkansas threw out a confession
by a "stupid and weak-minded" teenager who had not been told of
the possible consequences of such a confession and who had been
promised that if he confessed he would not be harmed163
It certainly would be inaccurate to suggest that American courts
readily excluded criminal confessions on grounds of mental deficiency in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For exam157. For a modern statement of the law in this area, see W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, 1
CRIUINAL PROCEDURE 525-27 (1984); see also Annot., 8 A.L.R.4th 16 (1981) (mental
subnormality is one factor identified in the totality of the circumstances to be considered in determining voluntariness). For a discussion of Canadian cases addressing the
same problem, see Henderson, Mental Incapacity and the Admissibility of Statements, 23 CHIM. L. Q. 62, 71-73 (1980).
158. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
159. See generally L. BAKER, MIRANDA: CRE, LAW AND POLmcs (1983) (analyzing the evolution of the Mirandadoctrine).
160. Butler v. Commonwealth, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 435, 435-36 (1865).
161. Ford v. State, 75 Miss. 101, 103-04, 21 So. 524, 535 (1887).
162. Hoober v. State, 81 Ala. 51, 52, 1 So. 574, 575 (1886).
163. Williams v. State, 69 Ark. 599, 600, 65 S.W. 103, 104 (1901). See also State v.
Mason, 4 Idaho 543, 548, 43 P. 63, 64 (1895) (holding a confession coerced from a "halfwitted" boy by the armed emissary of an insurance company inadmissable); Hamilton
v. State, 77 Miss. 675, 678, 27 So. 606, 608 (1900) (holding confessions of a "dull" defendant in response to the repeated urging of his employer involuntary and thus inadmissible); Peck v. State, 147 Ala. 100, 102, 41 So. 759, 760 (1906) (holding confession of
a "weak minded" defendant, evoked by a question that assumed the defendant's guilt,
inadmissible).
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ple, the Georgia Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a
confession by a "man of weak mind" who was not an "idiot," declaring that persons who knew the difference between right and
wrong and were capable of committing the crime were "liable to
be convicted upon their own confession."'6 The court was unpersuaded by claims that such confessions were unreliable, and observed that: "[E]xperience teaches that, in point of fact, the
cunning and crafty are much more likely to conceal and misrepresent the truth, than those who are less gifted.' 65 Nevertheless,
courts did widely accept some degree of mental disability
as suffi66
cient to call into question the validity of a confession
As these early cases suggest, the relevance of mental retardation to the validity of a confession has more than one component.
One consideration is the increased likelihood that the retarded
person may be abnormally susceptible to coercion and pressure,
and therefore more likely to give a confession that is not truly
voluntary. 67 Another consideration is the possibility that the suspect will make a false confession out of a desire to please someone
perceived to be an authority figure.1 68 There is also reason for
concern that the retarded suspect does not understand, and may
be incapable of understanding,
the ramifications of a confession,
69
and his right not to confess.'
These considerations mirror the factors involved in obtaining legally adequate consent from retarded people in other areas, such
as medical care and admission to residential facilities and institutions. 170 Confessions involve waivers of constitutional rights, and
164. Studstill v. State, 7 Ga. 2, 12 (1849).
165. 1& The court buttressed its conclusion by declaring- "It is the trite observation of all travelers that if you wish to learn the truth with respect to the health of a
country, you must interrogate the children and servants about the matter." I&
166. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in a case involving minority rather
than mental deficiency, declared: "[I]f the party against whom the confessions are
introduced is shown not to possess sufficient intelligence... to understand the nature and obligation of an oath,.. . the statement or confession of such witness ought
not to be received in evidence." Grayson v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 573, 574, 51 S.W. 246,
246 (1899).
It is noteworthy that the analogy between children and mentally retarded adults,
which encounters strenuous resistance in the area of the insanity defense, see supra
notes 105-12 and accompanying text, finds more acceptance in the courts in cases involving the admissibility of confessions. Courts in confession cases frequently state,
and appear to place some reliance on, the mental age of defendants. See, e.g., Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 620 (1961) (court did not admit the confession of a thirtythree year old man with a mental age of nine and a half); United States v. Hull, 441
F.2d 308, 312 (7th Cir. 1971) (court did not admit the confession of an illiterate thirtyfour year old man with a mental age of eight or nine); Hines v. State, 384 So. 2d 1171,
1177 (Ala. Crim. App.) (court did not admit the confession of a defendant who had a
mental age of a six-year old), cert denied 384 So. 2d 1184 (1980).
167. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 69 Ark. 599, 602, 65 S.W. 103, 105 (1901) (promise of
protection induced confession); Hoober v. State, 81 Ala. 51, 53, 1 So. 574, 575-76 (1887)
(prosecutor led defendant to believe that she could go free only if she confessed).
168. See, e.g., Ford v. State, 75 Miss. 101, 102-04, 21 So. 524, 525-26 (1887); see also
supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of "cheating to lose").
169. See Grayson v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 573, 574, 51 S.W. 246, 246 (1899) (confession admissable only if defendant possessed "sufficient intelligence").
170. See Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 745, 370
N.E.2d 417, 427 (1977); AMERIcAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CONSENT
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thus require careful judicial scrutiny to ensure their validity.171
Considerations affecting the validity of such a waiver parallel
those involved in other forms of consent. 172 The three necessary
elements of a legally valid consent or waiver are capacity, information, and voluntariness. 73 Each of these elements presents
particular problems in confession cases involving mentally retarded people. 74
Whether a waiver is "intelligent" (and therefore valid) depends
on the circumstances of the particular case, "including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused," according to
Johnson v. Zerbst 75 This description is surely broad enough to
encompass a suspect's mental retardation as a relevant factor. An
intelligent waiver' 76 requires that the individual make "a rational
choice based upon some appreciation of the consequences of the
decision,"' 77 and a retarded person's limited intelligence may diminish his ability to appreciate these consequences, just as it may
limit his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. 78
Courts have recognized that a person's mental retardation does
not, by itself, render him automatically incapable of the waiver
inherent in a voluntary confession. 179 Mental retardation, howHANDBOOK 11 (H.R. Turnbull ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as CONSENT HANDBOOK];

Price & Burt, NonconsensualMedical Proceduresand the Right to Privacy, in THE
MENTALLY RETARDED CrrIzE AND THE LAW 93-112 (M. Kindred, J. Cohen, D. Penrod
& T. Shaffer eds. 1976).
171. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
172. Friedman, Legal Regulation ofApplied Behavior Analysis in Mental Institutions and Prisons,17 ARIZ. L. REV. 39, 71 (1975).
173. CONSENT HANDBOOK, supra note 170, at 6-13; Friedman, supra note 172, at 52;
see Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consentto Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628, 630-46
(1970).
174. Courts have recognized, for example, that mental retardation may be relevant
to the issue of voluntariness even where it has been determined that an individual's
capacity and information were acceptable. See, e.g., State v. Cheshire, 313 S.E.2d 61, 65
(W.Va. 1984).
175. 304 U.S. 458, 464.
176. An intelligent waiver by a mentally retarded person is, of course, an oxymoron. The Third Circuit discussed the intelligent waiver of a defendant's Miranda
rights as follows:
[I]ndeed it may be argued forcefully that a choice by a defendant to forego
the presence of counsel at a police interrogation is almost invariably an
unintelligent course of action. It is not in the sense of shrewdness that
Miranda speaks of "intelligent" waiver but rather in the tenor that the
individual must know of his available options before deciding what he
thinks best suits his particular situation. In this context intelligence is not
equated with wisdom.
Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735, 738-39 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 877 (1974).
177. Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142, 1146 (5th Cir. 1972).
178. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
179. See Commonwealth v. White, 362 Mass. 193, 196, 285 N.E.2d 110, 113 (1972)
(the court admitted the otherwise valid confession of a feeble-minded and illiterate
defendant); State v. Anderson, 379 So. 2d 735, 736-37 (La. 1980) (in considering
whether a mentally retarded defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights,
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ever, raises serious questions about the suspect's understanding of
the situation. Moreover, the Supreme Court has placed the burden of persuasion to establish the validity of the waiver on the
state.180 Therefore, it is in the interest of prosecutors and law enforcement officials to document that each confession by a retarded
suspect was within his capacity.
The capacity issue is likely to focus on the retarded person's
ability to understand the warning which Mirandarequires the police give to all suspects.181 The first issue is whether the retarded
8 2
suspect understands the concepts which constitute the warning.
The concepts of what "rights" are, what it means to give them up
voluntarily, the notion of the ability to refuse to answer questions
asked by a person of great authority, the concepts of the subsequent use of incriminating statements, the right to counsel and the
right to have the state pay for that counsel, and the idea that the
suspect can delay answering questions until a lawyer arrives are
all of some abstraction and difficulty. 8 3 A substantial number of
retarded people will not know what one or more of these ideas
means. 8- 4 A related difficulty is that the vocabulary of many retarded people is so limited; they may not be able to understand the
85
warning even if they are familiar with its component concepts'

Several courts have held a confession inadmissable where it was
court considered additional factors including expert testimony and the arresting officer's ambivalent testimony questioning whether the defendant ever understood the
rights explained to him); accord THE PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION,
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW 33 (1963).
180. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
181. The Miranda Court required that police warn each suspect "prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can and will be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires." Id. at 479 (1966).
182. It has been suggested that the anxiety some retarded defendants will experience upon being arrested may reduce their ability to understand the warning statement. F. MENOLAScINO, CHALLENGES IN MENTAL RETARDATION: PROGRESSIVE
IDEOLOGY AND SERvICES 185 (1977).
183. See Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1972). The Cooper court
found
substantial uncontroverted testimony that neither boy was capable of
meaningfully comprehending the Miranda warning. The special education teachers testified that the boys would not have understood the gravity
of the charges against them, the consequences of a conviction, any defenses which might be available to them, or any circumstances which
might mitigate the charges.
1d, See also Henry v. Dees, 658 F.2d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 1981) (mentally retarded defendant did not "separately and independently" name his constitutional rights because it was unlikely that he understood the complex waivers and their
consequences).
184. See People v. Bruce, 62 A.D.2d 1073, 1073-74, 403 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1978). Indeed, the Bruce court found it necessary to explain the meaning of voluntary to the defendant, a 17-year-old boy with an IQ of 59,before accepting his guilty
plea. Id.
185. See id., 403 N.Y.S.2d at 588-89 (A special education teacher testified that the
defendant who had an IQ of 59 "had a vocabulary of the approximate level of a 10 year
old, and would have difficulty understanding the entire warning form, unless it were
read at a slow pace with emphasis on certain words .... The officer... did not

attempt to explain the meaning of the warning to defendant.").
VOL.
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shown that the defendant was unlikely to have understood the
warning and where it was read to them "in a summary fashion,
without elaboration."' 18 6 One state court has turned this holding
into a more general rule: "When expert testimony indicates that a
defendant could have intelligently understood the waiver of his
constitutional rights only if they were simply and clearly explained, the record must expressly and specifically establish that
such an explanation was given."'18 7 These concerns arise even
with defendants classified as mildly retarded. 8 8
A substantial problem develops when the difficulties with a
mentally retarded defendant's capacity are not identified at the
time his confession is sought. 8 9 Capacity problems may work to
the serious disadvantage of the defendant if they result in an
invalid confession being used against him at trial. They may also
create serious problems for the prosecution if the disability is later
identified and the confession proves to be inadmissible. A number
of indicators might provide early warning of a capacity problem.
One would be to identify whether the suspect is literate. 9 0 An186. E.g., Toliver v. Gathright, 501 F. Supp. 148, 150 (E.D. Va. 1980); see infra note
193.
187. Hines v. State, 384 So. 2d 1171, 1181 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980). Although such
elaboration and explanation may require a deviation from the usual wording of the
Mirandatest, this deviation should not create a difficulty as long as the explanation is
clear and complete. The Supreme Court has held that the "precise formulation of the
warning" is not required as a "talismanic incantation." California v. Prysock, 453 U.S.
355, 359 (1981).
188. The defendants in Toliver, Cooper, and Bruce were all mildly retarded. See
supra notes 183-86. In Cooper, the court characterized the defendants as having "extreme mental deficiency." 455 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1972). Although the defendant's IQ scores fell within the "mild" range, the court's characterization is
understandable, because the level of handicap, especially for verbal tasks like those
involved in a Mirandawaiver, was substantial. See id
Unlike these cases Hines involved a defendant with an IQ of 39, which is on the
border between severe and moderate retardation. Hines misspelled his last name two
different ways in signing the waiver form, and there was expert testimony that at his
level of functioning "tying a shoe would be a complex task." 384 So. 2d at 117576.
189. See, e.g., People v. Redmon, 127 Ill. App. 3d 342, 468 N.E.2d 1310, 1313 (1984)
(16 year-old defendant had an IQ between 70 and 73). In Redmon, the defendant's
confession, obtained after 19 hours of interrogation, was suppressed for lack of capacity to waive his right to counsel. Id. at 1316. During the interrogation, police officers
repeatedly read Redmon the Mirandawarning, but he understood it only later, when
the prosecutor explained the warning in greater detail. Id. at 1315.
190. Morrow, A Legal Framework An Insider's Perspective, in REHABILITATION
AND THE RETARDED OFFENDER 60-61 (P. Browning ed. 1976). The author notes that
"[a]pparently the question, 'Can you read?' is rarely asked." Id. The mechanisms that
a retarded person has used all his life to minimize the stigma that accompanies his
disability may make identification of this problem a little more difficult. Morrow depicts a scene in which the defendant, in his desire to please the police officer, makes a
statement. The police officer normally writes down the statement, reads it back, says
"something to the effect of 'read this over ... is it right?,' and requests the accused's
signature. Sometimes the retarded person will appear to read the document to himself, but in fact, will not read it at all." Id
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other approach is to ask about the suspect's educational background.1 9 1 Observing the ease with which he signs his name
would also provide some clue. 192 Indications of confusion and inconsistency may also indicate a lack of capacity. 193 The scope of
the accused person's apparent vocabulary may also provide some
guidance. Ultimately, the most useful approach is to ensure that
the warning itself is given in a clear and unhurried fashion.
Whenever a doubt arises, explanations should be offered and inquiries made to determine if the accused has really understood.
The inquiry about the capacity of an individual to consent is
closely related to the issue of whether he has sufficient information upon which to base a choice. 9 4 The information component
of legally adequate consent for a retarded suspect may turn on
whether he understands the concepts contained in the waiver.
But retarded individuals, particularly if they have led a life isolated from the community, may also lack basic information about
the workings of the criminal justice system. Failure to understand
the adversarial nature of prosecutions and the concepts5 of trials
9
and their consequences should invalidate a confession.
The third element of legally adequate consent is that the act
must be voluntary. This component has engendered a great deal
of litigation concerning the confessions of mentally retarded suspects. The concern with this element is not that the suspect did
not understand what was being asked of him, but rather that his
action, either a confession or a waiver of the right to counsel, was
the product of coercion. In evaluating voluntariness, the Supreme
Court has warned of the importance of "the unusual susceptibility
of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion.' 1 96 An individual with mental retardation may be particularly susceptible to
nonphysical coercion. 197 Lower courts have identified special
191. See People v. Varecha, 353 M1.52,57-58, 186 N.E. 607,608-09 (1933) (court must
look to defendant's ability to be taught in determining his mental competence).
192. Id.; see supra note 188.
193. See Toliver v. Gathright, 501 F. Supp. 148, 151 (E.D. Va. 1980). The court observed: "The fact that Toliver said he would not make a statement, just moments
after he signed the waiver form, evinces confusion rather than comprehension." Id.
194. This element of the "consent triad" has been the focus of much litigation in
the area of medical care for mentally typical people. See, eg., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d
229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972). It is the concentrated focus on
information in this context that leads to the somewhat misleading label "informed

consent." See CONSENT HANDBOOK, supra note 170, at 6.
195. The Supreme Court has recently observed: "ThisCourt has never embraced
the theory that a defendant's ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions vitiates their voluntariness." Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1297 (1985). But Elstad
and the decisions it cites involved marginal misunderstandings by defendants who
were mentally typical. The "ignorance of the full consequences" of a mentally retarded defendant may be different in kind, not just degree, from those envisioned by
the Eistad majority.
196. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 n.8 (1980).
197. See Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407 (1967); Wreck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 442
(1961); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 625, 633 (1961); Fikes v. Alabama, 352
U.S. 191, 196-97 (1957); see also Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929, 938 (5th Cir. 1980) (en
banc) (accused was functionally isolated from all but his interrogators), cert denied,
450 U.S. 1001 (1981). The Jurek court stated.
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problems with retarded defendants in cases involving prolonged
questioning, 198 threats and promises of leniency,1'
a strip

search,200 and a polygraph test.20 1 Another court noted that a re-

tarded defendant, confronted with an accomplice's statement implicating him, "was particularly likely to have an exaggerated
perception of the dangers of remaining silent."20 2
Some courts have suggested that mental deficiency alone, without a showing of threats, deprivation of food, or some similarly
extreme circumstance will not render the voluntariness of a confession suspect, 20 3 but intimidation and coercion may take on subtle forms with a mentally retarded suspect. More than twenty
years ago, the President's Panel on Mental Retardation observed:
The retarded are particularly vulnerable to an atmosphere of
threats and coercion, as well as to one of friendliness designed to
induce confidence and cooperation. A retarded person may be
hard put to distinguish between the fact and the appearance of
friendliness. If his life has been molded into a pattern of submissiveness, he will be less able than the average person to withstand normal police pressures. Indeed they may impinge on him
with greater force because their lack of clarity to him, like all
unknowns, renders them more frightening. Some of the retarded are characterized by a desire to please authority: if a confession will please, it may be gladly given. "Cheating to lose,"
allowing others to place blame on him so that they will not be
angry with him, is a common pattern among the submissive retarded. It is unlikely that a retarded person will see the implications of consequences of2his
statements in the way a person of
04
normal intelligence will.

In considering the voluntariness of a confession, this court must take into
account a defendant's mental limitations, to determine whether through
susceptibility to surrounding pressures or inability to comprehend the circumstances, the confession was not a product of his own free will ....
The concern in a case involving a defendant of subnormal intelligence is
one of suggestibility.

623 F.2d at 937-38.
198. United States v. Hull, 441 F.2d 308, 312 (7th Cir. 1971).
199. United States v. Blocker, 354 F. Supp. 1195, 1201 (D.D.C. 1973), qffd,509 F.2d
538 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

200. Id
201. Henry v. Dees, 658 F.2d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 1981).
202. Toliver v. Gathright, 501 F. Supp. 148, 154 (E.D. Va. 1980)
203. United States v. Barnes, 520 F. Supp. 946, 957 (D.D.C. 1981). Other courts
have suggested that the significance of mental retardation may be less where the defendant has had extensive experience with the criminal justice system. E.g., United
States v. Young, 355 F. Supp. 103, 111 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Still other courts have suggested that whether the retarded suspect is employed may be relevant. E.g., People v.
'Bruce, 62 A.D.2d 1073, 403 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (1978). It is not clear from these opinions
whether employment is thought relevant to the suspect's capacity to understand the
waiver or to his susceptibility to coercion. E.g., State v. Anderson, 379 So. 2d 735, 737
(La. 1980).
204. PRESMEN'S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, REPORT OF THE TAsK FORCE
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These factors should induce great caution in law enforcement officials seeking confessions and in courts reviewing their legal
adequacy.2 05
Part II of the new Mental Health Standards20 6 addresses "Police
and Custodial Roles," but does not directly treat the waiver and
confession problems. It does, however, recommend that law enforcement personnel receive specialized training to help them
identify mental health and mental retardation problems.20 7 Further, in a different context, the Mental Health Standards recognize the problem with involving mental retardation professonals
in the interrogation process in the absence of counsel; Mirandatype warnings are insufficient where the defendant is unaware of
the precise nature
of the interview and the adversarial role of the
2 08
interviewer.
B.

Competence to Stand Trial

The competence of mentally retarded defendants to stand trial is a
crucial issue. 20 9 While the doctrine in this area is well settled,
practical problems with its implementation loom large, and the
nature of mental retardation exacerbates those problems.
The courts have long accepted that it is impermissible to try a
defendant who lacks the ability to understand the proceedings or
to present a defense. Blackstone declared that such persons could
not be tried.2 10 This view has been fully supported by other com33 (1963); see also Morrow, supra note 190, at 60 (the retarded individual's
desire to assimilate may also make it very difficult to identify him as retarded); CONSENT HANDBOOK, supra note 170, at 11 (mentally retarded persons are more likely to
aquiesce to requests from authority figures).
205. One appellate court stated with admirable candor. "We do not know enough
about intelligence quotients (IQ) and mental retardation to rule conclusively on this
question. Yet we do know enough to believe the matter needs further analysis."
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 366 Mass. 601, 608, 321 N.E.2d 822, 828 (1975). The court
went on to suggest that expert testimony on mental retardation might be necessary at
suppression hearings. Id, 321 N.E.2d at 828.
206. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-2.1 - 7-2.9.
207. Id. 7-2.8.
208. See id. 7-3.1 commentary at 75-76. The MentalHealth Standardspoint out the
potentially ironic result of a mental health professional's presence at the interrogation. The contrast between antagonistic police interviewers and the compassionate
mental health or mental retardation professional interviewer may induce the defendant to make legally damaging statements he might not otherwise make. This is particularly true in light of the professional's sophisticated interviewing techniques.
Questions that require seemingly innocuous answers may be intended to evoke, and
may result in, legally damaging responses. Id
209. See generally Bennett, A Guided Tour Through Selected ABA Standards Relating to Incompetence to Stand Tria 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 375 (1985).
210. Blackstone elaboratedAlso, if a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and before
arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it;
because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he
ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall
not be tried, for how can he make his defense?
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COmMEARiES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND *24. Hale reached the
same conclusion:
If a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and before his
arraignment he becomes absolutely mad, he ought not by law to be arON LAW
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mentators and courts in England and America. 211 The United
States Supreme Court has observed that trying an incompetent
defendant violates due process. 212 And although the public has
fixed its attention on the insanity defense, 2 13 Dr. Alan Stone is
certainly correct in calling competence to stand trial "the most significant mental health inquiry pursued in the system of criminal
2 14
law."
The theoretical applicability of the competence doctrine to mentally retarded defendants has never been seriously questioned.
The early pronouncements of the doctrine used the term "insane,"
which was then broad enough to encompass people labeled "idiots. '215 The fact that a functional measure, rather than one
limited by clinical etiology, determined incompetence is demonstrated by the early English cases which discussed the competence
of deaf mutes. 216 These cases were followed by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in State v. Harris.217 Harrisheld that a deaf and
dumb prisoner who, despite efforts to educate him, was unable to
understand the significance of a trial ought not be compelled to
participate; "[w]hether arising from physical defect or mental disorder, he must, under such circumstances, be deemed "not sane,"
raigned during such his phrenzy; but be remitted to prison until that incapacity be removed; The reason is, because he cannot advisedly plead to the
indictment ....
And if such person after his plea, and before his trial,
become of non sane memory, he shall not be tried...
1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34-35 (London 1736).
211. See Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899) (discussion of early authorities); 1 N. WALKER, supra note 11, at 219-41 (detailed discussion of the British
experience); United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 285-86 (S.D. Ala. 1906) (announcing
a test for competence that was similar to the modern formulation because it measured
competence by a person's ability to aid counsel and testify at trial); Commonwealth v.
Braley, 1 Mass. 103, 104 (1804); State v. Peacock, 50 N.J.L. 653, 654-55, 14 A. 893, 894
(1888) (court held proof of insanity was improperly excluded by the lower court and
was injurious to the defendant); Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9, 20 (N.Y. 1847) ('he
true reason why an insane person should not be tried, is, that he is disabled by an act
of God to make a just defence if he have one.").
212. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1974); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378
(1966).
213. See generallyL. CAPLAN, THE INSANrTY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W.
HINCKLEY, JR. (1984); C. ROSENBERG, THE TRIAL OF THE ASSASSIN GUITEAu: PSYCHIATRY AND LAW IN THE GILDED AGE (1968) (an account of the insanity trial of President
Garfield's assassin).
214. See A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 200
(1975). Competence issues involve vastly larger numbers of defendants than does the
insanity defense. See id. at 203; Steadman & Hartstone, Defendants Incompetent to
Stand Trial, in MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTVES FROM LAW AND
SOCIAL ScIENcE, supranote 3, at 39-42; see generally H. STEADMAN, BEATING A RAP?:
DEFENDANTS FOUND INcoMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL (1979).
215. 1 N. WALKER, supra note 11, at 225.
216. I&
217. 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 136 (1860).
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and... he ought not to be tried." 218
Another nineteenth-century American case 219 acknowledged
that mental retardation could constitute the basis for incompetence, but required that the degree of disability be substantial2 2 0
The same concerns that retardation could cause incompetence, 221
but that the retardation
had to be truly disabling, continued well
222
into this century.
The new Mental Health Standards recognize that mental retardation may be the source of incompetence to stand trial. Standard
7-4.1 identifies the test for competence as "whether the defendant
has sufficient present ability to consult with defendant's lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and otherwise
to assist in the defense, and whether the defendant has a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings." 22s The same
standard explicitly recognizes that incompetence "may arise from
...mental retardation or other developmental disability... so
long as it results in a defendant's inability to consult with defense
218. Id-at 143. Even at that early date, the court explicitly recognized that the
provision of counsel was insufficient to cure the problems of incompetence. Id.
219. State v. Arnold, 12 Iowa 479 (1861).
220. I& at 484. The court noted that testimony had indicated that defendant's
"manner occasionally indicated mental imbecility," but ruled that he had failed to
rebut the presumption of sanity
To do this, evidence of mere incapacity to fully understand and comprehend all his legal rights; and to make known in the most succinct and intelligent manner to his counsel all the facts material to his defense, is not
sufficient. A doubt must be raised whether at the time there is such
mental impairment, either under the form of idiocy, intellectual or moral
imbecility, or the like, as to render it probable that the prisoner cannot, as
far as may devolve upon him, have a full, fair and impartial trial.
IdA substantial degree of disability was also generally required to successfully invoke
the insanity defense. See supra note 94.
221. See State v. Brotherton, 131 Ken. 295, 300, 291 P. 954, 960 (1930) (observing
that the court below "showed a proper concern that no person of feeble mind should
be put to trial on a serious charge"); Act of 1919, ch. 299, § 2, 1919 Kan. Sess. Laws,
490, 490 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. 39-237 (1923)) (repealed 1939). The act stated'"Ihatwhenever in a court of record, during the hearing of any person charged with a
misdemeanor or crime, it shall be made to appear to the court that the person is feeble-minded the court shall summarily remand such person to the probate court of the
county for examination ... [for possible civil commitment]." I& See also H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRI/nNAL DEFENSE 434 n.21 (1954) (similar statutes
recognizing retardation as a cause of incompetence to stand trial).
222. See State v. Lammers, 171 Kan. 668, 669,237 P.2d 410,411 (1951). In Lammers,
the trial court's charge to the examining commissioners stated:
You have been appointed ... to ascertain, after a thorough examination,
... whether he be insane, an idiot or an imbecile and unable to comprehend his position and make his defense. A person may be illiterate, have a
low degree of competency and a low I.Q.rating as relates to scholastic matters but he may have a normal or high degree of competency through native or natural ability.
223. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-4.1(b). This standard is similar
to the test announced by the Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,
402 (1960) ("whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding - and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceeding against him."). Id. See
Favole, supra note 120, at 247-57 (a compilation of tests employed by the various states
for competence to stand trial).
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counsel or to understand the proceedings." 22
One issue that remains unresolved in the modern era is the degree of retardation necessary for finding a defendant incompetent
to stand trial. Courts often rely upon IQ scores 22 and estimates of
"mental age" 226 to determine whether a defendant is competent.
Many appellate courts conclude that even a relatively low level 227
of
intellectual functioning is sufficient to establish competence.
The approach taken by the Mental Health Standardsis preferable.
The commentary observes that "[c]ompetence is functional in nature, context dependent and pragmatic in orientation. If a defendant is capable of meeting the articulated requirements for
competence, the presence or absence of mental illness is irrelevant."228 The same is true for mental retardation. While the presence or absence or degree of mental illness or mental retardation
"may certainly be significant in evaluating the defendant's competence,"229 the ultimate question is the actual ability of the individual defendant to perform tasks required at trial.
Mental retardation may affect an individual's functioning in
ways that make him incompetent to stand trial.23 A defendant's
receptive and expressive language skills, vocabulary, conceptual
224.

MENTAL HEALTH STANDARS, supra note 4, 74.1(c).
225. A surprisingly large number of reported cases involve expert testimony in
which the witness ascribes an IQ score or range of IQ scores to the defendant without
administering any standardized intelligence tests. See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 419 So. 2d
840, 842 (La. 1982). In the Rogers case, a psychiatrist who had not conducted any
intelligence tests testified that the defendant's IQ was between 60 and 70, and concluded that he was competent to stand trial because of "[his] ability to recall the
phone number and city block number at his mother's house where he resided, [and]
his place of employment ... [and because of] defendant's statement that he had
dropped out of school in the eighth grade." Id. Dr. Mauroner did not determine
whether the defendant had been socially promoted in school, and none of the doctors
inquired as to whether he could read or write. Although this same witness "conceded
that a psychological test would be the most accurate means of determining the level of
defendant's retardation, he insisted that a test result showing even severe mental retardation would not cause him to change his opinion that the defendant could assist
counsel at trial." Id See also State v. Bennett, 345 So. 2d 1129, 1137 (La. 1977) (the
"guesses" by expert witnesses, none of whom had tested the defendant, ranged from
IQ scores of 35 to 90). This sort of guesswork, of course, does not fall within the
proper scope of expert testimony. See infra note 397. It may also violate the ethical
code of the witness's profession. I&
226. Cf. supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
227. For a compendium of decisions organized by levels of intellectual functioning,
see Annot., 23 A.L.R.4th 493 (1983).
228. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-4.1 commentary at 187.
229. I&
230. The court in State v. Williams, 381 So. 2d 439,440 (La. 1980), stated that: "Being mentally retarded or of subnormal intelligence is not in itself proof of incapacity
....
However, when substandard mental ability combines with other problems to
prevent a defendant from rationally assisting his counsel, a fair trial cannot proceed."
(footnotes omitted). The first sentence in this statement is certainly true, but the
second suggests that factors unrelated to mental retardation produce the effect of incompetence. This may be misleading because the effects of the mental retardation
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ability, and low level of general knowledge may all impair his ability to participate in his defense. Even at the higher levels of mild
mental retardation, a defendant may be unable to understand a
concept like "waiver" or the elements of the crime with which he
is charged unless special efforts are made to explain them and assist him in understanding them.2 31 Therefore, courts err when
they suggest that it is only the accompanying presence of a mental
illness that makes a mentally retarded person incompetent to

stand

trial.23

Similarly, courts should not accept expert testimony from an
evaluator who merely tells the court that a retarded defendant is
not psychotic, and therefore is competent to stand trial.23

Such

testimony is even less helpful than that of an expert who tells the
court the defendant's IQ score or estimates his mental age and
may themselves be the indicia of incompetence. This is demonstrated by the
Williams case itself in which there was testimony that the defendant was:
moderately retarded, suffering from a severe speech disorder and hampered by an extremely primitive ability to cope. Williams cannot read or
write, remember his address or his attorney's name ....
His judgmental
capacity is impaired by an inability to concentrate and a limited education
....
[He] does not know the name of the President of the United States.
Id- With the possible exception of the speech impediment, each of these factors is
almost certainly a direct consequence of defendant's "mild to moderate" mental
retardation.
231. In United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857, 865 (9th Cir.), cert denied 444 U.S.
857 (1979), a defendant with an IQ of 67 and a first to second-grade reading level, was
so described by an expert witness for the defense. The prosecution's expert witness
basically agreed but stated that the defendant would be competent if questions, terms,
and proceedings were explained to him in 'simple words and simple sentences, using
concrete examples. Id The court held that the defendant could be competent if properly assisted, asserting that the extra burden upon counsel of assisting the defendant
"certainly does not establish that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial." Id at
867.
232. See State v. Edwards, 257 La. 707, 711-12, 243 So. 2d 806, 808 (1971) (distinguishing a case which found defendant incompetent to stand trial at roughly the same
level of retardation, IQ 59, because the defendant involved was psychotic).
233. E.g., State v. Bennett, 345 So. 2d 1129 (La. 1977). The Bennett court found "[i]t
was insufficient [to show competence] for the court to find that defendant was not
psychotic, was oriented as to time and place and was aware of his surroundings." Id
at 1137. The factors listed by the court are traditional diagnostic indicia for the lack of
psychosis. The witness in Bennett revealed a lack of understanding of both mental
retardation and the criteria for competence to stand trial by stating "that a severely
retarded individual with an IQ of 10 might be aware of his surroundings, and thus he
could presumably assist counsel and understand the proceedings against him 'within
his capabilities."' Id The Supreme Court of Louisiana correctly rejected this contention, noting that "[d]ue process, however, requires a level of effective participation by
an accused in criminal proceedings against him." IdThis sort of misleading testimony may result from the court's appointment of
mental health professionals as evaluators who lack any knowledge or experience in
the field of mental retardation. Standard 7-4.4(a)(iii) requires that evaluators have
appropriate training and experience. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supa note 4,

7-4.4(a)(iii); see also i& 7-3.10. Knowledge about mental illness is not a sufficient qualification for evaluating a retarded defendant unless the mental health professional
also happens to have expertise in the area of mental retardation. See text accompanying notes 51-61. Testimony by such an unqualified witness may go unchallenged at
the hearing because the witness's qualifications in the area of mental illness are
known and accepted by counsel and the court, but this illusory expertise ill serves the
court and may result in substantial injustice to both the defendant and the
prosecution.
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then makes a conclusory statement about his competence to stand
trial.2 Courts should not only insist on testimony which evaluates the defendant's degree of mental retardation, but also should
require descriptions of its effects in some detail, and explanations
of how these effects would affect the individual's ability to participate in a trial.2 5 Only this kind of detailed, nonconclusory testimony will allow the court itself to retain the ultimate decision on
competence rather than merely deferring the decision to evaluators whose expertise does not extend to the nature of the trial
236
process.
An even greater concern than the possibility of misleading testimony on competence is the likelihood that the failure to detect the
defendant's disability will result in no competence evaluation at
234. State v. Bennett, 345 So. 2d 1129, 1137 (La. 1977). The court noted that "[t]he
hearing redounded with statements by the two examining physicians that defendant was able to assist counsel, but there was scant testimony to support this conclusion." Id.
235. Such testimony can be provided by a qualified mental retardation professional
who has personally interviewed and evaluated the defendant without resort to any
diagnostic instruments beyond the adaptive behavior scales and the generally accepted intelligence tests. Cf.notes 400-09 and accompanying text. Some evaluators,
however, make use of a check list for estimating a defendant's competence to stand
trial. LABORATORY OF COMfuNITY PSYCHIATRY, HARvARD MEDICAL ScHooL, COmPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL AND MENTAL ILLNESS 106-13 (1973) [hereinafter cited as LABORATORY OF COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY]; see also Lipsitt, Lelos & McGarry,
Competency for Tria: A Screening Instrumen 128 Amd. J.PSYCHIATRY 105 (1971)
(competency screening questions and test results discussed). The Harvard Laboratory's work was published as a monograph by the National Institute of Mental Health,
and some evaluators have apparently asserted that a score derived from this check list
represents "competency to stand trial according to National Institute of Mental
Health Standards." State v. Young, 291 N.C. 562, 566, 231 S.E.2d 577, 580 (1977); State
v. Willard, 292 N.C. 567, 575, 234 S.E.2d 587, 592 (1977). This checklist has received
substantial criticism. See, e.g., Brakel, Presumption, Bias and Incompetency in the
Criminal Process, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1105, 1107-08; see also MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-4.1 commentary at 184-85 (check lists of specific criteria fail to
fully resolve the issue of the defendant's competence). The check list is useful in
directing the attention of evaluators to the relevant issues affecting competence to
stand trial, but the suggested "scores" given to mentally retarded defendants in some
of the published clinical examples are highly questionable. The defendant's second,
and improved, explanation of the concepts in question may not represent a true increase in understanding of the trial process. The improved response may merely represent mimicking of an answer supplied by the evaluator. See LABORATORY OF
*

. .

COmmUNITY PSYCHIATRY, supra, at 106-13.

236. Bennet4 345 So. 2d at 1137. Although the Bennett court agreed that "it may be
impossible in a pretrial competency hearing to avoid reliance upon psychiatric prediction concerning the accused's capabilities, the trial court may not rely so extensively
upon medical testimony as to commit the ultimate decision of competency to the physician." Id See also MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-4.8(c)(ii) (court is

to decide on the issue of competence "by the greater weight of the evidence."); iai
7-3.9(a) ("[Ihe expert witness should not express, or be permitted to express, an
opinion on any question requiring a conclusion of law... properly reserved to the
court or the jury."). Of course the same principle applies where the expert witness is
a mental retardation professional other than a psychiatrist or other physician.
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all.2 37 The efforts that many mentally retarded people typically

expend in trying to prevent any discovery of their handicapm may
render the existence or the magnitude of their disability invisible
to criminal justice system personnel. These attempts to "pass" as
a mentally typical person may be as "successful" in the context of
a trial as they often are in the setting of confessions and Miranda
warnings.2 3 9 This may account for what prominent observers have
identified as the relative "paucity [of case law and commentary on
competence] which cite mental retardation." These observers conclude "[ilt is our impression that the competency issue is raised too
often for the mentally ill and too infrequently for the mentally
retarded. 240 The Mental Health Standardsplace responsibility on
the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the court itself to raise the
issue of competence whenever any of those individuals "has a good
faith doubt as to the defendant's competence." 241 Nevertheless,
experience teaches that without extraordinary diligence, these
persons are most likely to raise the issue of competence only when
the defendant is acting in a bizarre or disruptive fashion.242 This
extra diligence is warranted 43 because the prospect of an undetected mentally retarded defendant sitting through a trial he does
not understand is exactly the evil the doctrine of competence was
237. See Mickenberg, Competency to Stand Trial and the Mentally Retarded De-

fendant The Need for a Multi-DisciplinarySolution to a Multi-DisciplinaryProblem, 17 CAL. W.L. REV. 365, 367 (1981) (contending that most retarded defendants are
never examined for competence to stand trial).
238. See supra notes 80-85.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 189-93.
240. LABORATORY OF COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY, supra note 235, at 6. The authors
of the Harvard study view this result as paradoxical because
[t]here are good grounds to speculate that retardates are a good deal less
able to cope adequately with criminal trial than the mentally ill. This
speculation is based both on the cognitive deficits of the retarded and their
characteristic dependency and malleability which permits them to be easily manipulated by investigatory and prosecutory personnel.
Id. at 14.
241. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-4.2(a); see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 177 (1975) (trial court should have ordered a competency exam, as
motion for continuance alleged that defendant was not "of sound mind" and requested a psychiatric examination).
242. Many of the reported cases in which a retarded defendant was found incompetent to stand trial involved individuals who also manifested obvious symptoms of
mental illness. See, ag., People v. Samuel, 29 Cal. 3d 489, 499-500, 629 P.2d 485, 489-90,
174 Cal. Rptr. 684, 688-89 (1981) (regressed behavior including eating feces); see also
Sessoms v. United States, 359 F.2d 268, 270 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (defendant was "narcistic" and "schizoid").
243. The need for great caution in preventing incompetent defendants from being
tried extends to the appellate courts, which have traditionally given substantial deference to trial courts on the issue of competence. See, ag., People v. Murphy, 72 Ill. 2d
421, 431, 381 N.E.2d 677, 682 (1978) (trial court in a position to observe defendant and
his conduct). However, judges are not experts on mental retardation and its manifestations and consequences. Where the record below indicates that the trial judge received only conclusory, inconsistent, or incompetent testimony from evaluators, or
relied solely on the court's own observation of the defendant's docility and apparent
attentiveness, an appellate court can appropriately scrutinize whether there was an
adequate basis for the finding that a retarded defendant was competent to stand trial.
See, e.g., State v. Bennett, 345 So. 2d 1129, 1137-38 (La. 1977) (psychiatric reports were
conclusory and without support).
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originally designed to prevent. 2 4
Finally, it is worth noting that mentally retarded defendants
present unique issues regarding attempts to effect 2 " competence
once they have been found incompetent. It was previously believed that the incompetence of retarded defendants was almost
always permanent. "Treatment" with the hope of eventually rendering the defendant able to stand trial was thus futile.M Modern
developments in the field of habilitation 7 and special education 24 have greatly increased our ability to teach retarded individuals particular concepts and skills. The disability which makes
some retarded defendants incompetent will be so substantial that
no teaching or habilitation can effect competence. For many
others, however, a carefully designed and individualized program
of habilitation may make it possible for the defendant to receive a
fair trial.249 It is clear, however, that this can only be accom244. See supra note 210.
245. The term "effect" is more appropriate for retarded defendants than the more
common "restore" because most mentally retarded defendants who are incompetent
will not have been competent at any previous time. Testimony Presentedto the ABA
Standing Comm. on Assoa Standardsfor Criminal Justice 2 (1983) (testimony of
Thomas E. Coval and Dr. Sheldon R. Gelnan on behalf of the AAMD). See also
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-4.10 (stating that a defendant deter-

mined to be incompetent to stand trial has a right to treatment to "effect"
competence).
246. PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ON LAW 35 (1963). The task force concluded that
[i]n the case of the mentally retarded defendant, unlike the mentally ill,
there is often little point in finding inability to stand trial at the moment,
but requiring that a trial must follow 'recovery.' Limited, though valuable, gains may be possible if the patient receives treatment and training,
but for the majority of the retarded, the likelihood of great change remains slight.

Id.

247. See supra note 57.
248. See B. BLATr, D. BILKEN & R. BOGDAN, AN ALTERNATIVE TEXTBOOK IN SPECIAL EDUCATION (1977); D. EVANS, THE LIVES OF MENTALLY RETARDED PEOPLE
57-113 (1983); D. MACMILLAN, MENTAL RETARDATION IN SCHOOL AND SOCIETY 453-536
(2d ed. 1982); E. POLLOWAY, J. PAYNE, J. PATTON & R. PAYNE, STRATEGIES FOR
TEACHING RETARDED AND SPECIAL NEEDS LEARNERS 152-294 (3d ed. 1985); W. SAILOR
& D. GUESS, SEVERELY HANDICAPPED STUDENTS: AN INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN 51-203
(1983). See generally SYSTFMATIC INSTRUCTION OF THE MODERATELY AND SEVERELY
HANDICAPPED (M. Snell 2d ed. 1983) (a collection of articles on teaching concepts and

skills).
249. See MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-4.10 (provides for the right

to habilitation pursuant to an individualized plan designed to effect the defendant's
competence). For example, when the nature of the incompetence is the individual's
general inability to understand concepts of the complexity required for trial, habilitation is unlikely to be successful. On the other hand, when a defendant's incompetence
results from the lack of general knowledge about the role of the various participants
in criminal trials, or from correctible gaps in vocabulary and communications skills, a
trial may be possible within the time framework allowable under law. See generally
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4,7 4.14 (trial of defendant rendered competent by habilitation).
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plished by qualified mental retardation professionals experienced
in the arts of habilitation. It is cruelly futile to send such defendants to state hospitals for the mentally ill that have no programs
to habilitate retarded individuals, and this happens far too
2 50
frequently.
C. Competence to Plead Guilty
Guilty pleas by mentally retarded defendants present one of the
most difficult doctrinal and practical problems faced by the criminal justice system in the mental disability area. Courts are
sharply divided on the appropriate standard for competence to
plead, and the practical consequences of the choice between the
competing formulations are substantial.
Historically, acceptance of the idea that some retarded defendants are incompetent to enter a plea has paralleled the awareness
that some defendants are incompetent to stand trial.251 Pleas had
special significance for medieval courts, and the failure, or refusal,
of a defendant to enter a plea made it impossible to convict or punish him.25

2

Therefore it was of the greatest importance to know

whether the failure to plead was a conscious decision, or, in the
alternative,
"by visitation of God," a category which included
"idiots."25 3
Of course, today guilty pleas have an entirely different significance.2 The operation of the criminal justice system depends on
a predictable quantity of plea bargaining, and for many defendants, a plea bargain appears to be their only substantial hope of
reducing their sentence.25 5 Therefore, the modern criminal justice
250. Cf People v. Lang, 76 Ill. 2d 311, 326-28, 331-32, 391 N.E.2d 350, 356-59, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 954 (1979) (involving a deaf defendant).
251. See supra notes 209-250.
252. The most common difficulty with which medieval and Tudor judges had to
contend at the outset of a trial for felony or treason was the man who simply refused
to plead "guilty" or "not guilty." Unless he uttered the necessary words, reverence to
the ritual of the law made it unthinkable to proceed with the trial, with the result
that he could not be convicted and executed. More important still for the Exchequer,
his property would not be forfeit. But to take this course for the sake of one's dependents called for great fortitude, since the courts' remedy was to order the man who
refused to plead to be subjected to the peineforte et dure, which consisted of slowly
pressing him to death under an increasing weight, unless his endurance gave out in
the process and he consented to plead. 1 N. WALKER, supra note 11, at 220. Therefore, if a prisoner refused to plead, as was quite likely if he was a madman or deafmute, the first question for the court was: "Is he mute of malice, or by visitation of
God?" Id.
253. Id
254. See generally ABA STANDARDS FOR CRImAL JusTIcE, supra note 4, ch. 14
introduction at 14-5 (reflecting the widespread acceptance of plea bargaining in the
criminal process); J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GuuITY PLEAS (2d ed. 1982);
A. ROsETr & D. CRESSEY, JusTICE BY CONSENT: PLEA BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN
COURTHOUSE (1976) (critical analysis of plea bargaining in a number of jurisdictions);

Alschuler, The C7angingPlea-BargainingDebate, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 652 (1981) (critical review of the plea bargaining process).
255. Recent research suggests, however, that at least for common law crimes, the
defendant has less to gain from a plea bargain than any other participant in the trial.
LaFree, Adversarial and NonadversarialJustice: A Comparisonof Guilty Pleasand
Trials, 23 CRimINOLOGY - (in press 1985).
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system provides numerous incentives for all parties to attempt to
negotiate a plea of guilty to avoid trial s6 At the same time, a
guilty plea has the effect of waiving all of the defendant's constitutional rights in the adjudicative process and is the full equivalent
of a conviction.2 7 The prospect of a mentally retarded defendant
entering a guilty plea without fully understanding its consequences is most alarming, because those consequences are
uniquely momentous for that defendant2ss
While it is generally recognized that the standard for competence to plead guilty is higher than for other kinds of consent or
waivers,2 9 the key issue today is whether the standard to plead
guilty is higher than, or otherwise different from, the standard for
competence to stand trial. It appears that most courts view the
tests as identical, and thus apply the Dusky test 26 0 for competence
to stand trial to the issue of the adequacy of a guilty plea.26 ' There
is, however, a substantial and persuasive minority view. The
Ninth Circuit has rejected the identity of the two tests in a case
involving mental illness, 26 2 and the District of Columbia Circuit
has rejected their
identity in a case involving the issue of mental
26 3
retardation.
The reason for establishing a different test for competence to
plead is the imperfect match between the test for competence to
stand trial and the issues involved in assessing the adequacy of a
plea. The ABA's trial standard requires the court to inquire
"whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult
with defendant's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational un256. But see supra note 255 (incentives offered by the criminal justice system to
entice defendants to plead guilty do not work to defendants' best advantage); Brereton & Casper, Does it Pay to Plead Guilty? DifferentialSentencing and the Functioning of Criminal Courts, 16 LAw & Soc'y REV. 45, 64 (1981-1982).
257. The Supreme Court noted long ago that "[a] plea of guilty... is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a jury, it is conclusive. More is not required; the court has
nothing to do but give judgment and sentence." Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S.
220, 223 (1927).
258. See CONSENT HANDBOOK, supra note 170, at 22-23 (suggesting that the formality of checking the adequacy of a retarded person's consent should vary with the importance of the consequences of his decision); see also Monroe v. United States, 463
F.2d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir. 1972) (noting the significant consequences of a guilty plea to
include the waiver of several constitutional rights, including the privilege against self
incrimination, trial by jury, and confrontation).
259. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 355 F. Supp. 103, 111 (E.D. Pa. 1973) ("[Ihe
procedures for taking a guilty plea are more stringent than those for waiving Miranda
rights.").
260. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
261. See MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-5.1; Note, Competence to
Plead Guilty: A New Standard,1974 DuKE L.J. 149, 155; cf. Sharp v. Scully, 509 F.
Supp. 493, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (a petitioner found competent to stand trial on serious
charges is competent to strike a favorable sentencing bargain and plead guilty).
262. Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 214-15 (9th Cir. 1973).
263. United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 726 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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derstanding and otherwise to assist in the defense, and whether
the defendant has a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings." 2 A court using this standard to assess the adequacy of a guilty plea will inquire into the defendant's memory of
relevant events and his ability to communicate, 2a 5 rather than address his appreciation of the consequences of a guilty plea and his
ability to assess its desirability in his case. The alternative selected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Seiling v. Eyman is a separate test which focuses more directly
on the issues involved in the plea bargaining process: "A defendant is not competent to plead guilty if a mental illness has substantially impaired his ability to make a reasoned choice among the
alternatives presented to him and to understand the nature of the
consequences of his plea. '266 The Ninth Circuit defends this
choice on the grounds that it "requires a court to assess a defendant's competency with specific reference to the gravity of the deci26 7
sions with which the defendant is faced."
The D.C. Circuit found the Ninth Circuit's approach particularly helpful in reviewing the guilty plea of a mentally retarded
defendant in United States v. Masthers.2 68 The trial court had accepted a guilty plea from a mildly retarded defendant with a reported IQ of 57. The court of appeals, concerned that the plea may
have been incompetent, held that the trial court's observations of
the defendant's demeanor and the colloquy in accepting the
plea 69 were not sufficient to justify a finding that the plea was
competent and voluntary.270 Judge Bazelon, writing for the court,
noted that the defendant's answers in the colloquy almost never
went beyond a simple affirmation. This apparently disguised the
defendant's disability from both the trial judge and from his
own counsel.2 71 Judge Hastie's concurring opinion observed that
264. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-4.1; cf.Dusky v. United States,
362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (stating the test for competence to stand trial is
whether the defendant has "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him").
265. See, ag., State v. Cheshire, 313 S.E.2d 61, 64 (W. Va. 1984).
266. Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 215 (9th Cir. 1973) (quoting Schoeller v. Dunbar, 423 F.2d 1183, 1194 (9th Cir.) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting), cert denied, 400 U.S. 834
(1970)); see also United States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400, 404 n.3 (1st Cir. 1970) (citing In re
Williams, 165 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1958)) ("Courts have recognized that the conclusion that a defendant is competent to stand trial does not necessarily mean he has the
mental capacity needed for an intelligent decision to plead guilty.").
267. Seiling, 478 F.2d at 215.
268. 539 F.2d 721, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
269. See FED R. CRIM. P. 11.
270. Masthers, 539 F.2d at 723-25. The court of appeals sought to explore the issue
as it related to mentally retarded defendants by inviting the Mental Health Law Project to participate as an amicus curiae.
271. Id. at 723-25 (Defendant Masthers acquiesced with simple responses of "Yes
Ma'am" or "No Ma'm" to all but one question asked during the colloquy. At sentencing, the defendant explained his pending marriage: "[W]e haven't been together for
about three years and we were getting married this month or last month, like she is
expecting a kid." When the trial judge replied, "Not yours, I take it," defendant responded: "I don't know."); see R. EDGERTON, THE CLOAK OF COMPETENCE: STIGMA IN
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as special efforts are made to improve the understanding of the
deaf litigant and the litigant who little comprehends English, "it
seems neither fair nor humane to refuse to make an analogous
appropriate special effort when it appears that an accused person's
comprehension is substantially impaired because of mental retardation."2 72 Masthersaccurately reflects what we know about common characteristics of mentally retarded people, and correctly
analyzes the effect of both the disability and the individual's attempt to disguise it in criminal proceedings 27 3
The Mental Health Standardstake a somewhat ambiguous position on the applicability of the trial competence test to the adequacy of guilty pleas. The commentary notes that there may be
defendants who are competent to stand trial but whose mental illness makes it impossible for them to plead at an acceptable level
of competence.2 7 4 But the standard itself states that "[o]rdinarily,
absent additional information bearing on defendant's competence,
a finding made that the defendant is competent to stand trial
should be sufficient to establish the defendant's competence to
plead guilty."2 75 This appears to establish a rebuttable presumption that a defendant who meets the test for standing trial will
also be competent to plead. To the extent that it merely suggests
that the two groups will substantially overlap, and that defendants
competent to stand trial will most frequently be competent to
plead, the statement is certainly accurate. However, it would be
misleading for courts to use the standard to justify a refusal to
inquire into competence to plead where there may be reason to
doubt that the defendant's guilty plea was knowing and
6
voluntary.2
THE LIVES OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 144-71 (1967) (discussing the attempts of

some mentally retarded people to hide and deny their disabilities and to "pass" as

normal).

272. Masthers, 539 F.2d at 730; see supra note 37 (discussion of Judge Robb's dissenting opinion).
273. See Note, Competence to Plead and the RetardedDefendant: United States v.
Masthers, 9 CONN.L. REV. 176 (1976) (discussion of the case, including the guilty-plea
hearing on remand).
274. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-5.1 commentary at 291-95. The
commentary uses the example of a defendant so overwhelmed by guilt caused by the
mental illness that the guilty plea seems necessary to expiate the guilt. Id. Guilty
pleas prompted by mental illness, and not actual guilt, should not be accepted. Id.
275. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-5.1(a)(i).
276. This refusal to inquire into competence to plead probably also misreads the
standard. The commentary accompanying the standard explicitly anticipates cases in
which additional information suggests a difference in the competence to perform the
two different tasks involved in trials and pleas: "[The test should not be equated to
that of competence to stand trial testing whether the defendant has the mental capacity to assist his attorney to make the plea decision, but instead should directly address
the defendant's ability to make that decision in light of all the attendant factors
... ." Id. 7-5.1 commentary at 292.
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The approach taken in Sieling and Masthers is particularly attractive for cases involving mental retardation. There are likely
to be a significant number of retarded defendants who remember
the events of the incident at issue, can communicate with counsel,
and understand the proceedings of trial, but nevertheless are incapable of weighing the choices necessary to make a competent plea
of guilty. But the very existence of this presumed subset of retarded defendants is the reason that different tests are troubling.
If a defendant is so retarded that he is incompetent to plead but
not incompetent to stand trial, he is denied the opportunity to reduce his sentence through effective plea bargaining - an opportunity available to all other defendants.
Therefore, defendants who are incompetent to plead guilty but
are competent to stand trial will, at least theoretically, face the
prospect of a harsher sentence than a similarly situated
nonretarded defendant who can avail himself of the opportunity
to plea bargain.2 7 7 Denying this opportunity to the first defendant
solely because of his disability offends basic notions of fairness and
equal protection. An artificial identity between the standards for
trial and pleading avoids the creation, or recognition, of this anomalous class. This artificial identity can be created only by accepting guilty pleas from some defendants who cannot understand
the nature and consequences of their agreement, or by refusing to
try some defendants who can understand the nature of trial pro27 8
ceedings and assist counsel.
The better approach would be to accept, as the Mental Health
Standards implicitly do, the fact that a realistic inquiry into the
defendant's competence to enter a guilty plea will produce a small
group of defendants who are denied access to the advantages of
plea bargaining.2 7 9 Fair implementation of this approach requires
that the sentencing judge be informed of the defendant's incompetence to enter a guilty plea. The judge should then take the defendant's incompetence to plead into account and reduce the
sentence to approximate that which the defendant might have received had he been able to engage in effective plea bargaining. 2,S
277. But see supra note 255.

278. The model statute suggested by the ABA Commission on the Mentally Disabled argues that another, more satisfactory, resolution of the dilemma is available.
Section nine of that act provides for a more thorough and detailed explanation of the
nature of the guilty plea that the defendant must make. The commentary to this
section suggests that this approach is preferable to the Ninth Circuit's test in Seiling
because it "appear[s] to provide the same protection without the ambiguities and complications introduced by a having [sic] dual standards of competence." MODEL DEvELOPMENTALLY DISABLED OFFENDERS AcT, supra note 8, commentary at 746. As
desirable and appropriate as the Model Act's more detailed explanation is, it can only
reduce the size of the group of retarded defendants competent to stand trial but incompetent to plead guilty. This reduction is a valuable mitigation of the problem, but
appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, it is not a complete solution because it
does not offer a comparable guarantee of the adequacy of pleas to that afforded by the
Seiling test.
279. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
280. This reduction is not the same as, and should not be viewed as a substitute for,
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This imprecise substitute for the availability of the plea bargaining
process281 would reduce the unfairness to those defendants denied
effective plea bargaining, recognizing that different tasks are involved in trials and pleas, and that the competence required for
one is not identical to that required for the other.
Finally, it should be noted that the number of defendants incompetent to plead guilty because of mental retardation can be
reduced substantially through modern special education. 28 2 It is
true that some defendants are so substantially disabled that no educational efforts will allow them to attain the competence required to meet the Sieling test. For example, some retarded
defendants, even with skilled teaching, will still be incapable of
grasping the abstract concepts involved in a plea agreement.
Others, however, would be incompetent to plead only because
they do not know the meaning of key words 283 or because, unaided, they cannot understand the bargaining process or the conceptual foundation for a particular proposed agreement. Many
individuals in this latter group are able to learn the necessary inthe mitigating impact of mental disability recognized in standard 7-9.3. See infra note
320.
281. The plan is a necessarily imprecise substitute for plea bargaining because the
judge cannot replicate with complete accuracy the process and product of plea negotiations. Plea negotiations typically depend on factors such as the strength of the prosecution's case and the expense of bringing it to trial. It does not seem impractical or
inappropriate to ask the sentencing judge to approximate the likely result of hypothetical negotiations by taking these factors into account. Of course plea bargaining
also depends on the defendant's willingness to forego a trial by pleading guilty, and
there is no practical way for a court to replicate the defendant's decision-making process if the defendant lacks the ability to comprehend the terms of the proposed agreement. Establishing the unavailability of the plea bargaining process as a mitigating
factor in sentencing thus gives a few defendants the benefit of a bargain to which they
would not have agreed if they were competent. It also gives defendants the theoretical benefits of both pleading to a lesser offense (reduced sentence) and pleading not
guilty (the possibility of acquittal). At the same time, it requires the state to give up
that portion of the full sentence it would have lost in a plea bargain without the plea's
concomitant benefits to the prosecution (certainty of conviction and avoiding the expense of trial). Nevertheless, these factors merely evidence the unavoidable imprecision of attempting to replicate a negotiating process when one party is incapable of
negotiating. Further, because the number of defendants who are triable but incompetent to plead will be very small, the imprecision and awkwardness of this approximation will be outweighed by the advantages of realistic evaluations of the defendant's
competencies and more equitable treatment of disabled defendants.
282. As Judge Hastie observed in Masthers,if the defendant "should be permitted
to withdraw his plea, it should not be too difficult to find someone skilled in working
and communicating with the mentally retarded who could and would communicate
effectively with him, so that his participation in any further proceeding would be
knowing and meaningful." Masthers, 539 F.2d at 730 (Hastie, J., concurring).
283. For example, on remand in the Masthers case, the trial judge substituted the
simple question '"Didanyone scare you into this?" for the more inaccessible and unfamiliar "coerced" in conducting the colloquy on a new proposed guilty plea. It appears
that the defendant clearly understood the judge's question when phrased in this manner. See Note, supra note 273, at 178 n.9 (quoting a telephone interview with observers at Masthers's trial).
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formation and skills from a competent special education
teacher.28 4 Of course, the ability to effect competence in these defendants requires referral to professionals with skills and training
which match the nature of the particular handicap involved. 28 5
The availability of this professional expertise offers the realistic
be
prospect that a substantial number of retarded defendants2 can
86
made competent to decide whether or not to plead guilty.

V. DispositionalIssues
A.

Civil Commitment

The civil commitment of defendants found not guilty by reason of
insanity has fostered a great deal of controversy, 287 although very
little has focused on mentally retarded defendants. 2s8 The commitment of defendants found permanently incompetent to stand
trial has received less public attention,28 9 but presents issues acknowledged to be of particular importance to retarded defend284. See supra note 248 (discussing the training and capabilities of modern special
educators).
285. The typical order committing the retarded incompetent defendant to the
state mental hospital, or other psychiatric facility or agency, to "restore" competence
usually fails because those facilities typically lack expertise in special education. Today, however, the implementation of the Education for Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-61 (1982), has produced a substantial pool of special education talent in communities throughout the nation. Courts and other agencies involved in the criminal
justice system should have little difficulty in enlisting the assistance of qualified
mental retardation professionals with these skills.
286. For example, one of the authors, Professor Luckasson, recently served as an
expert witness in the case of a mentally retarded convict whose earlier plea of guilty
was being challenged in state court as incompetent. Evaluation of the prisoner's intelligence revealed him to be mildly mentally retarded with an extremely limited vocabulary and understanding of the criminal justice system. For example, when he was
asked the meaning of the operative terms of the plea bargain he had "approved," he
could only define "rights" as the opposite of "lefts" and identify "waive" as a physical
gesture. His understanding of these terms had not been explored at the time of his
original plea. It also became clear during the evaluation that the defendant had
thought a guilty plea appropriate because he felt bad that he had not prevented the
commission of the crime by another person and not because he himself had committed it (as he apparently had not).The trial judge agreed to a withdrawal of the original guilty plea. Subsequently, it became clear that the defendant's best interest would
be served by an Alford plea, resulting in a sentence of time already served, rather
than a new trial. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). However, this
would be possible only if the defendant became competent to agree to the even more
conceptually complex Aford plea. Using standard special education methodology, it
was possible to teach the defendant the necessary vocabulary and concepts in four
sessions over a period of one week. The trial judge then conducted a thorough inquiry
into the defendant's current competence and accepted the plea.
287. See MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-7 introduction at 392-93;
Limiting the Insanity Defense: Hearingson S. 818, S.1106, S.1558, S.1995, S.2572, S.
2658, and S. 2669 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalLaw of the Senate Comm on the
Judiciary,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-395 (1982); L. CAPLAN, THE INSANrrY DEFENSE AND
THE TRIAL OF JoHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.122-24 (1984); Wexler, Redefining the Insanity
Problem, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 528, 528-32 (1985).
288. Courts have held, apparently without exception, that statutes providing for
subsequent commitment of insanity acquittees apply to acquittees who are mentally
retarded. See, eg., United States v. Shorter, 343 A.2d 569, 571-72 (D.C. 1975).
289. But see H. STEADMAN, BEATING A RAP? DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO
STAND TRIAL 1-10 (1979).
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ants.290 For both groups of defendants, the key issue is whether
commitment must be according to procedures established for all
civil patients, or in the alternative, by a special system of commit291
ment designed for individuals in the criminal justice system.
The Mental Health Standards provide a system of special commitment for mentally ill and mentally retarded defendants found
permanently incompentent and not guilty by reason of mental
nonresponsibility. 292 The proposed provisions of this special commitment system are particularly important for mentally retarded
defendants.
The Mental Health Standardsestablish as the criteria for special
commitment 293 that the individual be "currently mentally ill or
mentally retarded: and, as a result [pose] a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to others. ' 294 This requirement precludes commitment when the sole ground is the mere continuation of mental
disability. Some state statutes still provide that an insanity acquittee cannot be released until he is free from mental disability. 295
290. See, eg., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715,738 (1972) (criminal commitment of a
mentally retarded deaf-mute until he became sane held unconstitutional, given the
lack of a substantial probability that he could ever fully participate in a trial).
291. The Supreme Court held in Jackson that permanently incompetent defendants could not be held indefinitely without a general commitment hearing on their
current mental condition. I&i In Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 366-68 (1983),
the Court declined to require that acquittees who had established their own insanity
at criminal trial receive a commitment hearing at which the state bore the burden of
persuasion. Cf.Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1979) (requiring that the
state bear the burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence at general commitment hearings). The Supreme Court in Jones distinguished Jackson on the ground
that the insanity acquittee had been found by the criminal trial jury to have committed the criminal act. 463 U.S. at 364 n.12. It is this distinction that appears to support
the constitutionality of using special commitment procedures in seeking the confinement of permanently incompetent defendants whose "factual guilt" has been determined by a trial court. See MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-4.13(b).
292. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-4.13, 7-7.3.

293. The criteria for commitment and the procedures for adjudicating commitment
cases are identical for acquitted and incompetent defendants. See ic.7-4.13(b)(ii).
294. I& 7-7.4(b).
295. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 19.2-181 (Supp. 1985) (requiring that an acquittee be committed as long as he or she "is insane or mentally retarded or... his discharge would
be dangerous to the public peace and safety"). A 1984 amendment substituted the
term "mentally retarded" for "feebleminded." Act of April 9, 1984, ch. 703, 1984 Va.
Acts 1527, 1543.
For a listing of states' statutory grounds for commitment of insanity acquittees see
Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquitta 94 HARV. L. REV. 605, 606 n.6
(1981). See generally Yankulov v. Bushong, 80 Ohio App. 497, 504, 77 N.E.2d 88, 92-93
(1945) (court ordered a mentally retarded acquittee released on habeas corpus because
he could not be found dangerous as a result of continuing insanity). The court
reasoned:
While it is established that Steve Yankulov is a moron and therefore easily
subject to influence, whether for good or bad, he is apparently no different
than any other moron, and the mere fact that a person is a moron does not
subject him to incarceration in a hospital for criminal insane persons.
I&.at 504, 77 N.E.2d at 93.
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96
Such provisions are unreasonable and arguably unconstitutional 2
for both mentally ill and mentally retarded defendants because
the state lacks a distinctive interest in confining insanity acquittees who lack a relevant characteristic that differentiates them
from general civil patients. The only such trait that has been asserted is their dangerousness. 297 The mere continuation of mental
disability, in the absence of a showing of dangerousness, cannot
justify the commitment of an acquittee. This is particularly true
when the disability results from mental retardation because, unlike individuals with an episodic or cyclical or curable mental illness, few acquittees who are mentally retarded will be able to
shed their retardation during commitment. 29 Thus, for most retarded acquittees, a provision requiring their confinement until
they persuade a court that they are no longer retarded or "insane"
constitutes a life sentence - even when it is demonstrable that
the individual is not dangerous to anyone.
The procedures for special commitment are also of particular
interest in cases involving mentally retarded individuals. The
Mental Health Standards establish procedural protections that
grant the basic rights enjoyed by proposed patients under most
mental health civil commitment statutes.299 However, these procedures may be substantially more rigorous than those usually
employed for the civil commitment of mentally retarded persons. 30 0 Paradoxically, mentally retarded acquittees and defendants found permanently incompentent to stand trial may receive
greater procedural protection under these Mental Health Stan296. See State v. Krol, 8 N.J. 236, 24649, 344 A.2d 289, 295-96 (1975) (holding that

due process and equal protection require that the standard for commitment of a person who has been acquitted by reason of insanity be cast in terms of continuing
mental illness and dangerousness to self and others, and not in terms of insanity
alone). Although the United States Supreme Court did not directly hold that a statute would be unconstitutional if it provided for release of an insanity acquittee only if
he showed that he was no longer insane and no longer dangerous, the formulation of
its holding in Jones approved confinement "until such time as he has regained his
sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society." 463 U.S. at 370 (emphasis
added).
297. See MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-7.4 commentary at 413-16.
298. See supra note 54.
299. See, e.g., MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-7.5, 7-7.8 commentary
at 430-33. The procedural protections do differ from the usual commitment procedures in some respects. Acquittees are entitled to representation by counsel, confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses, independent expert witnesses, the
privilege against self-incrimination, and an expedited appeal. I& 7-7.5. The rules of
evidence, including the prohibition on hearsay testimony, apply. Id 7-7.5(d). But, in
contrast to many civil commitment statutes, periodic review is less frequent and acquittees cannot be released without a court order. Special acquittees may petition for
a rehearing one year after commitment and every two years thereafter. And unlike
regular commitment review, the burden of initiating review rests with the special
acquittee. I& 7-7.8 & commentary at 430-33. For a general discussion of state law, see
Van Duizend, McGraw & Keilitz, An Overview of State Involuntary Commitment
Statutes, 8 MENTAL & PHYSICAL L. REP. 328 (1984).
300. See DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW: STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES, supra note
8, at 416-21 (1982) (discussing the general procedures and criteria for voluntary admission in various jurisdictions); see generally Dybwad & Herr, Unnecessary Coercion:
An End to Involuntary Civil Commitment of RetardedPersons,31 STAN. L. REV. 753
(1979).
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dards than they would receive if subjected to their state's general
civil commitment laws.3 01 The resolution of this paradox lies in
reform of those general commitment laws which fail to provide
basic procedural protections.3 0 2 The fact that the American Bar
Association has identified these protections as necessary for the
commitment of acquittees suggests that no fewer protections can
be afforded to individuals who have not been accused of any
303
wrongdoing, but whose commitment is sought on civil grounds.
Perhaps the most important of these procedures for retarded acquittees and incompetent defendants are the requirements for periodic review. The Mental Health Standardsprovide that one year
after the initial commitment hearing and every two years thereafter, the state has the burden of persuading the court by clear and
convincing evidence that the acquittee or incompetent defendant
still meets the commitment criteria.3 °4 This is likely to be especially important for retarded individuals, who may stand a greater
than average chance of getting lost in the system and thus remain
in confinement long after its necessity has ended. But unless the
superintendent of the facility petitions for their release,3 0 5 acquittees and incompetent defendants must initiate the periodic review
hearings.3 0 6 Because of their limited ability to understand their
rights, the procedures for implementing them, and their acquiescence to authority,30 7 mentally retarded individuals will often lack
the ability to trigger periodic review of their continued confinement. Thus, for retarded persons, the requirement of regularly
available legal counsel is particularly crucial,3 08 and a heavy responsibility falls upon the attorney to both ascertain carefully
whether the retarded person understands his or her rights and to
contest continued confinement whenever the client has not com301. This is particularly true of incompetent defendants, who will have received a
hearing on both whether they committed the criminal act and a commitment hearing.
See MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-4.13, 7-7.5.
302. Indeed, standard 7-7.3(b) provides for the use of general commitment procedures, rather than those designed for violent insanity acquittees, for those acquittees
whose cases do not involve dangerous felonies, but requires that those procedures satisfy due process. This requirement is directed at those states whose mental retardation civil commitment statutes lack basic procedural protections. See MENTAL
HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-7.3 commentary at 405-10.
303. In particular, the procedural protections provided at the special commitment
hearing described in standard 7-7.5 and at periodic reviews described in standard 7-7.8
constitute a floor for implementing the requirement of fundamental fairness in the
general civil commitment of mentally retarded persons.
304. MENTAL HEALTH STANDnADS, supra note 4, 7-7.8.
305. See i& 7-7.9.
306. See id. 7-7.8(a).
307. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
308. See MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-7.8(c) commentary at 431.
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petently waived such a hearing.30

9

Finally, it is noteworthy that the Mental Health Standards acknowledge that specially committed mentally retarded persons
have rights during their confinement equivalent to those enjoyed
by civilly committed individuals. 310 Among the most important of
these is the right to habilitation. 311 By casting the rights of acquittees in terms equivalent to those found in the civil commitment
system, the Mental Health Standards avoid limiting the right to
habilitation to the rather parsimonious formulation recognized by
the Supreme Court in Youngberg v. Romeo. 3

2

In Romeo, the

Court held that substantive due process required that civilly committed mentally retarded persons receive habilitation sufficient to
ensure their physical safety and freedom from unnecessary physical restraint. Though the Court did not suggest that its ruling constituted the entirety of a retarded person's constitutional right to

habilitation, 313 the habilitation specially committed retarded persons are entitled to receive under the Mental Health Standards is
not limited to whatever the Court ultimately concludes to be the
minimum requirement of due process. State statutes,

3 14

and possi-

constitutions, 315

bly state
typically provide a more explicit and expansive right to habilitation, including the right to an
individualized habilitation plan.316 The Mental Health Standards
requirement of equivalent habilitation rights to those enjoyed by
civilly committed persons also protects specially committed retarded individuals from a lack of appropriate mental retardation
services at state mental hospitals that do not otherwise serve re317
tarded people.
309. See Luckasson & Ellis, RepresentingInstitutionalizedMentally RetardedPersons, 7 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 49, 50 (1983).
310. See MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-7.6.
311. See supra note 57.
312. 457 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1982).
313. See Romeo, 457 U.S. at 326-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Ellis, The
Supreme Court and Institutions: A Comment on Youngberg v. Romeo, 20 MENTAL
RETARDATION 197, 198 (1982) ("[B]y tying Mr. Romeo's right to habilitation to his
right to freedom from undue restraint within the institution, the court left open the
possibility that the right to habilitation includes the training needed to acquire community living skills for those individuals whose release from the institution is
feasible.").
314. See DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW: STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES, supra note
8, at 849-64 (compilation of relevant state statutes).
315. See generallyMeisel, The Rights of the Mentally III UnderState Constitutions,
45 LAw & CONTENMP. PROBS.7 (Summer 1982).
316. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-9 (1978 & Repl. 1984); see also MODEL DEVELOPIENTALLY DISABLED OFFENDER AcT, supra note 8, § 6 (providing model rules for
"Preparation of Individualized Program Plans"); Bennett, Reviewing an Individual
HabilitationPlan: A Lawyer's Guide, 4 U. ARK.LrTLE RocK L.J. 467,474-84 (1981).
317. The appropriate comparison group for determining an acquittee's or an incompetent defendant's right to habilitation would clearly be mentally retarded people in
residential confinement in that state, whether they were located in the same facility
or in another. The Mental Health Standards would not be satisfied if a state claimed
that specially committed persons were entitled only to those services offered to other
committed persons confined at the same facility, if other mentally retarded people
were receiving more appropriate habilitation in other facilities.
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B. Sentencing
Mentally retarded defendants who are convicted or who plead
guilty present the issue of the possible relevance of their disability
in the determination of an appropriate sentence. 318 Disagreeing
with those courts that have held that mental retardation has no
relevance in setting a criminal sentence,3 19 the Mental Health
Standardsprovide that "[e]vidence of mental illness or mental retardation should be considered as a possible mitigating factor in
sentencing a convicted offender. '320 The commentary to this section justifies its provision by reference to the appropriateness of
"individualized justice"3 2 1 and apparently is premised on the notion that a defendant's mental retardation is extremely likely to
have influenced his or her criminal actions in a way that reduces
the degree of culpability.32 2 H. L. A. Hart has argued that mitiga318. In addition to the usual ways in which many defendants do not reach the
sentencing stage, including incompetence and acquittal, a substantial number of retarded defendants are "diverted" from the criminal justice system before going to
trial. Some of this process occurs through formal referrals to community retardation
agencies from personnel in the criminal justice system. See, eg., Schwartz, A Diversionary System of Services for the Mentally Retarded Offender, in THE RETARDED
OFFENDER 298, 298-302 (M.Santamour & P. Watson eds. 1982); Note, The Mentally
Retarded Offender in Omaha-Douglas County, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 622, 649-57
(1975). Other retarded persons accused of being lawbreakers are diverted informally
through a decision by service providers in the community that invoking a criminal
sanction would be undesirable. See Edgerton, Crime Deviance and Normalization,in
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND COYI uNrrY ADJUSTMENT OF MENTALLY RETARDED

PEOPLE, supra note 69, at 145, 162. For a proposed statutory structure for the diversion of retarded defendants, see MODEL DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED OFFENDER
AcT, supra note 8, § 7.
319. McCune v. State, 56 Tex. Crim. 207, 212,240 S.W.2d 305, 309 (1951) ("We have
been cited to no decision requiring or permitting the trial judge to instruct the jury in
his charge that they might consider feeble-mindedness of the accused in mitigation of
the punishment to be assessed in the event of conviction."); see H. WFIHOFEN, MENTAL
DISORDER AS A CRmiNAL DEFENSE 206-11 (1954); S.GLuEcK MENTAL DISORDER AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW 412-18 (1925). But cf May v. State, 398 So. 2d 1331 (Miss. 1981)
(remanding for resentencing a mildly retarded fourteen-year-old, who had been tried
as an adult, on the issue of mitigation because special education opportunities were
not available at the state penitentiary).
320. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supranote 4, 7-9.3. Although some of the pro-

visions of the Standardsrelating to sentencing are limited to the more seriously disabled mentally retarded defendants, see infra notes 326-62 and accompanying text,
this provision applies unambiguously to all individuals who have mental retardation.
321. d 7-9.3 commentary at 463; cf Morris, Sentencing the Mentally 114 in REFORN AND PUNISMEN
ESSAYS ON CRDMINAL SENTENCING 125 (M. Tonry & F. Zimring eds. 1983) (arguing that a defendant's mental illness should normally reduce the
severity of the punishment imposed but that occasionally it should be a factor that
prolongs punishment).
322. Cf ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMNMAL JUSTICE, supranote 4, 18-3.2(b)(i)(D) (2d.
ed. 1981) (suggesting mitigation of criminal sentences when "the offender because of
youthful age or any physical or mental impairment lacked substantial capacity for
judgment when the offense was committed"). The commentary refers to this provision as "a 'diminished responsibility' criterion." Id 18-3.2(b)(i)(D) commentary at
18.229.
In contrast the Model Developmentally Disabled Offender Act provides: "In sen-
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tion is particularly appropriate where a convicted criminal's "ability to control his actions is thought to have been impaired or
weakened..., so that conformity to the law which he has broken
was a matter of special difficulty for him as compared with normal
persons normally placed. 3 23 The United States Supreme Court
has held that mental condition may not be constitutionally excluded from consideration in capital sentencing.3 2 The Mental
Health Standards extend the principle of allowing consideration
of mental condition to sentencing in noncapital cases. This
broader requirement of mitigation may prove imprecise in its imtencing a defendant who is developmentally disabled, the court shall impose the least
restrictive alternative consistent with the needs of the defendant, and of public
safety." MODEL DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED OFFENDER ACT,supra note 8, § 11(3).
This approach to sentencing incorporates a modified mandate to employ no greater
restriction than individual circumstances require - a requirement that is absent in
the sentencing of mentally typical convicts. The Model Act's commentary argues that
this
simply legitimizes consideration of developmental disability in determining the degree and duration of the restraints on liberty to be imposed, and
establishes a presumption in favor of selecting a sentence or conditions of
probation which are no more harsh, hazardous or intrusive and involve no
more restrictions on the defendant's physical freedom or social interaction
than are absolutely essential.
Id, commentary at 760; cf AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, THE
LEAST RESTRICTiE ALTERNATvE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES, 51-52 (H.R. Turnbull

ed. 1981).
The Model Act thus incorporates into sentencing a principle designed to reduce
unnecessary deprivation of liberty in the civil commitment process. This is a much
more substantial departure from traditional theories of sentencing than is the Mental
Health Standards' requirement of mitigation. But it should be recalled that the
Model Act also provides that a developmental disability cannot constitute the basis for
a defense of nonresponsibility, and thus retarded convicts under its provisions include
some who would have been acquitted under standard 7-6.1. See supra notes 130-35.
323. H. HART, PUNISHmENT AND RESPONSIBILTY 15 (1968). Of course this justification for mitigation sounds remarkably like the volitional prong of the insanity defense, which was rejected in standard 7-6.1. See supranote 125-29. The Mental Health
Standards'call for mitigation can thus be read as a partial substitute for the full exculpation some mentally disabled defendants would have received under a broader
definition of the insanity defense. Cf.B. WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 77
(1963) (arguing that mental disability should not form a defense to criminal charges,
but instead should be considered as a factor at sentencing, relevant "to the choice of
treatment most likely to be effective in discouraging [the defendant] from offending
again"). But see R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQuALITY AND

DESERT 81 (1979). Singer argues against mitigation for provocation or duress: 'To
attempt to alter the substantive criminal law in the sentencing criteria ... is both
duplicitous and undersirable." Singer accepts the relevance of diminished capacity,
but believes its determination by the jury should not be displaced by the sentencing
judge. I&L
324. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982), held that the sentencing judge
in a capital case could not decline to consider the possibly mitigating circumstances of
a defendant's mental state arising from a troubled family background. I&L The
Eddings majority relied on the plurality opinion in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978) (opinion by Burger, C.J.), which declared that, while individualization of sentencing was not constitutionally required in noncapital cases, a statute precluding consideration of any possible mitigating circumstances in a death penalty case constituted
cruel and unusual punishment. One of the limited mitigating circumstances recognized by the statute in Lockett was that the "offense was primarily the product of the
offender's psychosis or mental deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity." Id. at 607, 612-13. One of Lockett's accomplices "received a lesser penalty because it was determined that his offense was 'primarily the
product of mental deficiency'. . . ." Id. at 591.
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plementation, but it may also reduce the problems caused by inappropriate imprisonment of vulnerable retarded convicts32
The Mental Health Standards also propose a system of commitment 326 at sentencing for those defendants with particularly severe disabilities. This system provides for habilitation of less
327
disabled mentally retarded convicts in correctional facilities,
and for more substantially handicapped offenders in mental retardation facilities "preferably under the supervision of the jurisdiction's department of mental health or mental retardation. 32s The
more seriously disabled convicts may be committed upon the petition of either the prosecutor or the offender 32 9 if a court, by clear
and convincing evidence, finds that the defendant "requires treatment or habilitation in a . .. mental retardation facility rather
than an adult correctional facility."33 0 This dichotomous system
for the habilitation of retarded convicts parallels the proposed system for treating mentally ill offenders, but raises substantially different issues as applied to persons with mental retardation.
The first issue involves the separation of two groups of retarded
offenders on the basis of the severity of their disability. 33 1 Mentally ill convicts deemed severely disabled enough to qualify for
post-conviction commitments are those "who suffer a substantial
disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation or memory
325. We have also suggested reducing of sentences to diminish potential injustice
arising from the trial and conviction of defendants found incompetent to enter a plea
of guilty. See supranotes 280-281 and accompanying text. This adjustment should be
separately considered from any reduction due to mitigating circumstances.
326. The approach bears some resemblance to the diversion of mentally disabled
offenders. See supra note 318. It differs from diversion in that it follows a criminal
trial and conviction and because it results in a formal criminal sentence. See MENTAL
HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-9.10(a).
327. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-9.7(a).
328. Id. 7-9.7(b).
329. Id 7-9.8(a).
330. Id. 7-9.9(d). The clear and convincing standard is set forth at id. 7-9.9(c).
331. A parallel distinction is drawn between prisoners who are "seriously mentally
retarded" and other mentally retarded prisoners. Id. 7-10.1(b)-(c); see infra note 341,
385-91. In the context of defining the scope of the insanity defense, Congress has also
apparently attempted to distinguish defendants on the basis of the severity of their
mental retardation. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, § 402(a), 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 20(a) (West Supp. 1985) ("as a result of severe mental disease or defect"). See supra
note 123. The Senate Report elaborates:
The provision that the mental disease or defect must be "severe" was added to section 20 as a Committee amendment. As introduced in S. 829, the
provision referred only to a "mental disease or defect." The concept of
severity was added to emphasize that nonpsychotic behavior disorders or
neuroses such as an "inadequate personality," "immature personality," or
a pattern of "antisocial tendencies" do not constitute the defense.
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 229, repr7inted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 3411; cf.supranote 126. There is no indication that the effect of the modifier on
mental retardation ("defect") was considered, and there is currently no clarifying
caselaw.
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which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, or the capacity to recognize reality or the ability to meet the demands of life ...."3
The commentary suggests that this dichotomy represents an attempt to reflect the psychiatric distinction between psychotic
mental illness and lesser forms of mental disorder,33 3 and thus to
assure that "the standard for commitment of the mentally ill
should be the same for offenders and non-offenders. '33 4 No parallel distinction exists in most mental retardation commitment laws
on the basis of the severity of an individual's handicap.3 Nevertheless, the Mental Health Standards opt for a parallel structure,
"reflect[ing] the policy view that the standard for commitment of
the mentally retarded should, so far as possible, track the standard
for the commitment of the mentally ill offender. '3 36 A distinction
in severity is therefore drawn, defining a "seriously mentally retarded offender" as one who has "very significant subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with
substantial deficits in adaptive behavior."33 7
Ultimately, the attempt to treat mental illness identically with
mental retardation fails because of differences between the composition of the two groups. Within the universe of mentally ill
people, there are a substantial number of people, perhaps a majority, whose disability is so mild, ill-defined, and common that it
subverts the purposes of the Mental Health Standards to address
their situations with the same legal rules that encompass mental
illness that is truly disabling, particularly psychotic illnesses.338
Mental retardation, as currently defined, presents no such problem.339 Even though the majority of mentally retarded individuals, and presumably an even larger majority of retarded
defendants who reach sentencing, are labeled as "mildly" mentally retarded,34 0 their disability is not comparable in relative lack
of severity to that of defendants whose mental illness results from
a neurosis or personality disorder. The substantial disability en332. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supira note 4, 7-9.1(b).

333. Cf AMERICAN PsYciFRIc ASSOCIATION, A PsYcmIATRIc GLOSSARY 114 (5th
ed. 1980) (defining psychosis as "[a] major mental disorder of organic or emotional
origin in which a person's ability to think, respond emotionally, remember, communicate, interpret reality, and behave appropriately is sufficiently impaired so as to interfere grossly with the capacity to meet the ordinary demands of life.").
334. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-9.1 commentary at 458.
335. DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW: STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 417-18 (1982).
Apparently only Ohio and the District of Columbia limit by statute commitments
based on the severity of an individual's mental retardation. Ono REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5123.01(L) (Page 1981) ("at least moderately mentally retarded"); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 6-1924 (1981) ("at least moderately mentally retarded and requires habilitation").
336. MIE'rAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-9.1 commentary at 458.
337. d 7-9.1(c).
338. During the reign of the Durham rule, the District of Columbia Circuit addressed similar issues in the debate about whether "psychopathic personality disorders" would suffice to support a defense of insanity. See Blocker v. United States, 288
F.2d 853, 860-62 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J., concurring).
339. Note that individuals previously labeled "borderline" mentally retarded no
longer fall within the definition of mental retardation. See supra note 44.
340. It is likely that an even larger majority of retarded defendants who reach sentencing are labelled as "mildly" mentally retarded. See infra note 342.
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compassed by even "mild" mental retardation defeats any attempt
to find a parallel distinction in mental retardation analogous to
the division in mental illness between psychoses and less disabling
disorders.
Both the definition and the underlying attempt at distinction
are problematic.34 1 The commentary notes that the majority of
people with mental retardation are mildly retarded
and suggests that the distinction between the "seriously" mentally retarded offender and other mentally retarded convicts should be
drawn somewhere within the mildly retarded range, with all profoundly, severely, and moderately retarded persons within the
class of the "seriously" retarded, and some mildly retarded offenders included while others are excluded. 3 The Mental Health
Standardsattempt to accomplish this division by adding modifiers
to the American Association on Mental Deficiency definition of
mental retardation: the individual's intellectual functioning must
be "very significantly subaverage" and the deficit in adaptive behavior must be "substantial."'
These "qualifying artifices"3 45 re3
4
6
quire the sentencing tribunal
to consider "[t]he totality of the
circumstances" in determining whether a particular mildly retarded offender falls within the commitment criteria, but "do not
allow the sentencing tribunal to divide mathematically the I.Q.
range of mild retardation and to thereby fix a precise I.Q. prerequisite dictating a commitment or incarceration decision."34 7
Drawing this line in individual cases is an unenviable task.3
341. It should be noted that the definition contained in the final version of the
Mental HealthStandardsis far superior to that in previous drafts, which was likely to
cause serious confusion among courts and mental retardation professionals. Cf.Provisional Standards 7-9.1(c), 7-10.1(c) (1st Tent. Draft, July 1983).
342. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supranote 4,7-10.1 commentary at 494-95. The
commentary further observes that "[flew retarded offenders who progress to a sentencing hearing will fall within the severe or moderate classes and it is next to inconceivable that any would fall within the profound class." MENTAL HEALTH
STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-9.1 commentary at 460. See also J. WILSON & R. HERNSTEIN, CRIE AND HUMAN NATURE 154 (1985) (the offender population contains relatively few very low IQ's). Our review of the appellate cases suggests that while the
commentary's statement is generally accurate, it may be slightly exaggerated because
a noticeable number of defendants with reported IQ scores indicating moderate retardation find their way to appellate courts.
343. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-9.1 commentary at 460. The

MentalHealth Standardsstate: "The ... definition... is not meant to exclude from
the commitment alternative all mildly retarded offenders nor is it meant to include
automatically all mildly retarded offenders." Id.
344. Id. 7-9.1(c) commentary at 458-61.
345. Id. 7-9.1(c) commentary at 459.
346. Id 7-9.9(a)(iv) (commitment hearing must take place before a "judicial hearing officer").
347. Id, 7-9.1 commentary at 460.
348. Part of the difficulty is semantic. An expert witness would be hard pressed to
testify honestly and coherently that an IQ score that is at least two standard devia-
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Determining whether it is worth the effort requires an evaluation
of the anticipated benefit of the dichotomy. The principal purpose
of drawing the line must be based on a conclusion that the lessdisabled portion of mildly retarded individuals will more appropriately receive habilitation in prison while profoundly, severely,
moderately, and the remainder of the mildly retarded convicts
will more appropriately receive habilitation in mental retardation
faciities.- 9 The validity of these premises are open to question. It
is true that the population of large residential facilities for mentally retarded people is now concentrated at the more disabled end
of the spectrum of disabilty-so However, this strong trend toward
deinstitutionalizing mildly retarded persons, and many individuals
with much more substantial handicaps,"51 merely reflects the
tions below the mean and ranks in the bottom three percent of the population is not
"very significant[ly] subaverage." It is even more difficult to imagine a mentally retarded defendant convicted of a criminal offense who does not have a "substantial"
deficit in adaptive behavior.
349. The symmetry of parallel treatment of mentally ill and mentally retarded
convicts may also have some modest benefit, but standing alone, it would surely be
insufficient to warrant the litigation that will result from the required distinctions
between "seriously" retarded convicts and others.
Another possible rationale would suggest that it is politically unacceptable for less
seriously mentally retarded individuals to "escape" the full brunt of punishment by
commitment, or transfer to a mental retardation facility pursuant to standard 7-10.4 of
the Mental Health Standards. This argument appears more persuasive regarding
mental illness that is less severe than psychosis than it does for "mild" mental retardation, which is a substantial disability. See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying
text.
Finally, it may be thought desirable to limit the use of state coercion in effecting
involuntary habilitation. This is a principal reason for limiting the mental illness civil
commitment criteria to those with substantial disorders, and may apply in similar
fashion to mentally ill convicts. But society has not similarly rationed its use of coercion in the area of mental retardation. See supra note 335. Of course, this rationale
would not apply to habilitation that the convict or prisoner seeks pursuant to standard
7-9.8(a) or 7-10.4(a). When neither the prosecution nor the offender objects to commitment at the time of sentencing, standard 7-9.9(b) still requires expert certification
that the individual's retardation is "serious." There is no similar requirement in the
case of a consensual transfer pursuant to standard 7-10.3, and indeed a prisoner seeking a transfer need not even allege that he is "seriously mentally retarded."
350. Hauber, Bruininks, Hill, Lakin, Scheerenberger & White, A National Census
ofResidentialFacilities:A 1982 Profile ofFacilitiesand Residents, 89 AM. J. MENTAL
DEFICIENCY 236, 244 (1984) ("nearly half (46.8%) of the residents of facilities of 16 or
more [residents] were profoundly retarded"). This concentration, however, does not
provide useful data for deciding which individuals among the mildly retarded population of convicts will appropriately be served in such facilities.
It is also paradoxical that the more "seriously" retarded offenders are guaranteed
placement consistent with the least restrictive alternative principle, while less disabled retarded individuals, who are usually viewed as the most likely candidates for
community placement, have no such right under the standards. See MENTAL HEALTH
STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-9.10(b).

351. For example, the ENCOR (Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation) program has had great success in providing services in the community for severely and profoundly retarded people, and even those who are also "medically
fragile." See K. CASEY, J. McGEE, J. STARK & F. MENOLASCINO, A COMMUNITYBASED SYSTEM FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED: THE ENCOR EXPERIENCE 4 (1985);

see also J. STARK, J. McGEE & F. MENOLASCINO, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF COMMUNITY SERVICES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED 89, 161-68 (1984). Further evidence

is provided by the thorough study of the process of deinstitutionalizing the residents
of the much-litigated Pennhurst institution in Pennsylvania. J. CONROY & V. BRADLEY, PENNHURST LONGITUDINAL STUDY: A REPORT OF FIVE YEARS OF RESEARCH AND
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judgment that they can receive more humane and efficient services in smaller community residential facilities.w 2 This reveals little about the relative merits of large residential facilities in
comparision to prisons for mildly retarded individuals.
Part of the difficulty may stem from the apparent premise that
the array of alternatives is limited to prisons and large residential
mental retardation facilities. Mental retardation professionals
have developed "structured correctional services 353 which provide habilitation to mentally retarded offenders in the community.3 There is no reason to believe that these services will be
more effective or appropriate for "seriously" retarded convicts
ANALYSIS (Temple University and Human Services Research Institute 1985) (finding

that all Pennhurst residents, regardless of their level of retardation, could be served
successfully in the community); cf.Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Pennburst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
352. See Lensink, ENCOR Nebraska, in PRESIDENT'S COMMITE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, CHANGING PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR THE MENTALLY RE-

TARDED 280 (rev. ed. 1976); S.HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE
161-207 (1983); Ferleger, Anti-Institutionalization and the Supreme Court 14
RUTGERS L.J. 595, 603-11 (1983). For the literature on community residential placement of mentally retarded individuals, see generally B. BAKER, G. SELTZER &
M. SELTZER, AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE: CoMwNTrrY RESIDENCES FOR RETARDED ADULTS
3-10 (1977); D. BRADDOCK, OPENING CLOSED DOORS: THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
DISABLED INDIVIDUALS (1977); THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW

499-514 (M.Kindred, J. Cohen, D. Penrod & T. Shaffer eds. 1976); F. MENOLASCINO,
CHALLENGES IN MENTAL RETARDATION: PROGRESSIVE IDEOLOGY AND SERVICES 331-32
(1977); G. O'CONNOR, HOME IS A GOOD PLACE: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF COMMUNITY RESIDENTIAL FACILIrIES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED 2-5, 66-73 (AAMD Mon-

ograph No. 2,1976); R. SCHEERENBERGER, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION & INSTITUTIONAL

REFoRi 39-52, 190-93 (1976); DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND COMMUNITY ADJUSTMENT

OF MENTALLY RETARDED PEOPLE, supra note 69, at 15.
353. F. Mf!ENOLASCINO, CHALLENGES IN MENTAL RETARDATION: PROGRESSIVE IDE-

OLOGY AND SERVICES 195 (1977); see Note, The Mentally Retarded Offender in OmahaDouglas County, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 622, 667-68 (1975); see also THE MENTALLY RETARDED OFFENDER, supra note 33; Harbach, An Overview of RehabilitationAlternatives, in REHABILITATION AND THE RETARDED OFFENDER 122,132-35 (P. Browning ed.

1976) (the result of community treatment centers reveal that community based corrections can serve as a practical alternative to conventional imprisonment).
354. Specialized community services are especially attractive for the habilitation of
mentally retarded offenders since generic residential institutions for mentally retarded people usually lack the facilities and expertise necessary to deal with such
offenders. Santamour and West explain:
When placed in institutions for retarded persons, [offenders] victimize the
other residents and disrupt routine. They present security risks and training needs that the institutions are ill-equipped to handle because of facility
design and staffing patterns geared to meet the needs of the docile multiply handicapped individual. Accordingly, it is generally accepted in the
field of retardation that the choice of residence for rehabilitation and
training of the offender is some place other than existing state institutions
for the mentally retarded.
Santamour & West, The Mentally Retarded Offender: Presentationof the Factsand a
Discussionof Issues, in THE RETARDED OFFENDER 7, 29 (M. Santamour & P. Watson
eds. 1982); see THE PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON LAW 40 (1963). Similar concerns were voiced more than 60 years ago.
See W. Fernald, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS STATE SCHOOL FOR THE
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than for those functioning at the upper end of the mildly retarded
category; yet only the former appear to be eligible under the
Mental Health Standardsfor post-conviction commitment to such
programs.35

The problem may also inhere in the structure of the sentencing
standards, which focus on whether the offender "requires" habilitation in a mental retardation facility.3 56 It is not completely clear
what is meant by the term "requires."' 3

7

In any event, sentencing

contemplates a formal inquiry into the individual habilitation
needs of a particular offender, and yet access to this inquiry is limited artificially by a prerequisite of severity of handicap. The
Mental Health Standards presuppose that the questions of degree
of disability and need for services in a specialized facility will produce the same answer. This may be true for mentally ill prisoners; psychotic individuals may need the more intensive services of
a mental health facility while persons with neuroses and personality disorders can be treated effectively in prison. Mental retardation, however, is different from mental illness, and the dividing
line between "seriously" and "non-seriously" retarded offenders
may not be closely related to habilitation needs. It is likely that
most profoundly and severely retarded individuals would be difficult to serve in prison; the severity of their mental disability and
the likelihood of accompanying physical handicaps35s require specialized professional attention which few prisons provide.3 59 Aside
from discussion of physical disability, there is nothing in the literature to suggest that prisons are categorically better able to provide habilitation to individuals in the higher functioning range of
FEEBLEMINDED 19 (1922), quoted in Menolascino, The Mentally Retarded Offender, 12

MENTAL RETARDATION 7,9 (1974).
355. See MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-9.7. See also supra note 350.
356. See MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-9.7(a) (providing for habilitation in prison for convicts whose retardation does not "necessitate commitment");
id. 7-9.9(d) (formulating the criteria for commitment in terms of whether the offender "requires ... habilitation in a ... mental retardation facility rather than an
adult correctional facility"); see also id. 7-10.4(b) (providing for transfer from prison
when the seriously mentally retarded prisoner "requires care not available in the correctional facility").
357. For example, "requires" could be synonymous with "would benefit from" or,
in the alternative, "will deteriorate or regress without." These different formulations
will, of course, describe different groups of offenders.
358. There is a higher incidence of physical handicaps among severely and profoundy retarded individuals. Fewell & Cone, Identifcation and Placement of Severely HandicappedChildren, in SYSTEMATIC INSTRUCTION OF THE MODERATELY AND
SEVERELY HANDICAPPED 46, 47-48 (M. Snell 2d ed. 1983).
359. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1340-45 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd in part
and rev'd in parton other grounds,679 F.2d 1115,1167 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied,460
U.S. 1042 (1983). Severely or profoundly mentally retarded persons who have serious
physical handicaps also require intensive specialized physical therapy services. For
general discussions of the importance of physical therapy to people with mental retardation, see B. BOBATH, ABNORMAL POSTURAL REFLEx AcTivrTY CAUSED BY BRAIN
LESIONS (2d ed. 1971); K. BOBATH, A NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS FOR THE TREATMENT OF CEREBRAL PALSEY (2d ed. 1980); M. IIVANAINEN, BRAIN DEVELOPMENTAL
DISORDERS LEADING TO MENTAL RETARDATION (1985); S. LEVITT, TREATMENT OF CEREBRAL PALSEY AND MOTOR DELAY (2d ed. 1982).
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mild retardation than for other mildly retarded persons. 360 Therefore the definition of the dividing line between the two categories
of retarded offenders does not seem well suited to the tasks it is
asked to perform in the Mental Health Standards.
The resolution of this difficult problem may be found in the individualized hearing processes which the Mental Health Standards already provide. The attraction of parallelism with mental
illness is outweighed by the dissimilar service needs of mentally
retarded individuals and the different relationship between those
needs and the severity of an individual's disability. Therefore, the
attempt to classify retarded persons on the basis of "seriousness"
of their disability should be abandoned, and a hearing on individual habilitation needs provided to any mentally retarded offender
or prisoner whose commitment or transfer to a mental retardation
facility is proposed.361 Such hearings will be superior to a categorical exclusion in distinguishing those individuals who belong in
prison from those who are more appropriately placed in specialized facilities.3 62
C

Mentally Retarded Prisoners

As a federal court has recently observed, "[m]entally retarded persons meet with unremitting hardships in prison." 3a 3 They are
more likely to be victimized, 36 4 exploited,3 65 and injured 366 than
360. Similarly, there are fewer differences in management requirements for serving individuals with IQs of 50, as contrasted with 65, than there are in the mental
health field in serving psychotic prisoners as contrasted with those who merely have
neuroses or personality disorders.
361. If a jurisdiction believes that individual commitment or transfer proceedings
may result in too many retarded convicts finding their way out of prisons and into
mental retardation facilities, limitations can be accomplished through the formulation
of commitment and transfer criteria. See supra note 357.
362. This is not to say that the severity of a particular individual's disability is irrelevant, because it may be an appropriate factor to consider in determining where his
habilitation needs can be served.
363. Ruiz, 503 F. Supp. at 1344.
364. Santamour & West, The Mentally Retarded Offender: Presentation of the
Factsand a Discussion of the Issues, in THE RETARDED OFFENDER, supranote 33, at 7,
29.
365. "[I]nmates with low intelligence levels are prime targets for exploitation.
Consequently, they are peculiarly in need of special protection from physical, emotional, sexual, and financial abuse at the hands of others." Ruiz, 503 F. Supp. at 1344.
366. 'entally
retarded prisoners are markedly and abnormally prone to receive
more injuries than the average inmate. Some of their injuries occur on the job; others
are suffered at the hands of other inmates or security officers." Id. at 1344.
Injuries and beatings are also far from uncommon in large residential facilities confining mentally retarded people. Cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 310-12 (1982);
Woestendiek, The Deinstitutionalizationof Nicholas Romeo: The UnwittingRevolutionaryof Pennhurs Phil. Inquirer, May 27,1984, (InquirerMagazine), at 18 (detailing beatings sustained by Nicholas Romeo at the Pennhurst State Hospital for the
mentally retarded following the Supreme Court's decision); New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752,756 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (1300 reported
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other inmates. They are also more likely to be charged with disciplinary violations,36 7 and partially as a result, to serve longer
sentences. 368 Finally, they are unlikely to receive any habilitation
designed to address the problems caused by their mental
369
retardation.
One of the most important provisions in the Mental Health
Standards is the declaration that mentally retarded prisoners
have a right to habilitation.3 7 0 This explicit recognition of the habiitation needs of retarded individuals is a substantial advance
from previous standards,3 71 which typically discussed treatment
incidents of injuries, assaults, and fights in an eight month period in one institution);
D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHmAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 17-23, 75-76 (1984) (describing
injuries, abuse and neglect suffered by residents of Willowbrook, a New York State
institution for the mentally handicapped).
367. Ruiz, 503 F. Supp. at 1344. The court explained:
[Retarded inmates] are slow to adjust to prison life and its requirements,
principally because they have almost insurmountable difficulties in comprehending what is expected of them. Not understanding or remembering
disciplinary rules, they tend to commit a large number of disciplinary infractions. Because they are often not as well coordinated as persons of
average intelligence, they also frequently fail to meet work performance
quotas and are, therefore, subjected to disciplinary action for laziness or
refusal to work.
Id
The Ruiz court also observed that retarded inmates tend to fare poorly before disciplinary adjudication tribunals, in part because they seldom have the assistance of
counsel and are unable to make a persuasive presentation on their own behalf. The
court also noted that retarded prisoners are punished in solitary confinement with
disproportionate frequency. Id
368. 1i at 1344. In addition to problems with disciplinary infractions, the Ruiz
court observed that retarded prisoners "are frequently unable to succeed in institutional programs whose completion would increase their chances for parole, and they
are also unlikely to be able to present well-defined employment and residential plans
to the Parole Board." Id
369. "[P]risons provide few, if any, meaningful programs or services for the retarded." United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 729 n.56 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see Ruiz,
503 F. Supp at 1344; Brown & Courtless, supra note 63, at 1164, 1169. Santamour and
West argue that "[tihe retarded offender is rejected ... by the correctional field, who
place the retarded offender as low man on the totem pole of those who might benefit
from treatment and rehabilitation programs." Santamour & West, supra note 364, at
28-29.
370. See MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-9.7, 7-10.8. This right is extended to all retarded offenders and prisoners regardless of the "seriousness" of their
mental retardation.
The Mental Health Standards distinguish between "seriously mentally retarded
prisoners" and others who are less severely disabled. They provide that seriously
mentally retarded prisoners can be transferred to a mental retardation facility while
those who are less severely disabled are to receive habilitation services in correctional
facilities. This distinction leads to the same problems discussed in the section on sentencing. See supra notes 326-62 and accompanying text.
371. E.g., A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 23-5.1(a) (1982) ("Prisoners

should receive routine and emergency medical care, which includes the diagnosis and
treatment of... mental health problems."); STANDARDS FOR HEALTH SERvICES IN
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 27 (Am. Pub. Health Ass'n 1976) ("Mental health services should be made available in every correctional institution."); see George, Standards Governing Legal Status of Prisoners,59 DENVER L.J. 93, 101 (1981). But see
COMMITTEE ON ACCREDITATION FOR CORRECTIONS, MANUAL OF STANDARDS FOR
ADULT CORRECrIONAL INSTs. standard 4278 (1977) (designating as "essential" the re-

quirement that "[w]ritten policy and procedure specify that qualified psychological
and psychiatric personnel provide services for inmates diagnosed as severely mentally
retarded") The accompanying discussion does not make clear whether "severely
VOL.
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for mental illness without specific mention of the nonmedical
services directed toward the amelioration of the handicaps caused
by mental retardation.31 2 There is little caselaw on the issue of
whether failure to offer habilitation to retarded prisoners constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment37 3 and therefore this provision of the Mental Health
Standardsmay be particularly influential in determining whether
such services are provided.
Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Estelle
v. Gamble that failure to provide needed medical care can constitute cruel and unusual punishment,7 4 numerous courts have held
that psychiatric services are a form of medical care that must be
available to mentally ill prisoners.3 75 However, mental retardation is not an illness,376 and habilitation includes services which
are not medical in nature;3 77 thus courts may not automatically
mentally retarded" is intended as a term of art reflecting the American Association
on Mental Deficiency classification system, but states:
Severely mentally retarded inmates should be placed in facilities specially
designed for their treatment. If they cannot be placed in such facilities
outside the correctional institution, the institution should provide adequate services for their health, development and protection of their dignity. Where possible, programs should provide for their continued
physical, intellectual, social, and emotional growth and should encourage
the development of skills, habits, and attitudes that are essential to adaptation to society.
Id.
372. For a discussion of habilitation, see supra note 57. Of course, some mentally
retarded prisoners will also be mentally ill, and these individuals will also require
mental health treatment. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text; HANDBOOK
OF MENTAL ILNSS IN THE MENTALLY RETARDED (F. Menolascino & J. Stark eds.
1984); MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL RETARDATION: BRIDGING THE GAP (F. Menolascino & B. McCann eds. 1983); PsYcrATmic APPROACHES TO MENTAL RETARDATION

(F. Menolascino ed. 1970).
373. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
374. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
375. The leading case is Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977). See also
Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 595 F. Supp. 1558, 1576-77 (D. Idaho 1984);
Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1332-34 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd in part and rev'd in
[parton othergrounds,679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983);
J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 334-42 (1981); Brenner & Galanti, Prisoners' Rights to PsychiatricCare, 21 IDAHO L. REv. 1-34 (1985). But see Capps v.
Atiyeh, 559 F. Supp. 894 (D. Or. 1983). In Cappms, the court recognized a constitutional
right to mental health care, but expressed concern about the subjectivity of psychiatric diagnoses, the possibility of malingering prisoners feigning mental illness, profes-

sional differences about the necessity of treatment in particular cases, and the
possibility that some mentally ill prisoners may be uncooperative with treatment efforts. Id. at 916-21. The court stated. "The inmates must, therefore, show a pattern of
cases, each of which discloses, with little or no room for reasonable mental medical
opinions to differ, (1) a serious mental illness (2) for which the inmate wants treatment (3) which he does not receive (4) thereby causing the inmate to suffer mental
pain." Id. at 917-18.
376. See supra notes 51-53.
377. See supra note 57.
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conclude that the constitutional guarantee of medical care necessarily extends to habilitation services for retarded prisoners. The
one court which has considered the matter concluded in Ruiz v.
Estelle that the eighth amendment guarantees the availability of
378
habilitation to mentally retarded inmates.
This conclusion can be supported without designating habilitation as "medical," nor does it require courts to recognize a more
general right to rehabilitation for all prisoners. 379 It is well documented that mentally retarded people, institutionalized without
proper habilitation, will regress and lose vitally important life
skills they previously possessed. 38 0 If such regression occurs in a
prison setting, the eighth amendment's right to protection from
harm 1 precludes the state from denying habilitation which
would prevent that harm.38 2 Where habilitation is necessary 38 3 for
378. Ruiz, 503 F. Supp. at 1345-46. The portion of the district court's opinion reversed by the court of appeals was unrelated to the provisions regarding retarded prisoners, which had resulted in a consent decree prior to completion of the appeal. The
consent decree required, in pertinent part, that defendants identify mentally retarded
and other special needs prisoners, evaluate their needs, provide "individualized treatment and placement plans appropriate for such prisoners' needs and assurances for
their implementation," and comply with procedural requirements for transferring
mentally disturbed prisoners to mental institutions. Ruiz, 679 F.2d at 1167.
379. Most courts have been reluctant to recognize such a right. J. GOBERT & N.
COHEN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 342-343 (1981); see McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332,
1335 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 859 (1975) (failure of prison authorities to provide
a rehabilitation program, by itself, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
Indeed, rehabilitation is offered less frequently as a justification for imprisonment.
See Bainbridge, The Return of Retribution,71 A.B.A. J. 61 (May 1985); see also Act of
Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 227 (D), 98 Stat. 1998 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(a)) ("imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and
rehabilitation").
380. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 7 (1981) (Pennhurst I); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 127-28 (1984)
(PennhurstII) (Stevens, J., dissenting); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children
v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). For citations to the scientific
literature documenting institutional regression, see Ferleger, Anti-Institutionalization and the Supreme Cour4 14 RUTGERS L. J. 595, 603 n.37 (1983); Teitelbaum & Ellis,
The Liberty Interest of Children: Due ProcessRights and Their Application, 12 FAM.
L.Q. 153, 183-84 nn. 127-34 (1978).
381. J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 329 (1981); cf. New York State
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
The constitutional right to medical care itself, as announced in Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 104 (1976), is based on the unconstitutionality of deliberately failing to prevent the pain accompanying untreated illness or injury. One court has based the right
of prisoners to receive psychiatric services on the constitutional duty to prevent "unnecessary pain or suffering." Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, 1124 (M.D. Tenn.
1982).
382. Cf Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 329 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(if a mentally retarded individual possesses basic self-care skills and is sufficiently
educable to maintain those skills with training then a state facility responsible for his
care may be constitutionally required to provide that training).
383. The determination of a mentally retarded individual's habilitation needs is not
fraught with the uncertainty and subjectivity that concerned one court regarding
mental illness in Capps v. Atiyeh, 559 F. Supp. 894, 916-921 (D. Or. 1983). See supra
note 375. The diagnosis of an individual as mentally retarded is a relatively objective
exercise that uses standard instruments of measurement. There is no professional
disagreement about what constitutes substantial impairment from mental retardation. Feigning mental retardation is more difficult than feigning mental illness, and
habilitation does not always require the same kind of conscious decision to cooperate
with the professional. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's contrary view, there is a
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an individual prisoner's mobility, physical safety, or other protected constitutional interests, such services cannot be denied.384
The right to habilitation recognized in the Mental Health Standards should be reflected in the courts' interpretation of the
eighth amendment.
The provisions in the Mental Health Standards for committing
and transferring prisoners to mental retardation facilities are
more problematic385 The difficulties stem, in part, from the fact
that retarded convicts may not be suitable residents for either
prisons or general mental retardation institutions, 3 6 and therefore any provision will engender difficulties in the many jurisdictions where no other alternatives currently exist. Nevertheless, it
is troubling that some mentally retarded convicts may be committed to a mental retardation facility without a determination
whether that facility is appropriate for retarded convicts, whether
it is willing to receive them, and whether the convicts need, or
would benefit from, the services the facility can provide. 387 Simiconsensus among mental retardation professionals that habilitation is possible and desirable for severely and profoundly retarded people. Cf.Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. at 316 n.20 (stating that mental retardation professionals disagree as to whether
effective training is possible for all severely retarded people.) The belief of the Justices that no such consensus exists is flat wrong. See Ferleger, Anti-Institutionalization and the Supreme Cour4 14 RUTGERS L. J. 595, 628-32 (1983).
384. Cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 319 (concluding that liberty interests
require that a state provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure
safety and freedom from undue restraint).
385. One set of difficulties surround the question of the degree of restriction that
retarded offenders require. The Mental Health Standards provide that committed or
transferred retarded convicts should not "be permitted access into the community by
...
mental retardation officials without authorization from appropriate correctional
officials or the court." MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supranote 4,7-9.11, 7-10.8. Giving judges or correctional officials the final say over the liberty of such individuals
makes some sense when the convict has demonstrated a risk of dangerous behavior.
Cf.id. 7-7.11 (requiring a court order for authorized leave of specially committed acquittees). However, for some offenders transferred or committed at the time of sentencing there will be no indicia of dangerousness, or as the commentary suggests, "a
threat to security," and thus in their cases the limitation is unwarranted. See supra
note 245, at 19 (testimony of Gelman and Coval). In addition, the Mental Health Standards presuppose that the commitment or transfer is to a remote and secure facility,
although it may in fact be to a "structured community program," for which the concept of limitation on "access to the community" is not meaningful. See supra note 353.
386. See supra notes 354, 363-69. The unsuitability of some retarded convicts for
either institution buttresses the argument for creating special programs designed for
mentally retarded offenders.
387. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4,7-9.9(b). This standard addresses
the sentencing of offenders when neither the individual nor the prosecution objects to
the commitment, and the only evidentiary requirement is a professional report that
the individual is "seriously mentally retarded." The Commentary suggests that under
such circumstances, "the reason for an evidentiary hearing is eliminated." Id. 7-9.9
commentary at 476-77. But there remain two possible reasons for such a hearing. One
is that the facility proposed for the commitment is not a party to the bargain, and may
have legitimate objections to the commitment. The other is that the convict, while
not "objecting," may not be competently consenting to the placement. Some retarded
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larly, when a retardation facility objects to the transfer of a retarded prisoner, the court may order his placement upon evidence
that he is "seriously mentally retarded and requires care not available in the correctional facility" 38 8 without ascertaining whether
the proposed facility is willing or suitable.
The alternative approach, which recognizes a right, or at least
an interest, in a facility determining the clients it can appropriately serve, 389 is not cost-free either, because it creates the risk of
all available facilities declining to serve retarded offenders. 390 Ultimately, where no existing facility believes it can properly provide habilitation to these individuals, the better approach is to
create new programs specifically designed to address their
needs. 391
VI.

The Role of Mental RetardationProfessionals

It has long been recognized that the fair and efficient administration of the criminal justice system requires the involvement of
qualified professionals from disciplines other than the law. These
professionals serve a variety of roles, including scientific, evaluative, consultative, and therapeutic. In this section, we will discuss
the special concerns that arise when professionals perform evaluations and subsequently give expert testimony about mentally retarded defendants.
One of the first issues to arise is the selection of appropriately
qualified professionals. 392 Given the historic confusion between
mental illness and mental retardation3 93 , it is not suprising to find
confusion on the question of which professionals have mental retardation expertise useful to the criminal justice system. Thus,
courts have often addressed questions regarding scientific inquiry
in the area of mental retardation and criminal justice, evaluation
consultation, and habilitation, without the assistance of mental retardation professionals. 394 Excessive reliance has been placed on
individuals will lack the ability to make such a judgment. See supra note 170. Because Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487-94 (1980), suggests that there is an important
liberty interest at stake in commitment even when the alternative is imprisonment,
care should be taken to protect that interest on behalf of an individual who lacks the
capacity to voluntarily waive his rights.
388. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-10.4(b).

389. Cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-13(I) (1978 & Repl. 1984) ("[No developmental
disabilities treatment or habilitation facility is required to detain, treat or provide
services to a client when the client does not appear to require such detention, treatment or habilitiation.").
390. See supra note 354, 369.
391. See supra note 353; SANTAMOUR & WEST, supra note 353, at 27-31. For a com-

pilation of state laws on transfers from prisons to mental hospitals, see Favole, supra
note 120, at 281-95.
392. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-1.1 commentary at 14.

393. See supra text accompanying notes 51-61.
394. See, e.g., State v. Schlaps, 78 Mont. 560, 577-78, 254 P. 858, 862 (1927) (testimony of teacher who administered test ruled properly excluded as not competent to
express an opinion); State v. Bennett, 345 So. 2d 1129, 1137 (La. 1977).
This problem can be compared to a similar problem that arises when mentally retarded defendants are imprisoned. Daniel and Menninger explain: '"lentally reVOL.
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psychiatrists to fulfill these duties, even after psychiatrists have
suggested the limitations of their expertise. 395
Selecting a qualified professional involves many factors. One
major concern is the type of training received by the professional
asked to evaluate or testify about a mentally retarded defendant's
condition. In contrast to psychiatrists and other mental health
professionals, whose training is usually limited to the needs of
people with mental illness, mental retardation professionals have
focused their training on the special needs and characteristics of
people with mental retardation. The graduate course work of special education teachers, for example, will generally include work
in the impaired learning ability of mentally retarded people; specialized educational curricula, techniques, methods, and materials;
standardized assessment of deficiencies; applied behavior analysis;
tarded forensic patients have often been confined in state hospitals where there are
only a few clinicians with expertise in mental retardation. Consequently, the mentally retarded forensic patient may have stayed longer than some mentally ill patients

because he received no appropriate rehabilitation." Daniel & Menninger, Mentally
Retarded Defendants: Competency and CriminalResponsibility, 4 Am. J. FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY 145, 154 (1983).

395. In 1961, Dr. Walter Barton, president of the American Psychiatric Association, observed. "Psychiatrists as a group are disinterested in mental retardation.
Many have no more accurate knowledge about the retarded than the layman does."
Barton, The President'sPage: The Psychiatrist'sResponsibility for Mental Retardation4 118 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 362, 362 (1961). Other psychiatrists express similar
views. Dr. Menolascino states:
[Psychiatry's] withdrawal and the historical events that led up to it have
resulted in a number of stereotyped views or blindspots that psychiatrists
characteristically exhibit when they must deal with the retarded. Briefly
these blindspots are: uncritical acceptance of mental age as an adequate
description of a person; treatment nihilism that is usually based on lack of
program knowledge and a myopic view of conceivable or even available
program alternatives; and excessive focus on the severely retarded and
their families, in contrast to the mildly retarded.
Menolascino, Psychiatry'sPas Currentand FutureRole in Mental Retardation,in
PSYCHIATRIC APPROACHES TO MENTAL RETARDATION 709, 717 (F. Menolascino ed.
1970). According to Dr. Bernstein, "Psychiatrists generally are not interested in and
do not use the broad range of knowledge or treatment techniques available when confronted with [mentally retarded] patients." Bernstein, Mental Retardation, in THE
HARVARD GUIDE TO MODERN PSYCHIATRY 551, 551 (A. Nicholi ed. 1978); see also
Dybwad, Psychiatry'sRole in Mental Retardation,in DMNISHED PEOPLE: PROBLEMS
AND CARE OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 123 (N. Bernstein ed. 1970). Dybwad has

stated.

"[A] profession's commitment to a human problem and its solution can be
measured by the extent and quality of its research operations in that field,
by the volume of relevant papers in the journals maintained or largely
supported by the profession, and by the attention given to the particular
subject in the course of the profession's academic training program. On all
of these three counts the factual evidence clearly points to a lack of interest in or commitment to mental retardation on the part of the psychiatric
profession."

1d, at 123-24. See also 6 AM. JuP. PROOF OF FACTS Idiocy and Mental Deficiency
Proof 1, 254 (psychiatrist more likely to concentrate on mental diseases of psychogenic
origin than on mental deficiency).
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485

communication for mentally retarded people; and extensive field
work and supervised teaching of people with mental retardation
in a variety of settings, including residential facilities and public
schools. Other professionals, whose work addresses the types of
disabilities which often accompany mental retardation, such as
speech, language and hearing impairments, physical and motor
disabilities, and vocational training and transitional problems,
should have similarly extensive training in mental retardation.
The Federal Rules of Evidence limit the availability of "expert"
status for the purpose of testimony. Rule 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in
396
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
This requirement limiting testimony to the individual professional's area of expertise is reflected in the Mental Health Standards.3 97 The Mental Health Standards preclude mental health
professionals from testifying, evaluating, or otherwise participating in the trial and adjudication of a mentally retarded individual
if the mental health professional's expertise does not include substantial training and expertise in the field of mental
retardation. 398
Thorough assessment of the abilities and weaknesses of a mentally retarded defendant can result in information of tremendous
assistance to a court. However, the assessment process requires
great care and professional skill and any proffered results must be
viewed with caution. At many points during the process, seemingly minor departures from good practice can severely limit the
utility or validity of an assessment report. 399
396. FED. R. EviD. 702.
397. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4,7-1.1(a) ("the [mental health and

mental retardation] professional's performance within these roles should be limited to
the individual professional's area of expertise and should be consistent with that professional's ethical principles").
398. The Mental Health Standardsdefine mental retardation professionals as:
individuals who have received extensive, formalized, post-graduate education and training in identifying specific functional deficits or habilitation
needs of persons with mental retardation or developmental disability.
Mental retardation professionals include special education teachers,
speech and language pathologists, audiologists, physical therapists, occupational therapists, and those psychiatrists, psychologists, clinical social
workers, psychiatric nurses or other mental health professionals who have
received the necessary education and training on mental retardation issues. Mental retardation professionals must be licensed or certified to
practice if the jurisdiction requires licensure or certification for the respective discipline.
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-1.1 commentary at 14. For a discussion
of training techniques employed by mental retardation professionals, see D. MACMAILAN, MENTAL RETARDATION IN SCHOOL AND SocIETY (2d ed. 1982); SYSTEMATIc INSTRUCTION OF THE MODERATELY AND SEVERELY HANDICAPPED (M. Snell 2d ed. 1983);
E. POLLOWAY, J. PAYNE, J. PATTON & IL PAYNE, STRATEGIES FOR TEACHING RETARDED AND SPECIAL NEEDS LEARNERS (3d ed. 1985).
399. See HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AssEssMFNT (G. Goldstein & M. Hersen

eds. 1984). Even when an examination has been conducted in consistence with good

VOL. 53:414

Mentally Retarded Defendants
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

Competent, professional assessment requires personal observation and interaction with the allegedly mentally retarded defendant. The Mental Health Standardsinstruct that no witness should
be qualified as an expert on a defendant's mental condition unless
the witness "has performed an adequate evaluation, including a
personal interview with the individual whose mental condition is
in question, relevant to the legal and clinical matter(s) upon which
the witness is being called to testify."40 0 This required evaluation
may be particularly important in cases involving mentally retarded defendants because it precludes hypothetical testimony
about the mental status of a defendant based solely on the characteristics of a particular class of mentally retarded individuals without analyzing the individual characteristics of the defendant.
Only professionals who have training and experience in evaluating people with mental retardation should perform the
assessments. As discussed earlier, mental retardation differs sufficiently from other forms of mental disability that training in
mental illness cannot, without more, qualify a physician to provide
useful information about a mentally retarded person. Similarly,
typical medical school training and the attainment of the academic
degree of M.D. cannot, without more, qualify a physician to give
expert testimony about mental retardation. 401 The Mental Health
Standards recognize that the field of mental retardation requires
particular training and experience and that relatively few professionals have expertise in both mental illness and mental
402
retardation.
Courts should not operate under the illusion that the simple administration of any test will resolve all questions regarding a reprofessional practice, the report may prove inadequate. One study found that despite
specific instructions to examiners to report on the issues of competence and sanity,
the majority of reports submitted to the court made no mention of either issue. Geller
& Lister, The Process of CriminalCommitment for PretrialPsychiatricExamination

and Evaluation, 135 AM. J. PSYcHIATRY 53, 58 (1978).
400. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-3.11(a)(iii).
401. To qualify as an expert under Standard 7-3.11 three criteria must be established. The professional must meet certain clinical educational and training requirements that are more stringent than merely possessing an academic degree. Thus, the
commentary advises that "a mental health professional whose training has been limited to evaluating mental illness should not be permitted to testify as an expert in a
case involving a mentally retarded defendant." Id 7-3.11 commentary at 142. Some

psychiatrists and other physicians will be qualified in the area of mental retardation,
but most will not.
402. Id. 7-3.11 commentary at 143. The commentary states: "Standard 7-3.11 attempts to assure that only those mental health and mental retardation professionals
who are truly qualified to testify as experts are permitted to do so." d. Of course, a
few mental disability professionals will have training and experience that gives them
expertise in both mental illness and mental retardation. These professionals are
uniquely qualified to assist courts in evaluating defendants who may have both disabilities. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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tarded person's status in a criminal case.40 3 Systematic assessment
requires the thoughtful selection and administration of valid examination instruments together with careful observation, interviewing, and analysis of all the data by a professional with proper
training and experience. The test instruments chosen must meet

the minimum criteria for test construction. These include a supportable theoretical base, proper question content, proper item

format, standardized administration, standardized scoring, adequate reliability (dependability), adequate validity (a true mea-

surement of what the test claims to measure), and normative
data.40 4 Few tests in common use can be rated highly in all categories. A determination of how a certain test rates can only be made
after thorough analysis of the accompanying test manual and supporting statistical data as well as independent scholarly research
performed with the test. This is not to suggest that less than scientifically perfect tests can never be used, but only that the substantial number of tests which do not withstand scientific scrutiny
must be used with great care by professionals thoroughly
grounded in evaluation skills. Any test battery must be scrutinized by courts in terms of the above criteria and the skills and
5
40
experience of the examiner.

The legal issues of each case will dictate the relevant tests to be
administered. In all cases where the defendant is suspected of being mentally retarded, an individual intelligence test should be administered in order to formulate an estimate of the defendant's
general intellectual functioning. Even if a defendant has had IQ
tests in the past, a new examination should almost always be con40 6
ducted in order to provide a comparison to the older test results.

This test assures that an examination was conducted in a manner
403. Courts should similarly reject testimony in which no evaluation was per-

formed. In State v. Bennett, 345 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (La. 1977), the court dismissed the
testimony of a psychiatrist and a coroner, each of whom alleged an IQ level for the
defendant without performing an examination. The court stated "The conclusory
reports by Drs. Rees and Anthony that defendant was able to assist counsel were not,
without supporting information which was lacking at the hearing, entitled to reliance
by the court." Id Similarly, in State v. Rogers, 419 So. 2d 840 (La. 1982), a psychiatrist's "intuitive interactions with the patient," absent testing, were rejected as
"clearly insufficient." Id at 844.
404. For example, the name of a test may suggest that it will evaluate one aspect of
intelligence, while in fact scientific data indicate that it evaluates an entirely different
aspect. Similarly, a test may require such subjective judgment on the part of the examiner that adequate reliability between different examiners can never be achieved.
In addition, the test may have been standardized on a population of pre-school children and, therefore, normative data for adults have never been collected. HANDBOOK
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 399, at 19-37.

405. This is an appropriate topic for cross-examination. See 1 J. ZIsIaN, COPING
WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 200-88 (3d ed. 1981) (discussing

the leading psychological tests).
406. Substantial disparities between test scores for the same individual generally
indicate a variety of problems that invalidate the scores. It may mean that a test is
unreliable, that an examiner did not receive adequate professional preparation, that
testing conditions such as physical environment or the rapport with the examinee
were improper, or that test anxiety depressed the score. See A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 23-44 (4th ed. 1976).
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consistent with good professional practice, and also that the witness is testifying based upon his own evaluation rather than one
whose principal virtue may be that it is conveniently on file.
Many cases also will require one or more of the following: personality assessment, adaptive behavior assessment, moral development examination, speech and language evaluation, motoric
functioning evaluation, or academic achievement evaluation - as
well as mental retardation forensic evaluations in the indicated
legal issues. 40 7 A professionally competent assessment should provide the court with an indication of the defendant's general intellectual functioning or IQ. However, careful analysis of the
defendant's performance on an IQ test may provide more specific
information that will be even more valuable to the court. Other
information from different parts of the assessment will often elucidate the defendant's ability to understand concepts, use numbers, remember past events and previously learned information,
put representative items in proper sequential order, solve puzzles,
answer questions, respond speedily, resist coercion, and the like.
These are factors an examiner untrained in mental retardation
will be unable to evaluate without the assistance of an expert professional. This knowledge, therefore, is central to the court's
needs from an expert witness. The evaluation can produce testimony regarding the defendant's abilities and characteristics that
the court can apply to the relevant legal test,408 and about the pos40 9
sibilities for effecting change in the defendant's functioning.
Expert witnesses need some familiarity with relevant legal issues in addition to their professional expertise. 4 10 The Mental
Health Standards recognize the existing limitations in forensic
training for mental health professionals. 4u Such training appears
to be even more rare for mental retardation professionals. Crea407. See id. at 180-81.
408. Note that the expert witness is limited in his or her ability to testify to the
ultimate legal issue in controversy. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-3.9.
409. The next step in the process is designing an individualized habilitation plan
for effecting the desired change (such as attainment of competence to stand trial).
The outlines of such a plan may be presented to the court for approval. See Bennett,
A Guided Tour Through Selected ABA StandardsRelating to Incompetence to Stand
Trial, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 375, 389-92 (1985).
410. Although experts may not be permitted to testify about the ultimate legal
issues, see supra note 408, they will need to understand the legal elements of competence to stand trial or the defense of mental nonresponsibility, for example, in order
to present relevant and coherent information in their testimony.
411. IENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS supra note 4, 7-3.10. In addition to requiring
that the evaluating mental health and mental retardation professional have sufficient
professional education and clinical training, the Mental Health Standardsalso require
"sufficient forensic knowledge, gained through specialized training or an acceptable
substitute therefor, necessary for understanding the relevant legal matter(s) and for
satisfying the specific purpose(s) for which the evaluation is being ordered." Id. 73.10(b).
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tion of such training programs is essential if the courts are to have
access to a sufficient number of competent professional experts in
the field of mental retardation.4
Assuming a witness has the necessary professional expertise as
well as sufficient forensic knowledge, the mental retardation expert might usefully testify to issues such as the defendant's intelligence,4' 3 his ability to understand the components of the Miranda
warning or to waive his constitutional rights,4 14 his general level of
functioning, 415 his academic attainment and potential, 416 and similar aspects of his disability.4' 7
VII.

The Right to a Mental RetardationProfessionalas
an Expert Witness

Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Ake v.
Oklahoma4 8 ruled that "when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to
be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a
State provide access to a psychiatrist's assistance on this issue, if
the defendant cannot otherwise afford one."4' 9
The Court reached this conclusion by applying the four-part
standard now common in procedural due process cases,42 0 factoring the defendant's interest affected, the governmental interest in
avoiding the requested procedures, the probable value of the additional safeguard sought, and the risk of erroneous deprivation if
the safeguard is not provided.4 21 The Court emphasized that the
defendant's interest in the accuracy of the proceeding is "uniquely
compelling. '42 2 The Court went on to discuss the pivotal role of
412. In the absence of such organized training programs, it falls to counsel to be
sure that the expert eyewitness in a particular case has sufficient understanding of
the relevant legal issues.
413. See, e.g., People v. Bruce, 62 A.D. 2d 1073, 403 N.Y.S. 2d 587, 588-89 (1978)
(certified school psychologist testified on IQ testing as well as on defendant's ability to
waive constitutional rights).
414. See, e.g., Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142, 1143-44 (5th Cir. 1972) (defendants'
special education teacher and their rehabilitation specialist testified that neither boy
could understand the Mirandawarning); Hines v. State, 384 So. 2d 1171, 1177 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1980) (special education professor testified that defendant was susceptible
to suggestion and could not understand the abstract concepts of the Miranda
warning).
415. See, e.g., Cooper,455 F.2d at 1143-44.
416. See, e.g., May v. State, 398 So. 2d 1331, 1334 (Miss. 1981) (defendant's special
education teacher testified to defendant's abilities in math, language, and spelling; his
speech pathologist testified on the evaluation she had performed for school
placement).
417. See United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 730 (D. C. Cir. 1976) (Hastie, J.,
concurring) ("It should not be too difficult to find someone skilled in working and
communicating with the mentally retarded who could and would communicate effectively with him, so that his participation in any further proceedings would be knowing
and meaningful.").
418. 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985).
419. Id at 1092.
420. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
421. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1094.
422. Id, at 1094.
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psychiatrists when insanity is raised in a criminal defense, and the
impossibility of maintaining an insanity defense without an appropriate expert witness. Finally, the Court found the state's economic interest in avoiding the cost of an expert to be outweighed
by the importance of the individual's interest.
Applying Ake to the situation of a mentally retarded defendant
asserting the defense of mental nonresponsibility must surely produce a similar result. The four-part test yields a virtually identical
analysis except that when a defendant is mentally retarded, the
necessary expert testimony will be provided by a mental retardation professional whose training and experience conforms to the
requirements specified earlier.4
While Ake dealt only with the insanity defense, the Court's reasoning suggests that a similar conclusion would be reached on
other criminal issues to which expert testimony by a mental disability professional was comparably crucial. The procedural due
process balancing test produces parallel results when applied to a
defendant's request for expert assistance in the context of competence to stand trial or of civil commitment subsequent to acquittal
by reason of mental nonresponsibility. In each instance, due process is denied by requiring a mentally disabled defendant to litigate the issue without the assistance of a competent professional
with relevant training and experience in the appropriate discipline
or disciplines.
The Mental Health Standards provide for the right to an independent expert witness in the context of incompetence to stand
trial,
the defense of mental nonresponsibility,4 commitment
following acquittal,4 6 and sentencing.4 7 The Mental Health Standards thus anticipated Ake, and made similar provisions for other
adjudications to which mental condition or ability are crucial
issues.
VIII. Specialized Training in Mental Retardation
Professionals in the field of mental retardation have long called
423. See supra note 398 and accompanying text; see also Decker, Expert Services in
the Defense of CriminalCases: The Constitutionaland Statutory Rights of indigents,

51 CN. L. REV. 574, 580-99 (1982) (discussing the constitutional right to expert defense
services under the due process clause and the sixth amendment).
424. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-4.8(a)(i).
425. I& 7-3.3(a).

426. 1

7-7.5.

427. Id. 7-9.4. The standards for postconviction commitment and involuntary
transfer from prisons to mental facilities provide for the right to call independent
expert witnesses. See Id 7-9.9(a)(iii), 7-10.5(a)(iii). Although these standards do not
explicitly address the right of indigents to such assistance at state expense, there is
nothing in the text or commentary to suggest that this right was intentionally
omitted.

1985]

for specialized training in mental retardation for all participants
in the criminal justice system. Police officers have often been
identified as primary targets for this training, 428 because their initial contacts with mentally retarded
offenders are crucial to ulti9
mate resolution of the case.4
Part II of the Mental Health Standardsaddresses police and custodial rules.4 30 The frequent failure to identify potential issues of
competence and nonresponsibility prior to trial induced the framers of the Mental Health Standards to require that when police
officers have reason to believe that an individual is mentally
retarded, they should communicate that information to the prosecutor or the court.43 ' The ability of police to detect mental retardation in defendants is limited, however, and thus courts cannot
rely upon this process to identify defendants who may be mentally
retarded.
The Mental Health Standards address specialized training for
law enforcement personnel as well as for individuals who have
custodial responsibilities. 432 It calls for the involvement of mental
health and mental retardation professionals in the design of curriculum and training materials for police officials.
Police often perceive individuals who are mentally ill as a
greater law enforcement problem than persons with mental retardation. As a result, police departments may err in focusing all of
their training upon the characteristics of mentally ill individuals,
and ignoring the fndicia of mental retardation. A police officer
may incorrectly conclude, for example, that an individual has no
special medical needs, when in fact he is a mentally retarded person with very low verbal ability who requires regular doses of an
anti-seizure medication. Or arresting officers may assume that
the individual does not wish to make a phone call, when in fact he
cannot remember his mother's telephone number, cannot read the
433
telephone book, or is simply unable to operate a telephone.
The Mental Health Standards provide that custodial personnel
"should receive training in identifying and responding to the
symptoms and behaviors, including self-injurious behavior, associated with mental illness and mental retardation. Emphasis should
be placed on those symptoms and behaviors that arise or are aggravated by the fact of incarceration, particularly as they relate to
suicide prevention. ' '43 While suicide prevention is a principal concern during incarceration, attention should also be paid to other
428. Norley, The Least RestrictiveAlternative and the PoliceInvestigatory Process,
in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CrIZEN AND THE LAw, supra note 35, at 525, 525-27.

429. Cf L. TEPLIN, MENTAL HEALTH AND CmnHNAL JusTIcE 157 (1984) (discussing
police interrogation with mentally disordered individuals).
430. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-2.1 to -2.9.
431. I 7-2.5(c).
432. Id 7-2.8.
433. See Haggerty, Kane & Udall, An Essay on the Legal Rights of the Mentally Ill
6 FAm. L.Q. 59, 60 (1972).
434. Id 7-2.8(c).
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forms of self-injurious behavior in which some mentally retarded
persons may engage, including self-biting, head-banging, psychogenic vomiting, and the like.4 35 The distress, guilt, shame, or confusion of the arrest may trigger such behaviors and the potential
danger to the mentally retarded person requires that police officers recognize and effectively manage the situation, preferably
with the assistance of competent mental retardation professionals.
Lawyers also need education in the area of mental retardation.
The limited ability of most lawyers to recognize mental retardation in their clients has been well documented.436 The Mental
Health Standards suggest that educational programs and courses
in mental retardation be offered by law schools, bar associations,
4 37
and other judicial organizations.
There is a similarly acute need for mental retardation professionals to become more knowledgeable about, and thus more ef43 8
fective in, the criminal justice system.
Conclusion
Mentally retarded criminal defendants present substantial difficulties for the criminal justice system. 439 These difficulties are exacerbated by misunderstandings about the nature of mental
retardation and confusion about the similarities and differences
between this disability and mental illness. The new Mental
Health Standards fall prey to similar misunderstandings and confusion in a few instances, but generally represent a substantial improvement over current laws and practices. Translating these
proposed improvements into the reality of everyday practice will
greatly improve the quality of justice that these individuals
receive.

435. See AMERICAN ASSOC. ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, LIFE-THREATENING BEHAVIOR: ANALYSIS AND INTERVENTION 3-278 (J. Hollis & C. Meyers eds. AAMD Monograph No. 5 1982).
436. BROWN & COURTLESS, supra note 63, at 1168; see Haggerty, Kane & Udall,

supra note 433, at 59-60 (1972).
437. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7-1.3.
438. See id 7-1.3(d).
439. State v. Bennett, 345 So. 2d 1129, 1136 (La. 1977). The Bennett court observed:
The mentally retarded offender poses unique problems for the criminal
justice system: his reduced understanding challenges traditional notions
of criminal responsibility; his physical presence at trial is offset by an abstraction of mind which may be severe enough to invoke the ban against
trying a defendant in absentia; his need for specialized care and training
argues against his commitment upon conviction to a penal institution illequipped to habilitate him.
Id-
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